Daily Papers

We propose a game-based formulation for learning dimensionality-reducing representations of feature vectors, when only a prior knowledge on future prediction tasks is available. In this game, the first player chooses a representation, and then the second player adversarially chooses a prediction task from a given class, representing the prior knowledge. The first player aims is to minimize, and the second player to maximize, the regret: The minimal prediction loss using the representation, compared to the same loss using the original features. For the canonical setting in which the representation, the response to predict and the predictors are all linear functions, and under the mean squared error loss function, we derive the theoretically optimal representation in pure strategies, which shows the effectiveness of the prior knowledge, and the optimal regret in mixed strategies, which shows the usefulness of randomizing the representation. For general representations and loss functions, we propose an efficient algorithm to optimize a randomized representation. The algorithm only requires the gradients of the loss function, and is based on incrementally adding a representation rule to a mixture of such rules.

We study why Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) makes Large Language Models (LLMs) more capable. While LLMs integrated with tools like Python code interpreters show great promise, a principled theory explaining why this paradigm is effective has been missing. This work provides the first formal proof that TIR fundamentally expands an LLM's capabilities. We demonstrate that tools enable a strict expansion of the model's empirical and feasible support, breaking the capability ceiling of pure-text models by unlocking problem-solving strategies that are otherwise impossible or intractably verbose. To guide model behavior without compromising training stability and performance, we also introduce Advantage Shaping Policy Optimization (ASPO), a novel algorithm that directly modifies the advantage function to guide the policy behavior. We conduct comprehensive experiments on challenging mathematical benchmarks, leveraging a Python interpreter as the external tool. Our results show that the TIR model decisively outperforms its pure-text counterpart on the pass@k metric. Crucially, this advantage is not confined to computationally-intensive problems but extends to those requiring significant abstract insight. We further identify the emergent cognitive patterns that illustrate how models learn to think with tools. Finally, we report improved tool usage behavior with early code invocation and much more interactive turns with ASPO. Overall, our work provides the first principled explanation for TIR's success, shifting the focus from the mere fact that tools work to why and how they enable more powerful reasoning.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

