category int64 1 70 | source_thread_id int64 8 26k | thread_id int64 8 26k | thread_title stringlengths 12 234 | thread_slug stringlengths 5 229 | post_id int64 11 63.6k | post_number int64 1 44 | user_id int64 -1 14.8k | username stringlengths 3 20 | name stringlengths 1 111 ⌀ | created_at stringdate 2018-02-16 08:44:58 2025-10-31 00:04:30 | updated_at stringdate 2018-02-17 03:42:31 2025-10-31 00:41:55 | cooked stringlengths 23 39.2k ⌀ | reply_to_post_number float64 1 41 ⌀ | reply_count int64 0 14 | quote_count int64 0 7 | reads int64 1 1.24k | score float64 0.2 446k | trust_level int64 0 4 | moderator bool 2 classes | admin bool 2 classes | staff bool 2 classes | like_count int64 0 68 | hidden bool 1 class | deleted_at float64 | post_url stringlengths 15 239 |
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61 | 2,701 | 2,701 | Council of Paris - Token Ring | council-of-paris-token-ring | 8,376 | 2 | 1,409 | julienbrodier | Julien Brodier | 2019-02-21T13:30:57.440Z | 2019-02-21T13:31:21.626Z | <p>Hi Adam,<br>
The link seems to be protected.<br>
Can you please have a look to the permissions ?<br>
Thanks !<br>
J.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 12 | 12.4 | 0 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/council-of-paris-token-ring/2701/2 |
61 | 2,701 | 2,701 | Council of Paris - Token Ring | council-of-paris-token-ring | 8,381 | 3 | 767 | AdamDossa | Adam Dossa | 2019-02-21T14:01:50.767Z | 2019-02-21T14:01:50.767Z | <p>Yep - this seems to be the case. It is being discussed at:</p><aside class="quote" data-post="1" data-topic="2707">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/adamdossa/48/817_2.png" class="avatar">
<a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/hackmd-document-is-now-protected/2707">HackMD document is now protected?</a> <a class="badge-category__wrapper " href="/c/happenings/7"><span data-category-id="7" style="--category-badge-color: #231F20; --category-badge-text-color: #FFFFFF;" data-drop-close="true" class="badge-category "><span class="badge-category__name">Happenings</span></span></a>
</div>
<blockquote>
The previous link:
<a href="https://hackmd.io/DaJhrasLQteUk3IwX5bQAg" class="onebox" target="_blank" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">https://hackmd.io/DaJhrasLQteUk3IwX5bQAg</a>
gives me a 403 error.
Anyone know what’s up with this?
Thanks,
Adam
</blockquote>
</aside>
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 12 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/council-of-paris-token-ring/2701/3 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 564 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-04-25T17:25:04.675Z | 2018-04-25T20:51:47.284Z | <p>Let’s assume that there is an expected fork because social consensus on a proposal was not reached, and that for various reasons it is likely that both forks will persist and have a similar number of active users and developers.</p>
<p>Would this definitely create permanent, separate universes as happened with Ethereum Classic? What are the ways to mitigate the impact of a major fork event and maintain our ecosystem encompassing multiple Ethereum-compatible networks?</p>
<p>One irony is that Polkadot might be an important part of such an ecosystem.</p>
<p>Consider the various areas of impact:</p>
<ul>
<li>technical governance, protocol development, dapp development</li>
<li>nodes, infrastructure</li>
<li>usability, for firms and for individuals</li>
<li>identity, e.g. for what is considered the primary network we currently use “ETH”, “ether”, “ethereum network”, “ethereum mainnet”</li>
<li>contract inter-op</li>
<li>firms, multi-sigs, governance contracts, individual accounts, keys</li>
<li>transaction history</li>
</ul>
<p>Or is this just too big to even put our head around?</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 48 | 179.6 | 2 | true | true | true | 4 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/1 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 566 | 2 | 14 | lrettig | Lane Rettig | 2018-04-25T21:12:52.660Z | 2018-04-25T21:12:52.660Z | <p>Thanks for bringing this up. I think this is a really interesting, important question. To me it’s pretty clear that the future is not a “one chain to rule them all” future but rather a future of many chains serving many purposes, transacting and communicating with each other. I don’t have answers to your questions but I think it’s a worthwhile area of inquiry.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 46 | 14.2 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/2 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 569 | 3 | 3 | MicahZoltu | Micah Zoltu | 2018-04-26T02:31:17.648Z | 2018-04-26T02:31:17.648Z | <p>I think the first hurdle we need to get past is how do we allow for each branch of a fork to have a reasonable chance at success? Right now, since exchanges are the dominant “use-case” for most blockchain projects whoever gets the ticker symbol has a <em>huge</em> leg up on the other branches.</p>
<p>Hopefully, we’ll eventually see popular apps and payment processors dominating the space, in which case <em>they</em> will likely be a major driver of which chain gets preference, rather than exchanges via ticker symbols.</p>
<p>In a perfect world we could have contentious forks just result in a community split where both communities are happy to plod along separately with slightly different rules but there is no animosity and no preference given for one or the other. I wish we lived in such a magical place…</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 41 | 28.2 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/3 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 570 | 4 | 69 | fubuloubu | null | 2018-04-26T02:48:02.618Z | 2018-04-26T02:48:02.618Z | <p>This is why ether needs to be used less as a store of value. Used just as a method to pay for gas, allotments of ether would be spread around a lot more and lost/stolen ether would get less painful. The great thing about tokens is that if a poor decision was made with them, someone could just make another smart contract and fork the userbase without forking the network. This is probably wishful thinking however.</p>
<p>Another interesting thought is how the plasma paradigm could play into this. Could you link those networks together and sibling plasma chains somehow?</p>
<p>I did just come back from a pub night, so this could be affecting my thoughts some <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/slight_smile.png?v=9" title=":slight_smile:" class="emoji" alt=":slight_smile:"></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 39 | 57.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 3 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/4 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 700 | 5 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-05-04T05:47:20.398Z | 2018-05-04T05:47:20.398Z | <p>This is to link to <a class="mention" href="/u/danfinlay">@danfinlay</a>’s “Strange Loop” proposal for users to signal and (potentially) coalesce around Ethereum-based networks that suit them.</p>
<aside class="quote quote-modified" data-post="1" data-topic="268">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/danfinlay/48/4187_2.png" class="avatar">
<a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/strange-loop-an-ethereum-governance-framework-proposal/268">Strange Loop: An Ethereum Governance Framework Proposal</a> <a class="badge-category__wrapper " href="/c/process-improvement/6"><span data-category-id="6" style="--category-badge-color: #0E76BD; --category-badge-text-color: #FFFFFF;" data-drop-close="true" class="badge-category " title="Discussions about general governance within the Ethereum community, and about specific forms of governance such as the EIP workflow and Ethereum hard forks."><span class="badge-category__name">Process Improvement</span></span></a>
</div>
<blockquote>
Repasting from the possibly more dynamic github here: <a href="https://github.com/danfinlay/ethereum-strange-loop" rel="nofollow noopener">https://github.com/danfinlay/ethereum-strange-loop</a>
Ethereum Strangeloop Proposal
Motivations
Hard forking allows protocol evolution, and other potentially valuable community services (cough, funds recovery), but contentious forks today can divide network value and create excessive overhead for that blockchain’s community.
