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Nov 13

MoGU: A Framework for Enhancing Safety of Open-Sourced LLMs While Preserving Their Usability

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

  • 9 authors
·
May 23, 2024

LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 15

I'm Afraid I Can't Do That: Predicting Prompt Refusal in Black-Box Generative Language Models

Since the release of OpenAI's ChatGPT, generative language models have attracted extensive public attention. The increased usage has highlighted generative models' broad utility, but also revealed several forms of embedded bias. Some is induced by the pre-training corpus; but additional bias specific to generative models arises from the use of subjective fine-tuning to avoid generating harmful content. Fine-tuning bias may come from individual engineers and company policies, and affects which prompts the model chooses to refuse. In this experiment, we characterize ChatGPT's refusal behavior using a black-box attack. We first query ChatGPT with a variety of offensive and benign prompts (n=1,706), then manually label each response as compliance or refusal. Manual examination of responses reveals that refusal is not cleanly binary, and lies on a continuum; as such, we map several different kinds of responses to a binary of compliance or refusal. The small manually-labeled dataset is used to train a refusal classifier, which achieves an accuracy of 96%. Second, we use this refusal classifier to bootstrap a larger (n=10,000) dataset adapted from the Quora Insincere Questions dataset. With this machine-labeled data, we train a prompt classifier to predict whether ChatGPT will refuse a given question, without seeing ChatGPT's response. This prompt classifier achieves 76% accuracy on a test set of manually labeled questions (n=985). We examine our classifiers and the prompt n-grams that are most predictive of either compliance or refusal. Our datasets and code are available at https://github.com/maxwellreuter/chatgpt-refusals.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 6, 2023

Temporal Self-Rewarding Language Models: Decoupling Chosen-Rejected via Past-Future

Self-Rewarding Language Models propose an architecture in which the Large Language Models(LLMs) both generates responses and evaluates its own outputs via LLM-as-a-Judge prompting, dynamically improving its generative capabilities through iterative Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). However, our analysis reveals a critical limitation in existing Self-Rewarding paradigms: the synchronized improvement of chosen and rejected responses progressively narrows the representational difference between contrasting samples, undermining effective preference learning. We propose Temporal Self-Rewarding Language Models that strategically coordinate past, present, and future model generations to sustain learning signals. Our dual-phase framework introduces: (1) Anchored Rejection - fixing rejected responses using the past initial model's outputs and (2) Future-Guided Chosen - dynamically curating chosen samples using next-generation model predictions. Extensive experiments across three model families (Llama, Qwen, Mistral) and different model sizes (Llama3B/8B/70B) demonstrate significant improvements when trained with our method compared to Self-Rewarding using same computation resources. For example, Llama3.1-8B reaches a 29.44 win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 with our method, outperforming the Self-Rewarding baseline (19.69) by 9.75. Notably, our method also demonstrates superior out-of-distribution generalization across mathematical reasoning (GSM8K), knowledge-based QA (ARC, TruthfulQA), and code generation (HumanEval) tasks, even though we do not specifically collect such training data.

Is Your Automated Software Engineer Trustworthy?

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 21

Accelerating LLM Reasoning via Early Rejection with Partial Reward Modeling

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly relied upon for solving complex reasoning tasks in domains such as mathematics, logic, and multi-step question answering. A growing line of work seeks to improve reasoning quality by scaling inference time compute particularly through Process Reward Models (PRMs), used to reward the reasoning at intermediate steps. While effective, these methods introduce substantial computational overhead, especially when generating large numbers of solutions in parallel. In this paper, we investigate whether PRMs can be used mid-generation to provide early signals that enable the rejection of suboptimal candidates before full generation of step is complete. We introduce the hypothesis that PRMs are also Partial Reward Models, meaning that the scores they assign to partially completed reasoning step are predictive of final output quality. This allows for principled early rejection based on intermediate token-level signals. We support this hypothesis both theoretically, by proving that the risk of discarding optimal beams decreases exponentially with generation length and empirically, by demonstrating a strong correlation between partial and final rewards across multiple reward models. On math reasoning benchmarks, our method achieves up to 1.4times-9times reduction in inference FLOPs without degrading final performance. These results suggest that early rejection is a powerful mechanism for improving the compute-efficiency of reasoning in LLMs.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 3

Refusal Falls off a Cliff: How Safety Alignment Fails in Reasoning?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Poison Once, Refuse Forever: Weaponizing Alignment for Injecting Bias in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 27

Refusal Tokens: A Simple Way to Calibrate Refusals in Large Language Models

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

  • 9 authors
·
Dec 9, 2024

EVOREFUSE: Evolutionary Prompt Optimization for Evaluation and Mitigation of LLM Over-Refusal to Pseudo-Malicious Instructions

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

  • 9 authors
·
May 29 2

Beyond the Surface: Probing the Ideological Depth of Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated pronounced ideological leanings, yet the stability and depth of these positions remain poorly understood. Surface-level responses can often be manipulated through simple prompt engineering, calling into question whether they reflect a coherent underlying ideology. This paper investigates the concept of "ideological depth" in LLMs, defined as the robustness and complexity of their internal political representations. We employ a dual approach: first, we measure the "steerability" of two well-known open-source LLMs using instruction prompting and activation steering. We find that while some models can easily switch between liberal and conservative viewpoints, others exhibit resistance or an increased rate of refusal, suggesting a more entrenched ideological structure. Second, we probe the internal mechanisms of these models using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs). Preliminary analysis reveals that models with lower steerability possess more distinct and abstract ideological features. Our evaluations reveal that one model can contain 7.3x more political features than another model of similar size. This allows targeted ablation of a core political feature in an ideologically "deep" model, leading to consistent, logical shifts in its reasoning across related topics, whereas the same intervention in a "shallow" model results in an increase in refusal outputs. Our findings suggest that ideological depth is a quantifiable property of LLMs and that steerability serves as a valuable window into their latent political architecture.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 29

Any Large Language Model Can Be a Reliable Judge: Debiasing with a Reasoning-based Bias Detector

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising tool for automatically evaluating generated outputs, but its reliability is often undermined by potential biases in judgment. Existing efforts to mitigate these biases face key limitations: in-context learning-based methods fail to address rooted biases due to the evaluator's limited capacity for self-reflection, whereas fine-tuning is not applicable to all evaluator types, especially closed-source models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Reasoning-based Bias Detector (RBD), which is a plug-in module that identifies biased evaluations and generates structured reasoning to guide evaluator self-correction. Rather than modifying the evaluator itself, RBD operates externally and engages in an iterative process of bias detection and feedback-driven revision. To support its development, we design a complete pipeline consisting of biased dataset construction, supervision collection, distilled reasoning-based fine-tuning of RBD, and integration with LLM evaluators. We fine-tune four sizes of RBD models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B, and observe consistent performance improvements across all scales. Experimental results on 4 bias types--verbosity, position, bandwagon, and sentiment--evaluated using 8 LLM evaluators demonstrate RBD's strong effectiveness. For example, the RBD-8B model improves evaluation accuracy by an average of 18.5% and consistency by 10.9%, and surpasses prompting-based baselines and fine-tuned judges by 12.8% and 17.2%, respectively. These results highlight RBD's effectiveness and scalability. Additional experiments further demonstrate its strong generalization across biases and domains, as well as its efficiency.

  • 7 authors
·
May 21