Dialogue agents based on large language models (LLMs) have shown promising performance in proactive dialogue, which requires effective strategy planning. However, existing approaches to strategy planning for proactive dialogue face several limitations: limited strategy coverage, preference bias in planning, and reliance on costly additional training. To address these, we propose PRINCIPLES: a synthetic strategy memory for proactive dialogue agents. PRINCIPLES is derived through offline self-play simulations and serves as reusable knowledge that guides strategy planning during inference, eliminating the need for additional training and data annotation. We evaluate PRINCIPLES in both emotional support and persuasion domains, demonstrating consistent improvements over strong baselines. Furthermore, PRINCIPLES maintains its robustness across extended and more diverse evaluation settings. See our project page at https://huggingface.co/spaces/kimnamssya/Principles.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive action sequence prediction capabilities but often struggle with dynamic, long-horizon tasks such as real-time strategic games. In a game such as StarCraftII (SC2), agents need to manage resource constraints and adapt to evolving battlefield situations in a partially observable environment. This often overwhelms exisiting LLM-based approaches. To address these challenges, we propose a hierarchical multi-agent framework that employs specialized imitation learning agents under a meta-controller called Strategic Planner (SP). By expert demonstrations, each specialized agent learns a distinctive strategy, such as aerial support or defensive maneuvers, and produces coherent, structured multistep action sequences. The SP then orchestrates these proposals into a single, environmentally adaptive plan that ensures local decisions aligning with long-term strategies. We call this HIMA (Hierarchical Imitation Multi-Agent). We also present TEXTSCII-ALL, a comprehensive SC2 testbed that encompasses all race match combinations in SC2. Our empirical results show that HIMA outperforms state of the arts in strategic clarity, adaptability, and computational efficiency, underscoring the potential of combining specialized imitation modules with meta-level orchestration to develop more robust, general-purpose AI agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in well-defined problems with clear solutions, such as mathematics and coding. However, they still struggle with complex real-world scenarios like business negotiations, which require strategic reasoning-an ability to navigate dynamic environments and align long-term goals amidst uncertainty. Existing methods for strategic reasoning face challenges in adaptability, scalability, and transferring strategies to new contexts. To address these issues, we propose explicit policy optimization (EPO) for strategic reasoning, featuring an LLM that provides strategies in open-ended action space and can be plugged into arbitrary LLM agents to motivate goal-directed behavior. To improve adaptability and policy transferability, we train the strategic reasoning model via multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) using process rewards and iterative self-play, without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) as a preliminary step. Experiments across social and physical domains demonstrate EPO's ability of long-term goal alignment through enhanced strategic reasoning, achieving state-of-the-art performance on social dialogue and web navigation tasks. Our findings reveal various collaborative reasoning mechanisms emergent in EPO and its effectiveness in generating novel strategies, underscoring its potential for strategic reasoning in real-world applications.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Understanding a student's problem-solving strategy can have a significant impact on effective math learning using Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITSs) and Adaptive Instructional Systems (AISs). For instance, the ITS/AIS can better personalize itself to correct specific misconceptions that are indicated by incorrect strategies, specific problems can be designed to improve strategies and frustration can be minimized by adapting to a student's natural way of thinking rather than trying to fit a standard strategy for all. While it may be possible for human experts to identify strategies manually in classroom settings with sufficient student interaction, it is not possible to scale this up to big data. Therefore, we leverage advances in Machine Learning and AI methods to perform scalable strategy prediction that is also fair to students at all skill levels. Specifically, we develop an embedding called MVec where we learn a representation based on the mastery of students. We then cluster these embeddings with a non-parametric clustering method where we progressively learn clusters such that we group together instances that have approximately symmetrical strategies. The strategy prediction model is trained on instances sampled from these clusters. This ensures that we train the model over diverse strategies and also that strategies from a particular group do not bias the DNN model, thus allowing it to optimize its parameters over all groups. Using real world large-scale student interaction datasets from MATHia, we implement our approach using transformers and Node2Vec for learning the mastery embeddings and LSTMs for predicting strategies. We show that our approach can scale up to achieve high accuracy by training on a small sample of a large dataset and also has predictive equality, i.e., it can predict strategies equally well for learners at diverse skill levels.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

A key aspect of temporal domains is the ability to make predictions multiple time steps into the future, a process known as multi-step forecasting (MSF). At the core of this process is selecting a forecasting strategy, however, with no existing frameworks to map out the space of strategies, practitioners are left with ad-hoc methods for strategy selection. In this work, we propose Stratify, a parameterised framework that addresses multi-step forecasting, unifying existing strategies and introducing novel, improved strategies. We evaluate Stratify on 18 benchmark datasets, five function classes, and short to long forecast horizons (10, 20, 40, 80). In over 84% of 1080 experiments, novel strategies in Stratify improved performance compared to all existing ones. Importantly, we find that no single strategy consistently outperforms others in all task settings, highlighting the need for practitioners explore the Stratify space to carefully search and select forecasting strategies based on task-specific requirements. Our results are the most comprehensive benchmarking of known and novel forecasting strategies. We make code available to reproduce our results.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Tasks requiring deductive reasoning, especially those involving multiple steps, often demand adaptive strategies such as intermediate generation of rationales or programs, as no single approach is universally optimal. While Language Models (LMs) can enhance their outputs through iterative self-refinement and strategy adjustments, they frequently fail to apply the most effective strategy in their first attempt. This inefficiency raises the question: Can LMs learn to select the optimal strategy in the first attempt, without a need for refinement? To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks), a novel framework that enables LMs to autonomously learn and select the most effective strategies for various reasoning tasks. We model the strategy selection process as a Markov Decision Process and leverage reinforcement learning-driven continuous self-improvement to allow the model to find the suitable strategy to solve a given task. Unlike traditional self-refinement methods that rely on multiple inference passes or external feedback, SMART allows an LM to internalize the outcomes of its own reasoning processes and adjust its strategy accordingly, aiming for correct solutions on the first attempt. Our experiments across various reasoning datasets and with different model architectures demonstrate that SMART significantly enhances the ability of models to choose optimal strategies without external guidance (+15 points on the GSM8K dataset). By achieving higher accuracy with a single inference pass, SMART not only improves performance but also reduces computational costs for refinement-based strategies, paving the way for more efficient and intelligent reasoning in LMs.