Currently, one stance that is popularly presented is “no forks” as the simplest solution to keeping one chain, but if fo…
</blockquote>
</aside>
| null | 0 | 0 | 31 | 131.2 | 2 | true | true | true | 4 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/5 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 1,177 | 6 | 34 | fulldecent | William Entriken | 2018-05-20T20:03:26.712Z | 2018-05-20T20:03:26.712Z | <p>There is no solution.</p>
<p>The solution is to not make contentious forks. I am working with traditional entities like governments and industry to adopt Ethereum. Traditional entities usually only consider hyper ledger. If we want to avoid the threat of extinction then we need to act like a failed fork is a risk of extinction.</p>
<p>Here are some initiatives I support, which are related to this discussion:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Repeal and replace <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-155.md" rel="nofollow noopener">https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-155.md</a></p>
<p>What happens when an Ethereum-foundation-supported fork fails? We will have the old version and the new version with the same ID. This is an existential threat. At present, every time there is a contentious fork we need to change the rules. Last time, Ethereum Classic started and we created EIP-155. Next time there is a fork they will both use the same chain ID, again, and we’ll need to scramble to fix it. Nobody is going to fork Ethereum and choose a new chain ID, everybody wants /their/ fork to be canonical. SOLUTION: do not use chain IDs, use genesis block IDs and make a new genesis block on each fork. I can write this up into a formal specification.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Immutability Enforcement Proposal, stop dicking around and accept it as draft, then debate it on merit. I’m working with banks and government to record official records on blockchain. Remember that in most of the world Ether is an asset not a currency. The United States Food and Drug Administration does not care if you lost EVM-gas-utility-tokens (i.e. Ether) on a Parity wallet. The US FDA cares that records recorded on the blockchain will stay there.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Encourage alternate EVM implementations and improve the Yellow Paper so that it is actually implementable.</p>
</li>
</ul> | null | 2 | 0 | 23 | 39.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/6 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 1,271 | 7 | 2 | phiferd | null | 2018-05-23T06:57:02.639Z | 2018-05-23T06:57:02.639Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="fulldecent" data-post="6" data-topic="236">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/fulldecent/48/8663_2.png" class="avatar"> fulldecent:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>The solution is to not make contentious forks</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>First, anyone can fork at any time. Users, miners, and developers can choose to follow them, or not. The people that decided not to follow the fork don’t get to choose for the people that do and vice versa. Saying that we shouldn’t allow contentious forks overestimates the control that “we” have and is a bit like saying the US could avoid contentious elections by just getting everyone to agree that we should all just be Democrats. Problem solved.</p>
<p>Second, is the issue with contentious forks or forks that make irregular state changes? Although these two sets certainly intersect, they are not the same. What if (by whatever measure is accepted) a fork with the irregular state change is deemed to be uncontentious?</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="fulldecent" data-post="6" data-topic="236">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/fulldecent/48/8663_2.png" class="avatar"> fulldecent:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>The United States Food and Drug Administration does not care if you lost EVM-gas-utility-tokens (i.e. Ether) on a Parity wallet</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>No, they don’t, I’m sure. <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/slight_smile.png?v=12" title=":slight_smile:" class="emoji" alt=":slight_smile:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"> However, what if they’re affected? Are you still confident they won’t care?</p>
<p>I think it’s critical for everyone to understand the costs of a <em>split chain</em>, but I don’t see how rejecting all irregular states changes necessarily follows from that observation. What if a particular irregular state change would prevent a split chain?</p> | 6 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 13.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/7 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 1,365 | 8 | 34 | fulldecent | William Entriken | 2018-05-29T23:36:27.754Z | 2018-05-29T23:36:27.754Z | <ul>
<li>Hiding ulterior motives and pretending that there is technical problem with the Immutability Enforcement Proposal</li>
<li>Not doing what you are supposed to do because of personal reasons, and then NOT resigning honorably like <a class="mention" href="/u/pirapira">@pirapira</a> did</li>
</ul>
<p>Personally, I am offended by the above two items. If you are instead offended by the words I’m using then sorry my word choice has been suboptimal.</p> | 6 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 7.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/8 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 1,367 | 9 | 34 | fulldecent | William Entriken | 2018-05-29T23:43:35.867Z | 2018-05-29T23:49:52.862Z | <p>ALL contentious forks have a serious cost, I’m not just focused on irregular state changes.</p>
<p>The US FDA will not have funds in a Parity wallet. But imagine if the FDA were to regulate that certain information about drugs should be “on the main net Ethereum blockchain” (a gross oversimplification). In this case, the FDA would need to maintain an up-to-date opinion on which fork was canonical. Every time we propose a hard fork there is a risk that FDA or some other entity does not recognize the new version.</p>
<p><strike>We (each community member, not just Magicians) should not…</strike> --> We should support hard forks only if there is a SERIOUS benefit. And if there is any chance it is contentious then SERIOUS should be >> $2B USD.</p>
<hr>
<p>On the other hard, the FBI might have funds in a Parity wallet. And the FBI can detain people if the community enacts a change which discriminately takes money which is in the custody of the FBI. Very unlikely scenario here.</p> | 7 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 12.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/9 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 1,369 | 10 | 2 | phiferd | null | 2018-05-30T00:53:50.840Z | 2018-05-30T00:53:50.840Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="fulldecent" data-post="9" data-topic="236">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/fulldecent/48/8663_2.png" class="avatar"> fulldecent:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>The US FDA will not have funds in a Parity wallet</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Not sure what you mean here – obviously, the Parity multisigs are not the only way things can go wrong with an application/data on the Ethereum blockchain.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="fulldecent" data-post="9" data-topic="236">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/fulldecent/48/8663_2.png" class="avatar"> fulldecent:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>But imagine if the FDA were to regulate that certain information about drugs should be “on the main net Ethereum blockchain”</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>If that information is authoritative and referenced many other applications, yes – a contentious hard fork will be problematic. However, it’s not hard to see that an issue with that information (e.g. incorrect information) that, for technical reasons, cannot be amended could be a major issue for the FDA.</p>
<p>My point is only that saying “we shouldn’t pursue contentious hard forks because the FDA wouldn’t want us to” makes the assumption that there is no scenario in which they wouldn’t be the ones <em>pushing</em> for a contentious hardfork. Why is that necessarily true?</p>
<p>In fact, <strong>the more critical the data is that they are storing on the blockchain, the more likely they (or anyone) will be to push for a hardfork</strong> in the event that some issue arises that cannot be resolved in any other way.</p>
<p>Also, note that the type of problem we’re talking about here can’t be solved just by having insurance.</p> | null | 1 | 1 | 13 | 12.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/10 |
61 | 236 | 236 | Can we make forks less dire? | can-we-make-forks-less-dire | 1,430 | 11 | 34 | fulldecent | William Entriken | 2018-06-03T23:33:49.248Z | 2018-06-03T23:33:49.248Z | <p>Here is the only important point I have, restated.</p>
<ul>
<li>Any change to the Ethereum client which is incompatible with the current software is a hard fork.</li>
<li>Hard forks cost up to $2B if a bunch of people dislike the new feature.</li>
<li>So the feature better be worth a lot more than $2B.</li>
</ul> | 10 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 7.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/can-we-make-forks-less-dire/236/11 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,373 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-03-21T19:04:43.840Z | 2019-03-21T19:22:30.053Z | <p>Post ideas about a reasonably fair algorithm to identify contributors and measure current contribution to Ethereum-related work of all kinds.</p>
<p>This algorithm could be run in an oracle and used to allocate community contribution rewards. It would be able to access data from the web or Ethereum mainnet, and track contributors and types of work.</p>
<p><em><strong>Please don’t argue about which is good or bad, just reply with ideas.</strong></em> I will collect related ideas together for focused evaluation.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 24 | 74.8 | 2 | true | true | true | 2 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/1 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,374 | 2 | 14 | lrettig | Lane Rettig | 2019-03-21T20:21:07.160Z | 2019-03-21T20:21:07.160Z | <p>Spitballing/brainstorming:</p>
<ul>
<li>GitHub comments/reviews/merges/commits/etc.</li>
