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Nov 17

Behind the Veil: Enhanced Indoor 3D Scene Reconstruction with Occluded Surfaces Completion

In this paper, we present a novel indoor 3D reconstruction method with occluded surface completion, given a sequence of depth readings. Prior state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods only focus on the reconstruction of the visible areas in a scene, neglecting the invisible areas due to the occlusions, e.g., the contact surface between furniture, occluded wall and floor. Our method tackles the task of completing the occluded scene surfaces, resulting in a complete 3D scene mesh. The core idea of our method is learning 3D geometry prior from various complete scenes to infer the occluded geometry of an unseen scene from solely depth measurements. We design a coarse-fine hierarchical octree representation coupled with a dual-decoder architecture, i.e., Geo-decoder and 3D Inpainter, which jointly reconstructs the complete 3D scene geometry. The Geo-decoder with detailed representation at fine levels is optimized online for each scene to reconstruct visible surfaces. The 3D Inpainter with abstract representation at coarse levels is trained offline using various scenes to complete occluded surfaces. As a result, while the Geo-decoder is specialized for an individual scene, the 3D Inpainter can be generally applied across different scenes. We evaluate the proposed method on the 3D Completed Room Scene (3D-CRS) and iTHOR datasets, significantly outperforming the SOTA methods by a gain of 16.8% and 24.2% in terms of the completeness of 3D reconstruction. 3D-CRS dataset including a complete 3D mesh of each scene is provided at project webpage.

  • 7 authors
·
Apr 3, 2024

Decoding Latent Attack Surfaces in LLMs: Prompt Injection via HTML in Web Summarization

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 6