In this work, we introduce a novel approach that equips LLM agents with introspection, enhancing consistency and adaptability in solving complex tasks. Our approach prompts LLM agents to decompose a given task into manageable subtasks (i.e., to make a plan), and to continuously introspect upon the suitability and results of their actions. We implement a three-fold introspective intervention: 1) anticipatory reflection on potential failures and alternative remedy before action execution, 2) post-action alignment with subtask objectives and backtracking with remedy to ensure utmost effort in plan execution, and 3) comprehensive review upon plan completion for future strategy refinement. By deploying and experimenting with this methodology - a zero-shot approach - within WebArena for practical tasks in web environments, our agent demonstrates superior performance over existing zero-shot methods. The experimental results suggest that our introspection-driven approach not only enhances the agent's ability to navigate unanticipated challenges through a robust mechanism of plan execution, but also improves efficiency by reducing the number of trials and plan revisions needed to achieve a task.

The effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) is heavily influenced by the reasoning strategies, or styles of thought, employed in their prompts. However, the interplay between these reasoning styles, model architecture, and task type remains poorly understood. To address this, we introduce StyleBench, a comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating reasoning styles across diverse tasks and models. We assess five representative reasoning styles, including Chain of Thought (CoT), Tree of Thought (ToT), Algorithm of Thought (AoT), Sketch of Thought (SoT), and Chain-of-Draft (CoD) on five reasoning tasks, using 15 open-source models from major families (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, Gemma, GPT-OSS, Phi, and DeepSeek) ranging from 270M to 120B parameters. Our large-scale analysis reveals that no single style is universally optimal. We demonstrate that strategy efficacy is highly contingent on both model scale and task type: search-based methods (AoT, ToT) excel in open-ended problems but require large-scale models, while concise styles (SoT, CoD) achieve radical efficiency gains on well-defined tasks. Furthermore, we identify key behavioral patterns: smaller models frequently fail to follow output instructions and default to guessing, while reasoning robustness emerges as a function of scale. Our findings offer a crucial roadmap for selecting optimal reasoning strategies based on specific constraints, we open source the benchmark in https://github.com/JamesJunyuGuo/Style_Bench.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown strong reasoning capabilities. However, a critical question remains: do these models possess genuine reasoning skills particularly complex strategic reasoning or are they primarily excelling at sophisticated pattern recognition within their training data? To address this question, this paper presents a chess testbed, ChessArena, to evaluate the strategic reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Chess requires complex strategic reasoning capabilities including long-term planning, strict rule comprehension, and multi-turn conversation memorization. Specifically, ChessArena is a competitive framework where LLMs play against each other, under four different play modes. The testbed is equipped with a ranking algorithm and a leaderboard. The testbed can also evaluate fine-grained capabilities including basic understanding, move selection, and puzzle solving. Over 13 LLMs with different modes are evaluated in ChessArena, playing over 800 games. The results reveal significant shortcomings in current LLMs: no model can beat Maia-1100 (a chess engine at human amateur level), while some even failed to defeat a random player that selects moves arbitrarily. We also present a strong baseline to the testbed: our fine-tuned Qwen3-8B substantially improved performance, approaching much larger state-of-the-art reasoning models.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened new opportunities in recommender systems by enabling zero-shot recommendation without conventional training. Despite their potential, most existing works rely solely on users' purchase histories, leaving significant room for improvement by incorporating user-generated textual data, such as reviews and product descriptions. Addressing this gap, we propose PURE, a novel LLM-based recommendation framework that builds and maintains evolving user profiles by systematically extracting and summarizing key information from user reviews. PURE consists of three core components: a Review Extractor for identifying user preferences and key product features, a Profile Updater for refining and updating user profiles, and a Recommender for generating personalized recommendations using the most current profile. To evaluate PURE, we introduce a continuous sequential recommendation task that reflects real-world scenarios by adding reviews over time and updating predictions incrementally. Our experimental results on Amazon datasets demonstrate that PURE outperforms existing LLM-based methods, effectively leveraging long-term user information while managing token limitations.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