<li>“Likes” on this forum, ethresear.ch, etc.</li>
<li>Physical attendance at events</li>
<li>“Reputation” score of some kind, but this is very hard to measure</li>
</ul> | null | 1 | 0 | 22 | 74.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/2 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,377 | 3 | 658 | alberreman | Alberreman | 2019-03-21T20:28:45.898Z | 2019-03-21T20:28:45.898Z | <p>I mean, I just posted on the ol’ Twitter machine, but I’ll post here too, 'cos why not?<br>
For reputation you could do some kind of Colony-like peer-assigned and review task-based system. The benefit would be accounting of non code-related tasks. It isnt sybil resistant, but you could potentially mitigate attacks/noise if there were recognized stakeholder groups that managed and reported contributions within their groups, and were then probably audited by other peer stakeholder groups. ex: magicians, cat herders, EF, Parity, Geth, maybe a union of open source contributors, etc.</p> | 2 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 69.2 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/3 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,378 | 4 | 658 | alberreman | Alberreman | 2019-03-21T20:34:05.487Z | 2019-03-21T20:41:04.364Z | <p>maybe a way of coming to this would be to start with an open doc that allowed people to list all of the ways in which a person can “contribute to Ethereum.” And then set out prioritizing that list somehow. fuck it, make it a TCR. Why not? and then come up with ways to measure contribution around all of the significant identified contribution types. but the point would be to start with what we consider valuable contribution. I think we too often just measure the things that seem most easy to measure, regardless of the comparative value we place on those contributions, or the relevance of those contributions to a person’s ability to make certain decisions (assuming that youre looking for contribution measurement approaches to identify decision-makers).</p>
<p>Edited to include my brainstormed list of contribution types:<br>
base level protocol coding<br>
dapp development<br>
ethereum research<br>
cat herders<br>
event organizers<br>
magicians<br>
lobbying groups<br>
dapp users<br>
conference attendees<br>
conference speakers<br>
people who write articles explaining things<br>
working for an ethereum company<br>
buying ether<br>
auditing code<br>
contributing to twitter/reddit/other forums<br>
educating people</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 20 | 59 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/4 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,379 | 5 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-03-21T20:45:54.391Z | 2019-03-21T20:45:54.391Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="alberreman" data-post="4" data-topic="2962">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/alberreman/48/984_2.png" class="avatar"> alberreman:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>I think we too often just measure the things that seem most easy to measure, regardless of the comparative value we place on those contributions, or the relevance of those contributions to a person’s ability to make certain decisions (assuming that youre looking for contribution measurement approaches to identify decision-makers).</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>We should definitely not be afraid to try our best to measure all the types of contributions that are relevant.</p>
<p>Perhaps those in each field of Ethereum could maintain their own measuring systems, updating their part of the algo, much in the way that Google is constantly updating PageRank.</p> | 4 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 28.8 | 2 | true | true | true | 1 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/5 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,381 | 7 | 658 | alberreman | Alberreman | 2019-03-21T21:11:17.386Z | 2019-03-21T21:11:17.386Z | <p>sure - then you would all have to have some way to universalize metrics across and within groups, or it’d get difficult to measure contributing groups against each other. maybe you could identify some meta-level Ethereum purpose/outcomes and prioritize them in some way (TCR or EIP-like process, like Aragon’s AGP process) so that they could be assigned value, and then each contributor group could self organize around how they can contribute to reaching those outcomes. Then individuals within that group would make a claim about their contribution totals which could be audited by the rest of the groups in some way.</p> | 5 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 8.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/7 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,382 | 8 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-03-21T21:13:00.702Z | 2019-03-21T21:13:00.702Z | <p>Inputs, things to measure, things to track over time:</p>
<ul>
<li>community priorities, addressed by the work</li>
<li>the work, quality of the work</li>
<li>adoption of / use of / dependency on work</li>
<li>peer review, qualitative and quantitative recognition</li>
</ul>
<p>Things to counteract:</p>
<ul>
<li>distortions caused by social media popularity</li>
<li>distortions caused by personal choices, e.g. privacy orientation</li>
<li>stakeholder groups gaming the algo construction process</li>
<li>gaming of the algo</li>
</ul> | null | 0 | 0 | 19 | 83.8 | 2 | true | true | true | 2 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/8 |
61 | 2,962 | 2,962 | Ideation session: Reasonably fair algorithm to measure current contribution | ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution | 9,441 | 9 | 692 | kronosapiens | Daniel Kronovet | 2019-03-25T14:06:36.602Z | 2019-03-26T23:41:31.874Z | <p>If we’re allowed to use an oracle, then I would be quite interested in incorporating a PageRank-style reputation system in which community members can “endorse” other community members and these endorsements are used to generate contribution scores – an endorsement from someone who is also endorsed is worth a lot, while an endorsement from someone who is unendorsed is worth little. The subjectivity gets around the Goodhart-related problems which we get into when we use objective metrics.</p>
<p>It can also be made somewhat sybil-resistant by limiting who gets a contribution score “to start” (i.e. we use objective github data to determine the “starting contribution distribution” and then use the subjective endorsements to distribute the contribution scores beyond what the data themselves can capture). If someone creates a fake account, their endorsements have zero weight until someone endorses them. So not sybil-resistant per-se, but not trivially sybillable either.</p>
<p>I like this idea because it is grounded in something objective (i.e. github contributions) but incorporates subjective information (endorsements) beyond what the objective can provide. It also means that we don’t have to worry about capturing every objective signal as the subjective assessments will “smooth out” the gaps in what the metrics show.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 14 | 72.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/ideation-session-reasonably-fair-algorithm-to-measure-current-contribution/2962/9 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 52,471 | 1 | 4,640 | yaruno | Jarno Marttila | 2024-11-02T19:47:00.054Z | 2024-11-02T19:47:14.582Z | <p>Hello fellow magicians!</p>
<p>I’m currently working on a research paper about NFT design. From the academic discussions I’ve reviewed, there doesn’t appear to be a widely accepted, high-level toolkit—such as a method, framework, or process—for designing and applying NFTs to different use cases. My hypothesis is that such tools could significantly support the adoption of NFTs in real-world applications.</p>
<p>In exploring this topic, I’ve noticed a considerable increase in NFT-related standards since we introduced our own, ERC-5023, a year and a half ago. After a brief review of the current landscape, I found that there are now over 160 different ERC standards related to NFTs in some way.</p>
<p>This brings me to a question for you all: Do you see any challenges arising from this trend of increasing amounts of NFT standards? And would you find high-level design tools helpful, such as tools that could help you quickly match existing token standards to your use case or give you confidence early on that your token design is suitable for your intended context?</p>
<p>Jarno</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 49 | 414.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/1 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 52,923 | 2 | 3,121 | sullof | Francesco Sullo | 2024-11-15T20:33:57.157Z | 2024-11-15T20:33:57.157Z | <p>Standards are set for “scientific” purposes. The adoption of a standard is the real story.<br>
Right now, the steps are “draft,” “review,” “last call,” and “final.” Maybe it would also be good to have something like “adopted.”</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 32 | 11.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/2 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 54,402 | 3 | 4,640 | yaruno | Jarno Marttila | 2025-01-01T20:12:41.128Z | 2025-01-01T20:12:41.128Z | <p>I’d argue that standards or in this case the ERCs are not just an academic exercise but a way to reduce waste as we shouldn’t have to invent the wheel multiple times and to increase interoperability in the EVM ecosystem as through existing standard contracts we know what to expect from the contract implementation. These are not the only benefits of standardisation but maybe this is as clear as day as it is, just felt compelled to reiterate it.</p>
<p>But coming back to sullofs point about adoption, I think it is much needed but so far it seems like many of the ERC standards goes without greater adoption.</p>
<p>Now related to token design and particularily to NFT design I should probably define here first what I mean with NFT design, but you can imagine it as a more holistic process e.g. confirming iteratively in a structured and a systematic way that you are doing the right things and the things right when choosing a type of NFT for your project and for your ecosystem, than a purely mechanistic one such as implementing things from set of requirements.</p>
<p>I’ve also noticed that in academia or in academic peer-reviewed journal articles there seem to be very few papers that explore both token design and NFT related token standards beyond the typical ERC-721 and ERC-1155 standards.</p>