We introduce a real-time strategy game environment based on Generals.io, a game with thousands of weekly active players. Our environment is fully compatible with Gymnasium and PettingZoo and is capable of running thousands of frames per second on commodity hardware. We also present a reference agent, trained with supervised pre-training and self-play, which reached the top 0.003% of the 1v1 human leaderboard after only 36 hours on a single H100 GPU. To accelerate learning, we incorporate potential-based reward shaping and memory features. Our contributions of a modular RTS benchmark and a competitive baseline agent provide an accessible yet challenging platform for advancing multi-agent reinforcement learning research. The documented code, together with examples and tutorials, is available at https://github.com/strakam/generals-bots.

Most existing chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting methods suffer from the issues of generalizability and consistency, as they often rely on instance-specific solutions that may not be applicable to other cases and lack task-level consistency in their reasoning steps. To address these limitations, we propose a comprehensive framework, StrategyLLM, harnessing the capabilities of LLMs to construct generalizable and consistent few-shot prompts for various tasks automatically. To this end, StrategyLLM employs four LLM-based agents: strategy generator, executor, optimizer, and evaluator, working together to generate, evaluate, and select promising strategies for a given task. The experimental results demonstrate that StrategyLLM outperforms the competitive baseline CoT-SC that requires human-annotated solutions on 13 datasets across 4 challenging tasks without human involvement, including math reasoning (34.21% rightarrow 38.79%), commonsense reasoning (70.3% rightarrow 72.5%), algorithmic reasoning (51.7% rightarrow 62.0%), and symbolic reasoning (30.0% rightarrow 79.2%).

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

Game playing has long served as a fundamental benchmark for evaluating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in general reasoning, their effectiveness in spatial strategic reasoning, which is critical for complex and fully observable board games, remains insufficiently explored. In this work, we adopt Chinese Chess (Xiangqi) as a challenging and rich testbed due to its intricate rules and spatial complexity. To advance LLMs' strategic competence in such environments, we propose a training framework tailored to Xiangqi, built upon a large-scale dataset of five million board-move pairs enhanced with expert annotations and engine evaluations. Building on this foundation, we introduce Xiangqi-R1, a 7B-parameter model trained in multi-stage manner: (1) fine-tuning for legal move prediction to capture basic spatial rules, (2) incorporating strategic annotations to improve decision-making, and (3) applying reinforcement learning via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with multi-dimensional reward signals to enhance reasoning stability. Our Experimental results indicate that, despite their size and power, general-purpose LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance in these tasks. Compared to general-purpose LLMs, Xiangqi-R1 greatly advances with an 18% rise in move legality and a 22% boost in analysis accuracy. Our results point to a promising path for creating general strategic intelligence in spatially complex areas.

Trading is a highly competitive task that requires a combination of strategy, knowledge, and psychological fortitude. With the recent success of large language models(LLMs), it is appealing to apply the emerging intelligence of LLM agents in this competitive arena and understanding if they can outperform professional traders. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of the current research on using LLMs as agents in financial trading. We summarize the common architecture used in the agent, the data inputs, and the performance of LLM trading agents in backtesting as well as the challenges presented in these research. This survey aims to provide insights into the current state of LLM-based financial trading agents and outline future research directions in this field.