<p>So a thought occured to me that maybe we should have some kind of tooling to assist both devs and non-devs on quickly navigating and grasping that what kind of NFT related standards exists in the ERC archives besides reading through and understanding every possible NFT standard available.</p>
<p>So, I’ve gone through 163 NFT related standards, taken the standards that are at least at stage of being in review and formulated 19 different categories on basis of their function or purpose and formed sort of ‘design’ cards out of these. The plan is to release these under CC licence, likely on github so anyone can use them and contribute back to them.</p>
<p>On the front side there’s category title, description of the category and a short summary of what that type of NFTs mean in non-technical manner. On the back side of the cards I’ve raised a few ERC standards and briefly listed their key information related to the category.</p>
<p>Here’s a snapshot of a single category card<br>
<div class="lightbox-wrapper"><a class="lightbox" href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/original/2X/c/c4d9c18447a752f7c0d6eafeb2526c09162c7755.jpeg" data-download-href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/c4d9c18447a752f7c0d6eafeb2526c09162c7755" title="Screenshot 2025-01-01 at 21.39.56"><img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/c/c4d9c18447a752f7c0d6eafeb2526c09162c7755_2_666x500.jpeg" alt="Screenshot 2025-01-01 at 21.39.56" data-base62-sha1="s5q7H8styZNmOReJibN3Z3LG0KN" width="666" height="500" srcset="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/c/c4d9c18447a752f7c0d6eafeb2526c09162c7755_2_666x500.jpeg, https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/c/c4d9c18447a752f7c0d6eafeb2526c09162c7755_2_999x750.jpeg 1.5x, https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/c/c4d9c18447a752f7c0d6eafeb2526c09162c7755_2_1332x1000.jpeg 2x" data-dominant-color="756B78"><div class="meta"><svg class="fa d-icon d-icon-far-image svg-icon" aria-hidden="true"><use href="#far-image"></use></svg><span class="filename">Screenshot 2025-01-01 at 21.39.56</span><span class="informations">1432×1074 158 KB</span><svg class="fa d-icon d-icon-discourse-expand svg-icon" aria-hidden="true"><use href="#discourse-expand"></use></svg></div></a></div></p>
<p>I’d love to hear what you think. Would something like this be helpful to you, or if not I’d also love to hear about it. Is there something missing from these cards? Or how could they serve your needs even better?</p>
<p>This is very much work-in-process but it has already garnered some academic interest as a potential design tool to assist non-devs on grasping NFT standards. There are also some plans to incorporate these as part of design exercises but I’ll let you know more about that once that track progresses.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 20 | 59 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/3 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 54,650 | 4 | 12,794 | Marcuszheng | Marcus | 2025-01-09T17:51:34.186Z | 2025-01-09T17:51:34.186Z | <p>In fact, we have found that many ERC standards are used enough, for example, ERC-20, ERC-721, ERC-1155, but apart from these ERCs, it seems that the references are not so much compared to the above ones?<br>
I think there may be several problems, some ERC standards have a limited scope of use.<br>
There is an educational gap between developers and academic researchers, and it may be difficult for academic researchers to pay attention to the ERC standards commonly used by developers.<br>
Also, we’re actually doing something similar, we’ve developed EIP.Fun to make some of the ERC standards easy to understand.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 16 | 23.2 | 0 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/4 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 55,049 | 5 | 12,859 | 1etsp1ay | 1etsp1ay | 2025-01-23T07:49:25.860Z | 2025-01-23T07:49:25.860Z | <p>The ERC-721 is basically a pointer … as a primitive it gets used in all sorts of weird and wonderful ways (hmmm 160+ proposed variants/extensions?)</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This brings me to a question for you all: Do you see any challenges arising from this trend of increasing amounts of NFT standards?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are 3 steps … non-sequentially<br>
a) the fun exploratory time when you play with the new shiny toy/primitive<br>
c) exploiting the billion+ dollar/yuan/euro commercial opportunity<br>
b) the boring standardisation phase and ECH’s attempts to control the chaos between a) and c).</p>
<p>Technical standards such as IEEE, IETF, and W3C all had ups and downs … sheesh just look at how many protocols are transported via https when there were more efficient mechanisms.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>My hypothesis is that such tools could significantly support the adoption of NFTs in real-world applications.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>are you contemplating a technical hack for essentially a socio-economic issue? unlike miners where consensus is needed for adoption, ERCs is more market pull so if it works in the real-world, standards can languish and act as placeholder for time of proposal (if want credit as originator). How will your tool accelerate “adoption”?</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 12 | 12.4 | 1 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/5 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 55,380 | 6 | 4,640 | yaruno | Jarno Marttila | 2025-02-03T21:38:54.755Z | 2025-02-03T21:38:54.755Z | <p>Instead of technical hack I’m thinking more in line of a practical but non-technical design artifact to quickly communicate taxonomies of token standards. Even though there’s an ever growing amount of them, it seems that there’s quite a bit of overlap between the standards. So the standards that are similar to each other could be categorized and distilled to represent their high level function or purposes.</p>
<p>The challenge that I’ve observed in relation to designing token based incentives with a group of stakeholders is that the non-technical people won’t necessarily understand what the engineers are talking about in terms of standards, their potential functionalities and features and the engineers may get stuck on a few previously utilized standards or want to create a new one without doing the homework of going through what already exists. So to alleviate some of this effort I’ve created some design cards <a href="https://github.com/yaruno/nft-design-cards" class="inline-onebox" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">GitHub - yaruno/nft-design-cards</a> .</p>
<p>Now they won’t be the cure all for token design process issues, but they may help to communicate more effectively between technical and non-technical stakeholders about what kind of functions and purposes have been explored in the token standard space, especially in the early exploration phase…</p> | 5 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 12 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/6 |
61 | 21,558 | 21,558 | About fragmentation of token standards and token designing | about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing | 55,915 | 7 | 3,121 | sullof | Francesco Sullo | 2025-03-01T17:15:05.603Z | 2025-03-01T17:16:38.363Z | <p>I introduced ERC7656, now in Last Call, also to reduce ERC proliferation.</p>
<p>One of the key goals of <a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7656" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">ERC-7656</a> is to reduce the proliferation of NFT standards. Currently, anyone looking to enable NFTs to manage additional functionalities often defines a new standard, requiring changes to the NFT itself. This leads to a growing number of interfaces, increasing the risk of conflicts and fragmentation.</p>
<p>ERC-7656 addresses this by allowing the deployment of token-linked services—smart contracts associated with and owned by an NFT. These services extend the NFT’s capabilities without requiring modifications to the NFT or its standard (e.g., ERC-721). This approach not only eliminates the need for new standards but also fosters creativity, as developers are no longer constrained by the limitations of the underlying NFT standard.</p>
<p>By decoupling functionality from the NFT itself, ERC-7656 promotes a more modular and interoperable ecosystem, reducing complexity and encouraging innovation. Thus said, the growing number of proposal is becoming a problem. Maybe there should be a better filter.</p>
<p>For example, right now, ERC authors post something here and at the same time make a pull request on the ERC’s repo. It would make more sense if someone posts here, and only if there is a reasonable engagement from the community, a PR is made possible.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 11 | 32.2 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/about-fragmentation-of-token-standards-and-token-designing/21558/7 |
61 | 3,020 | 3,020 | ProgPoW Benchmarked, by a Ethereum Miner! | progpow-benchmarked-by-a-ethereum-miner | 9,592 | 1 | 1,368 | xazax310 | Xazax310 | 2019-03-27T23:14:09.279Z | 2019-03-28T06:47:14.732Z | <p>Please read and discuss. I hope I brought some facts into the ProgPoW debate that we can make informed decisions from.<br>
<a href="https://medium.com/@infantry1337/comprehensive-progpow-benchmark-715126798476?source=friends_link&sk=8acbe3fb45ef704a20dc09c87a5890a8" class="onebox" target="_blank" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">https://medium.com/@infantry1337/comprehensive-progpow-benchmark-715126798476?source=friends_link&sk=8acbe3fb45ef704a20dc09c87a5890a8</a></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 17 | 113.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/progpow-benchmarked-by-a-ethereum-miner/3020/1 |
61 | 3,453 | 3,453 | Proposals to add EIP editor criteria and other EIP process improvements | proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements | 11,365 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-07-07T18:39:25.555Z | 2019-07-07T18:41:12.738Z | <p><a href="https://github.com/loredanacirstea">loredanacirstea</a> has submitted a PR to EIP-1 proposing a selection process for EIP Editors.</p>
<p><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/2172" class="onebox" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/2172</a></p>
<p>There is also a <a href="https://medium.com/@loredana.cirstea/make-ethereum-future-proof-one-proposal-at-a-time-18b8b98b08fc">Medium write-up</a> of this change, as well as a proposal to improve the EIP process itself.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In addition, I am working on a decentralized solution to <strong>randomly assign editors to EIPs and keep track of their work</strong> . My work, in its very early stages, can be found at <a href="https://github.com/loredanacirstea/eip-process">https://github.com/loredanacirstea/eip-process</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The proposed improvement to the EIP pipeline involves a dapp and an approach to ensure attention on each EIP, “randomly assigning editors to Ethereum EIPs and keep track of their work.”</p>
<p><a href="https://github.com/loredanacirstea/eip-process" class="onebox" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://github.com/loredanacirstea/eip-process</a></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 29 | 65.8 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements/3453/1 |
61 | 3,453 | 3,453 | Proposals to add EIP editor criteria and other EIP process improvements | proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements | 11,380 | 2 | 80 | boris | Boris Mann | 2019-07-09T13:46:28.669Z | 2019-07-09T13:52:39.909Z | <p><a class="mention" href="/u/loredanacirstea">@loredanacirstea</a> thanks for kicking this off. To recap, in the linked GitHub issue, several of us suggested that more process wasn’t needed, but rather just doing the work of regularly reviewing EIPs & ERCs.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Basically, I believe the issue is actually recruiting knowledgeable people and asking them to commit time to do the work — not handing someone a title.</p>
<p>If there were a line up of people begging for editor titles and/or tons of people consistently reviewing — this might be needed.</p>
<p>If it were me, I would put effort into recruiting more people rather than adding process that it’s unclear what it solves.</p>
<p>That’s my 2gwei. Good luck!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here are some quick thoughts on ideas that might grow participation / how to participate more:</p>
<p>Subscribe to new GitHub issues / PRs by “Watching”</p>
<p>Leave a comment saying “I’m reviewing”</p>
<ul>
<li>this lets people know if anyone is working on a particular EIP</li>
</ul>
<p>Run “what is an EIP / how do EIPs work” sessions at various conferences.</p>
<ul>
<li>Any in person conferences and Hackathons are good times for this</li>
</ul>
<p>Hold a weekly EIP review / edit session</p>
<ul>
<li>Pick a time, gather in the EIPs Gitter</li>
<li>Post chats as you edit / Review</li>
<li>Have one or more existing editors there to approve PRs and do issue management</li>
</ul>
<p>Run a weekly review of new EIPs</p>
<ul>
<li>post them here and on Twitter</li>
</ul>
<p>Use GitHub issues for more categorization:</p>
<ul>
<li>if the current repo maintainers want to add new people (essentially more editors), then labels and other GitHub features could be used.</li>
</ul>
<p>Related — I still have a PR in to add a full RSS feed of all EIPs. That handles them when they hit Draft on the website, not when they first get added to GitHub.</p>
<p>Anyway, the main thing is getting more humans involved. The bar for helping to correct EIPs into Draft is quite low. The next step of reviewing the technical content is probably about cross posting an announce here to the forum and promotion.</p>
<p>Also: I think Core EIPs have way different issues, so a lot of this mainly applies to ERCs.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 23 | 234.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements/3453/2 |
61 | 3,453 | 3,453 | Proposals to add EIP editor criteria and other EIP process improvements | proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements | 11,389 | 3 | 448 | xinbenlv | Victor Zhou (xinbenlv) | 2019-07-09T17:28:12.763Z | 2019-07-09T17:28:12.763Z | <p>Thanks Boris for constructively polling the idea of campaign.</p>
<p>Can I add that:</p>
<p>It seems according to <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/2172#issuecomment-508970296" rel="nofollow noopener">this issue comment</a> that “Editor to check technical soundness” is not a consensus.</p>
<p>Then can I say that at least “someone”(or some defined or undefined group of people) have to check / vet on technical soundness of an EIP - (is that a consensus?).</p>
<p>If that’s a case, we might also need to add a role / rule for checking that.</p>
<p>I propose, for tech soundness, if at least one EIP-final status author of same category step up and say LGTM for the technical soundnesss, and within the time range of last call no obligations, it’s being considered technically sound. If people have no consensus in technical soundness, then it blocks the Final-status bit until a technical soundness consensus (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Consensus" rel="nofollow noopener">similar to how Wikipedia gets consensus</a> check is reached.</p> | 2 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 13.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements/3453/3 |
61 | 3,453 | 3,453 | Proposals to add EIP editor criteria and other EIP process improvements | proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements | 11,390 | 4 | 80 | boris | Boris Mann | 2019-07-09T17:43:51.602Z | 2019-07-09T17:43:51.602Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="xinbenlv" data-post="3" data-topic="3453">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/xinbenlv/48/16173_2.png" class="avatar"> xinbenlv:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>I propose, for tech soundness, if at least one EIP-final status author of same category step up and say LGTM for the technical soundnesss, and within the time range of last call no obligations,</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>That is a different discussion.</p>
<p>The process of getting EIPs to “Accepted” is the domain of the Core Dev process for Core EIPs.</p>
<p>Otherwise, for ERCs, it’s no “over my dead body” complaints during the “Last Call” period.</p> | 3 | 0 | 1 | 18 | 8.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/proposals-to-add-eip-editor-criteria-and-other-eip-process-improvements/3453/4 |
61 | 16,271 | 16,271 | Post EIP/ERC Split: Represent each side as Camps in Ethereum Magicians | post-eip-erc-split-represent-each-side-as-camps-in-ethereum-magicians | 41,694 | 1 | 9,410 | 0xMawuko | Emmanuel 🦉✨ | 2023-10-26T05:08:03.490Z | 2023-10-26T05:08:03.490Z | <p>The EIP/ERC Split, a.k.a. the ‘reverse merge,’ has finally been completed and thus has kick-started the dawn of a new era where core protocol and application layer improvements can grow and be managed independently. There is no doubt that we will experience the Cambrian explosion on both sides.</p>
<p>However, one of the key objections that was highlighted in the proposal was the concern that this change would split the Ethereum community, especially with respect to Ethereum Magicians. I think this isn’t necessarily the case. Instead, this change has created an opportunity for various magicians in the fellowship to appropriately recognize their areas of interest and expertise and fully unlock their potential and contributions accordingly.</p>
<p>‘We are all of us Ethereum Magicians.’</p>
<p>The goal of this post is to make a meta-suggestion of something similar to Houses/Camps (as seen in some fantasy literature, including LOTR, Harry Potter, and the Percy Jackson series) in how various members affiliate themselves, all under the Ethereum Magicians community, and gather feedback and discussions on the best ways to proceed and achieve agreement. I think there’s good inspiration to be taken from the Optimism Collective, for example.</p>
<p>I’m particularly leaning closer to <code>Camps</code> and from the looks of it, we already have two Great Camps under the Fellowship, working together to grow the Infinite Garden:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Camp EIP</strong> - core protocol improvements</li>
<li><strong>Camp ERC</strong> - app-level improvements</li>
</ol>
<p>Where each Camp has Cabins, so for example:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Camp EIP</p>
<ul>
<li>Execution Cabin</li>
<li>Consensus Cabin</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>Camp ERC</p>
<ul>
<li>Wallet Cabin</li>
<li>Interface Cabin</li>
<li>Standards Cabin<br>
etc.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Would really appreciate some thoughts and discussions around this, and hope fully get some support for this on Magicians.</p>
<p>‘We are all of us Ethereum Magicians.’</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 17 | 338.4 | 1 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/post-eip-erc-split-represent-each-side-as-camps-in-ethereum-magicians/16271/1 |
61 | 16,271 | 16,271 | Post EIP/ERC Split: Represent each side as Camps in Ethereum Magicians | post-eip-erc-split-represent-each-side-as-camps-in-ethereum-magicians | 41,696 | 2 | 8,194 | Mani-T | Mani-T | 2023-10-26T06:14:38.729Z | 2023-10-26T06:14:38.729Z | <p>Separating discussions based on topics can reduce noise and make it easier for community members to find relevant information.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 17 | 48.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 3 | false | null | /t/post-eip-erc-split-represent-each-side-as-camps-in-ethereum-magicians/16271/2 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,585 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-21T16:48:40.242Z | 2019-01-21T16:52:32.280Z | <p>From my comment in the <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/jello-paper-as-canonical-evm-spec/2389/23">Jello Paper</a> discussion:</p>
<aside class="quote no-group quote-modified" data-username="jpitts" data-post="23" data-topic="2389">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/jpitts/48/15152_2.png" class="avatar"><a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/jello-paper-as-canonical-evm-spec/2389/23">Jello Paper as Canonical EVM Spec</a></div>
<blockquote>
<p>One notion that I arrived at is that the protocol should itself have semantic version, and that its component parts, i.e. the EVM, consensus, RLP, JSON-RPC, each should have semantic versions. Within their various contexts, the versioning changes would have different meaning.</p>
<p><a href="https://semver.org/">Semantic Versioning 2.0.0</a></p>
<p>Ethereum protocol would increment MAJOR when the update to any of its components leads to a fork.</p>
<p>EVM would increment MAJOR only if the update leads to incompatibility or security vulnerability (given contract development norms). MAJOR version increments in EVM is similar to a new series in microprocessors. But MINOR version increments in the EVM would lead to a MAJOR increment at the protocol level.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>And regarding “release candidates”, copying my <a href="https://gitter.im/ethereum/AllCoreDevs?at=5c45f1c19bfa375aab38ddc0">comments from AllCoreDevs gitter</a> here:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Protocol updates could follow the practice of “release candidate” within the semantic numbering scheme. And these clever release names, this is over-arching for the upgrade initiative and sticks once it stabilizes on mainnet. Constantinople is what you are attempting to get mainnet to.</p>
<p>So what you attempted to release was ethereum-8.0.0-rc1, released to the testnets and prepared for mainnet. An issue was found, therefore rc1 was aborted. The main network remains at ethereum-7.x.x. Now you proceed with ethereum-8.0.0-rc2, first on ropsten, etc, and then attempt to release to mainnet.</p>
<p>The “release candidate” approach allows you to keep attempting to get from 7.x.x to 8.0.0, by incrementing the x in 8.0.0-rcx. It allows you to not have to worry about the name, which is marketing and communication to the wider community. Once a stable rc-x happens on mainnet, well, IMO that is what becomes “Constantinople”</p>
</blockquote> | null | 0 | 0 | 20 | 539 | 2 | true | true | true | 3 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/1 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,593 | 2 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-21T19:01:59.706Z | 2019-01-21T22:18:52.402Z | <p>Here’s a <a href="https://gist.github.com/jpitts/4c541a4efa2f8872ce9acf63da5c4921" rel="nofollow noopener">gist</a> depicting what the versions of the protocol would look like, only a sketch. The rc1 and rc2 of Constantinople should have notes about which testnets they were released to, accurate representation of EIP changes, etc.</p>
<p><a href="https://gist.github.com/jpitts/4c541a4efa2f8872ce9acf63da5c4921" rel="nofollow noopener">https://gist.github.com/jpitts/4c541a4efa2f8872ce9acf63da5c4921</a></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 18 | 8.6 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/2 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,597 | 3 | 512 | axic | null | 2019-01-21T21:02:04.739Z | 2019-01-21T21:02:04.739Z | <p>A similar proposal was made back here: <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/178" rel="nofollow noopener">https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/178</a></p>
<p>It comes with some differences:</p>
<ul>
<li>only considers EVM,</li>
<li>because of this goes well with <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/154" rel="nofollow noopener">https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/154</a>,</li>
<li>only uses major/minor in order to save space</li>
</ul> | null | 2 | 0 | 16 | 28.2 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/3 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,598 | 4 | 512 | axic | null | 2019-01-21T21:05:46.137Z | 2019-01-21T21:06:29.379Z | <p>Because it only considers the EVM, the versions are a bit different - as an example the “DAO fork” doesn’t have a version.</p>
<p>Another question to consider if it is only for the EVM whether gas changes warrant a major version bump. Before gas changes (Spurious Dragon?) were added, it seemed as if gas cannot be changed. After that point though it felt like gas values cannot be relied on and are not to be considered a constant in contract development.</p>
<p>If gas costs are not considered, the version table looks quite differently.</p> | 3 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 53 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/4 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,599 | 5 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-21T21:13:37.465Z | 2019-01-21T22:12:03.590Z | <p>Thanks for the reference! I think that this could be used for advancing the version of the EVM component in a way that dapp developers can understand. Also it can inform how other protocol components might be versioned.</p> | 3 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 12.6 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/5 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,636 | 6 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-23T08:51:37.065Z | 2019-01-23T08:52:06.460Z | <p>It should be noted that in version 0.4.21, Solidity itself began to allow for the targeting of an EVM “version”.</p>
<p>Do developers have a difficult time knowing which EVM-related EIPs are included in these code-named releases?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>you can now specify which EVM version the contract should be compiled for. Valid values are “homestead”, “tangerineWhistle”, “spuriousDragon”, “byzantium” (the default) and “constantinople”. Depending on this setting, different opcodes will be used in some cases. The only place where this is currently used by default is that all gas is forwarded with calls starting from “tangerineWhistle” (in homestead, some gas has to be retained for the <code>call</code> opcode itself). Also, the gas estimator reports different costs for the opcodes depending on the version and thus the optimizer might generate different code.</p>
</blockquote>
<aside class="onebox allowlistedgeneric" data-onebox-src="https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases/tag/v0.4.21">
<header class="source">
<img src="https://github.githubassets.com/favicons/favicon.svg" class="site-icon" width="32" height="32">
<a href="https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases/tag/v0.4.21" target="_blank" rel="noopener">GitHub</a>
</header>
<article class="onebox-body">
<div class="aspect-image" style="--aspect-ratio:690/344;"><img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/f/f7284ce10aae233fe50eda2463d473912a3e5027_2_690x345.png" class="thumbnail" data-dominant-color="F6F2F3" width="690" height="345"></div>
<h3><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases/tag/v0.4.21" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Release Version 0.4.21 · ethereum/solidity</a></h3>
<p>We again introduced several changes that are scheduled for version 0.5.0 and can be activated using pragma experimental "v0.5.0";. In this release, this pragma does not generate a warning anymore, ...</p>
</article>
<div class="onebox-metadata">
</div>
<div style="clear: both"></div>
</aside>
| 5 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 11.4 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/6 |
61 | 2,493 | 2,493 | Sermantic versioning for the protocol, with release candidates | sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates | 7,637 | 7 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-23T08:57:33.044Z | 2019-01-23T08:57:33.044Z | <p>FYI, I updated the gist of the protocol releases and EIPs in each.</p>
<p><a href="https://gist.github.com/jpitts/4c541a4efa2f8872ce9acf63da5c4921" rel="nofollow noopener">https://gist.github.com/jpitts/4c541a4efa2f8872ce9acf63da5c4921</a></p> | 6 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 6.4 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/sermantic-versioning-for-the-protocol-with-release-candidates/2493/7 |
61 | 2,574 | 2,574 | ETH 2.0 Report on Dev teams from Moloch / Kyokan | eth-2-0-report-on-dev-teams-from-moloch-kyokan | 7,882 | 1 | 1,122 | tvanepps | Tvanepps | 2019-02-02T23:46:45.681Z | 2019-02-03T00:32:59.816Z | <p>Ameen asked me to remove for now. Will add back once full report is released to public.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 10 | 22 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/eth-2-0-report-on-dev-teams-from-moloch-kyokan/2574/1 |
61 | 13,129 | 13,129 | Documentations or guidance on selecting an ERC number | documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number | 34,689 | 1 | 7,546 | jsonsivar | Janison | 2023-03-02T21:04:53.385Z | 2023-03-02T21:04:53.385Z | <p>Hello, just posting on behalf of the <a href="https://github.com/fleekxyz/non-fungible-apps" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">NFA team</a>. We were wondering if there is more documentation or guidance on picking the ERC number. We read <a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">EIP-1</a> and it says it’s picked by us but wanted to see if there is specific rules we should follow on the number.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 18 | 158.6 | 0 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number/13129/1 |
61 | 13,129 | 13,129 | Documentations or guidance on selecting an ERC number | documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number | 34,705 | 2 | 303 | abcoathup | Andrew B Coathup | 2023-03-03T03:23:45.480Z | 2023-03-03T03:23:45.480Z | <p>EIP/ERC editors assign the EIP/ERC number. Generally it is the (first) PR number.<br>
Number gaming (e.g. creating issues/PRs to increase the number) will likely result in a different number being assigned.</p>
<hr>
<p>From: <a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1">EIP-1</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Once the EIP is ready for the repository, the EIP editor will:</p>
<ul>
<li>Assign an EIP number (generally the PR number, but the decision is with the editors)</li>
</ul>
</blockquote> | null | 1 | 0 | 17 | 13.4 | 3 | true | false | true | 0 | false | null | /t/documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number/13129/2 |
61 | 13,129 | 13,129 | Documentations or guidance on selecting an ERC number | documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number | 34,732 | 3 | 6,714 | stoicdev0 | Steven Pineda | 2023-03-03T21:30:37.879Z | 2023-03-03T21:30:37.879Z | <p>I wish this was cleaner. We’re on 6 thousand something now and there are actually less than 600 EIPs. From my team we’ve proposed 5 EIPs and it would be much easier to remember (and maybe even consecutive) if they weren’t 4 digits each.<br>
It’s small annoyance, but annoyance nevertheless.</p> | 2 | 2 | 0 | 15 | 38 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number/13129/3 |
61 | 13,129 | 13,129 | Documentations or guidance on selecting an ERC number | documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number | 34,735 | 4 | 303 | abcoathup | Andrew B Coathup | 2023-03-03T21:52:12.975Z | 2023-03-03T21:52:12.975Z | <p>There have been discussions previously of <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/5082" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">selling unused EIP numbers</a>.</p>
<p>In my opinion, only a few EIP/ERC <span class="hashtag">#s</span> have strong name recognition: ERC20, ERC721, EIP1559, EIP4844, some of which are 4 digit <span class="hashtag">#s</span>.</p> | 3 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 3 | 3 | true | false | true | 0 | false | null | /t/documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number/13129/4 |
61 | 13,129 | 13,129 | Documentations or guidance on selecting an ERC number | documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number | 35,910 | 5 | 1,332 | poojaranjan | Pooja Ranjan | 2023-04-05T23:24:18.865Z | 2023-04-05T23:24:18.865Z | <p>Every proposal needs a number but not all of them reach <code>Final</code> status.<br>
We use a common repo to promote EIPs and this has to be done via Pull Request.<br>
Allocating a different number to an EIP after getting merged to maintain the consecutive order is a bit complicated if looked at for maintenance purposes.<br>
I suppose it’s a process decision made at the time which turned out to be working well so far.</p> | 3 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 17.8 | 2 | true | false | true | 1 | false | null | /t/documentations-or-guidance-on-selecting-an-erc-number/13129/5 |
61 | 8,434 | 8,434 | Mixin Library Standard | mixin-library-standard | 23,607 | 1 | 3,861 | vigilance | null | 2022-02-26T07:43:34.979Z | 2022-03-07T20:24:47.352Z | <hr>
<div class="md-table">
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eip</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>title</td>
<td><strong>Mixin Library Standard</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>author</td>
<td>Tyler R. Drury <a href="mailto:vigilstudios.td@gmail.com">vigilstudios.td@gmail.com</a> (<a href="http://www.twitter.com/StudiosVigil" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">www.twitter.com/StudiosVigil</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discussions-to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
<td>Idea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>Standards Track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>category</td>
<td>ERC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>created</td>
<td>2022-02-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requires (*optional)</td>
<td>EIP-165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div><hr>
<h1>
<a name="table-of-contents-1" class="anchor" href="#table-of-contents-1"></a>Table of Contents</h1>
<ul>
<li>Summary</li>
<li>Motivation</li>
<li>Terms</li>
<li>Specification</li>
<li>Benefits</li>
<li>Implementation</li>
<li>Rationale</li>
<li>Security Considerations</li>
<li>References</li>
<li>Copyright</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Citation</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="summary-2" class="anchor" href="#summary-2"></a>Summary</h2>
<p>This proposal allows for a standardized approach when implementing the common eternal/external storage slot pattern in libraries and contracts.</p>
<p><strong>Mixins</strong> are libraries that are atomic units which are composable with other <strong>mixins</strong> and encapsulate the internal state<br>
variables and associated logic of a single, concrete, concept,<br>
providing internal constants and internal or private functions,<br>
which may be (typically) be associated with some structured data storage.</p>
<p><strong>Mixin</strong> libraries support <strong>internal</strong> functions to be called by an implementing contract and <strong>private</strong> constants, functions or modifiers for internal use.</p>
<p><strong>Mixins</strong> result in a library’s bytecode being inlined to all call sites within the callin Context contract which,<br>
by the transitive property of inheriting the inlined byte-code, effectively makes the Context ‘inherit’ the internal data structure and logic provided by the <strong>mixin</strong>,<br>
without the additional overhead associated with external library calls.</p>
<p>It is convenient to reuse and compose various <strong>mixins</strong>, since they load unique storage slots specific within the Context of an individual implementing contract,<br>
and since they are atomic structures with all necessary operations provided for that data type,<br>
functionality of contracts can not only be simplified by breaking them down into atomic components,<br>
but also allows for greater flexibility and reusibity, since multiple differing contracts can implement the same <strong>Mixin</strong>,<br>
or a single contract can utilize any number of additional storage slots while reusing the same library code.</p>
<p>For example, the ERC-20 token and EIP-1753 License standard both implement a name function which returns a string,<br>
a single <strong>Mixin</strong> can be declared which loads a contract’s storage slot with the desired structure and provides<br>
the appropriate getters and setters for the data as necessary.</p>
<p>This technique allows both ERC-20 and EIP-1753 implementations to utilize the exact same code in both contracts,<br>
without the unnecessary duplication of code by developers (although during compilation, the inlined internal functions will be injected into the contract directly at all call sites),<br>
while each individual contract manages its own unique storage slot.</p>
<p>Another example would be the ERC-721 and ERC-1155 metadata uri functions.</p>
<p>Both contracts could easily adopt the same <strong>Mixin</strong> providing functionality,<br>
while also expanding on that functionality as required by each unique contract,<br>
usually by implementing multiple other related Mixins as desired.</p>
<p>This technique also provides the distinct advantage that the <strong>Mixin</strong>’s storage utilized by the implementing Context contract is not contained within<br>
the contract itself (but rather is stored in an external, constant storage slot location, for each unique contract),<br>
thus dramatically reducing contract code size to be effectively only that of the compiled contract’s functions,<br>
by eliminating local internal contract storage within a contract.</p>
<p>This approach effectively allows an unlimited amount of data storage within a single contract,<br>
irrespective of contract bytecode size limit imposed by the Spurious Dragon hard fork, without actually violating it,<br>
since none of the storage space is contained within the contract, none of the data contributes to the implementing contract’s bytecode size,<br>
similar to how public libraries reduce code size by internally delegating calls to a separately deployed, public library.</p>
<p>This effectively reduces all contracts to only the size of their function’s bytecode,<br>
allowing for larger, more robust contracts, while also being incredibly small and gas efficient,<br>
with minimal overhead, while also making the implementing contracts much more easy to read and manage.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="motivation-3" class="anchor" href="#motivation-3"></a>Motivation</h2>
<p>Currently, the Spurious Dragon hard fork enforces a maximum contract bytecode size of ~24kb.</p>
<p>This limit effectively means that contracts significantly larger or more complex than a standard ERC-20 token<br>
hit this limit quickly during development.</p>
<p>This has lead to several interesting approaches to address the size limit, such as <strong>Proxies</strong> and <strong>Diamonds</strong>.</p>
<p>This proposal is based on EIP-2535 standard, providing a much more detailed standard for <code>diamond storage</code> specifically,<br>
for implementations of such a storage technique for general purpose use, beyond just <strong>Diamonds</strong> or <strong>Proxies</strong>.</p>
<p>When it comes to the need to reuse contract code and data contracts often inherit from other contracts, however,<br>
this technique causes the inherited code to be directly injected into the derived contract,<br>
meaning the larger a contract is, the larger its children’s bytecode will also be also.</p>
<p><strong>Mixins</strong> are libraries and thus, can not be instanstiated/deployed or inherited from, instead they define atomic operations on specific data structures,<br>
which can be called by an implementing contract context.</p>
<p>These structures and their functions can then be used in a contract (being inlined directly in the contracts),<br>
providing the data and functionality to the implementing contract as if it directly contained the data and functions,<br>
while minimally affecting overall bytecode size, providing the same functionality as inheritance but,<br>
with far higher benefits of both more complex and more efficient contracts,<br>
due to the reduced bytecode size since no data and minimal code exists within the deployed smart contract itself.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="specification-4" class="anchor" href="#specification-4"></a>Specification</h2>
<p>Since a <strong>Mixin</strong> is an <strong>internal</strong> library which operates on its own storage slot(s) by default,<br>
often <strong>Mixins</strong> don’t require a <code>using ... for bytes32;</code> statement in their implementing contracts,<br>
since all operations are executed directly through the <strong>Mixin</strong>, implementing contracts access functions through the <strong>Mixin</strong> directly as defined by the library.</p>
<p>Alternatively, if a <strong>Mixin</strong> supports using non-default storage slots,<br>
due to the nature of libraries the libraries functionality can be attached to a storage slot with a <code>using ... for bytes32;</code> statement is the implementing contract.</p>
<p>An arbitrary number of <strong>Mixins</strong> may be implemented by any contract through its library functions,<br>
so care must be taken to avoid clashing of function selectors.</p>
<p>Conversely a single contract may only implement a single version of any one <strong>Mixin</strong> for a specific storage slot,<br>
since multiple calls to the same <strong>Mixin</strong>’s storage slot from within the same contract map to the same place in storage.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="terms-5" class="anchor" href="#terms-5"></a>Terms</h2>
<p>The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.</p>
<div class="md-table">
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bytecode</td>
<td>The compiled EVM compatible binary representing a smart contract’s executable code to deployed on the blockchain at the contract’s address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct</td>
<td>A single data type representing a collection of other related data types.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>library</td>
<td>Similar to Contracts but generally contains functions which other contracts utilize, intended for reusability. Unlike Contracts, Libraries do not have their own storage and thus cannot have state variables, nor can they inherit nor be inherited from.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixin</td>
<td>A Library which generally accepts a storage slot as the first argument, which provides functionality for accessing and manipulating a structured data at a storage slot location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>storage slot</td>
<td>A unique bytes32 identifier for a <strong>storage</strong> location within a contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div><hr>
<h2>
<a name="benefits-6" class="anchor" href="#benefits-6"></a>Benefits</h2>
<p>By leveraging the <code>using ... for bytes32</code> statement, a <strong>mixin</strong>’s implementation can be attached to an arbitrary storage slot,<br>
allowing for great reuse and flexibility.</p>
<p>By moving variable storage out of the contract and into external storage slots,<br>
this technique provides the benefit of reducing the executing contract’s bytecode,<br>
leading to vast gains in terms of allowable contract functionality, as enforced in the Spurious Dragon hard fork.</p>
<p>This technique also allows for much more simple and straightforward contract code which is highly versatile.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="implementation-7" class="anchor" href="#implementation-7"></a>Implementation</h2>
<p><strong>Mixins</strong> <strong>must</strong> be libraries which adhere to the following axioms:</p>
<ul>
<li>All constants <strong>must</strong> either be private or internal</li>
<li>All functions <strong>must</strong> either be declared as either <strong>internal</strong> or <strong>private</strong>
</li>
<li>
<strong>Must</strong> declare or operate on at least one unique storage slot identifier, represented as a bytes32 hash</li>
<li>At least <em>one</em> <strong>pure</strong> function (either <strong>private</strong> or <strong>internal</strong>) which loads a data structure from the location of a unique storage slot,<br>
to be accessed or manipulated as defined by its interface by an implementing contract.</li>
<li>
<strong>May</strong> declare one or more data structures and associated operations for accessing or mutating that structured data</li>
<li>
<strong>May</strong> declare modifiers for use with its other functions</li>
</ul>
<p>A trivial example <strong>Mixin</strong> implementation for the ERC-173 Contract Ownership Standard:</p>
<pre><code class="lang-auto">// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
pragma solidity >=0.6.4 <0.8.0;
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
import "https://github.com/vigilance91/solidarity/libraries/address/addressConstraints.sol";
import "https://github.com/vigilance91/solidarity/ERC/ERC173/eventsERC173.sol";
///
/// @title ERC173 Mixin Library
/// @author Tyler R. Drury <vigilstudios.td@gmail.com> (www.twitter.com/StudiosVigil) - copyright 2/4/2021, All Rights Reserved
///
library mixinERC173
{
using addressConstraints for address;
using eventsERC173 for address;
struct ERC173Storage {
address owner;
}
bytes32 internal constant STORAGE_SLOT = keccak256("ERC-173.mixin.storage");
function storageERC173(
bytes32 slot
)internal pure returns(
ERC173Storage storage ret
){
bytes32 position = slot;
assembly {
ret_slot := position
}
}
///
///read-only interface
///
function owner(
bytes32 slot
)internal view returns(
address
){
return storageERC173(slot).owner;
}
function requireOwner(
bytes32 slot,
address sender
)internal view
{
address O = owner(slot);
O.requireNotNull(
"owner can not be NULL"
);
O.requireEqual(
sender
"caller not owner"
);
}
///
///mutable interface
///
function transferOwnership(
bytes32 slot,
address newOwner
)internal
{
addres owner O = owner(slot);
O.requireNotEqual(newOwner);
O.emitTransferOwnership(newOwner);
storageERC173(slot).owner = newOwner;
}
function renounceOwnership(
bytes32 slot
)internal
{
transferOwnership(
slot,
addressLogic.NULL
);
}
}
</code></pre>
<p>Additionally, it may be convenient in future EIPs, should this technique show large adoption,<br>
to include a <code>mixin</code> keyword in future compiler versions,<br>
to abstract these axioms into compiler-defined and enforced behavior, in order to eliminate human error and<br>
so as to differentiate between the use and purpose of traditional libraries in contrast to external storage <strong>Mixins</strong>, such that:</p>
<ul>
<li>Constants <strong>should</strong> only be <strong>private</strong> or <strong>internal</strong>, to prevent deploying a <strong>public</strong> library.</li>
<li>Functions <strong>should</strong> only be <strong>private</strong> or <strong>internal</strong>,<br>
so as to allow for the inlining of the internal code for loading the storage structure from the specific storage slot,<br>
within the context of the implementing contract (this technique does not work properly with <strong>public</strong> library functions).</li>
<li>At least one data structure <strong>may</strong> be defined along with an associated, default storage slot,<br>
which the compiler <strong>could</strong> generate in future versions by default based on the name of the <strong>Mixin</strong> library which could be accessible using standard EVM type() introspection.</li>
<li>Code for loading a data structure from a storage slot (which is trivial assembly similar to a compiler generated default constructor)<br>
<strong>could</strong> easily be automatically generated by the complier in future version,<br>
along with the corresponding automatically generated storage slot identifier,<br>
similar to how contracts may have auto-generated default constructors, if one is not explicitly declared.</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="rationale-8" class="anchor" href="#rationale-8"></a>Rationale</h2>
<p>With the byte-code limit for the Spurious Dragon hard-fork of 24Kb is incredibly limiting,<br>
utilizing external storage slots in a standardized manner via <strong>mixins</strong> is not only convenient but incredibly powerful and flexible,<br>
allowing for more complex contracts without imposing massive restrictions on contract size.</p>
<p>This proposal also allows for the distinction between internal library code which defines the <strong>mixin</strong>’s functionality on a specific type or storage slot<br>
and the implementing contract which should utilize the <strong>mixin</strong>’s functionality while also being<br>
responsible for managing state logic associated with external callers of a public interface,<br>
providing a clean distinction between these two approaches and what constructs have responsibility for what functionality.</p>
<p>Additionally having a single, reusable <strong>Mixin</strong> library allows for greater flexibility as a developer by easily allowing code reuse<br>
in multiple contracts which implement the same structures or logic without having to duplicate code or the associated bytecode bloat of declaring contract variables.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="security-considerations-9" class="anchor" href="#security-considerations-9"></a>Security Considerations</h2>
<p>There are no immediate security concerns regarding <strong>Mixins</strong> (since they are abstractions for atomic data structures)<br>
beyond any concerns specific to a particular standard implementation however,<br>
as this technique further develops there is a possibility this proposal may have unforeseen security issues.</p>
<p>Since each individual <strong>Mixin</strong> (with a unique storage slot) loads its data structure within the Context of an implementing contract,<br>
multiple contracts which implement the same <strong>Mixin</strong> do not conflict, conversely,<br>
accessing the same <strong>Mixin</strong> internally from a derived Context contract will load the same storage as if called from the base contract.</p>
<p>Similar to the Black Diamond pattern in languages which support multiple inheritance,<br>
if a single contract that inherits from multiple various base contracts but which also happen to implement the same <strong>Mixin</strong> utilizing the same storage slot<br>
the potential exists for conflict and unintentionally overwrite storage intended for use by the other <strong>Mixin</strong>.</p>
<p>Since the contracts don’t have the variables declared locally, the compiler will most likely not generate any warning that multiple contracts<br>
are modifying the same storage location.</p>
<p>The simple solution to this concern is to just use a unique storage slot for each derived implementation when it is unavoidable<br>
to have a contract inherit from two or more contracts which implement the same <strong>Mixin</strong>.</p>
<p>Another concern is that there may be storage conflicts between Proxies and their implementations if the layout of a storage slot is updated or slot locations between the two differ.</p>
<p>There are currently no other major issues regarding the use of <strong>Mixins</strong>.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="references-10" class="anchor" href="#references-10"></a>References</h2>
<ul>
<li>ERC-165: Interface Support</li>
<li>EIP-897 Delegate Proxy</li>
<li>EIP-2470: Singleton Factory</li>
<li>EIP-2535: Diamonds</li>
<li>EIP-1613: Gas Station Network</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="copyright-11" class="anchor" href="#copyright-11"></a>Copyright</h2>
<p>Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.</p>
<hr>
<h2>
<a name="citation-12" class="anchor" href="#citation-12"></a>Citation</h2>
<p>Tyler R. Drury, “EIP-XXX: <strong>Mixin Library Standard</strong> [DRAFT]”,<br>
Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no XXX, February 2022. [Online serial].</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 18 | 1,218.6 | 0 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/mixin-library-standard/8434/1 |
61 | 7,554 | 7,554 | safeTransferFrom can be called by Anyone once setApprovalForAll has been granted on one address | safetransferfrom-can-be-called-by-anyone-once-setapprovalforall-has-been-granted-on-one-address | 21,862 | 1 | 4,214 | JosephF | JosephF | 2021-11-24T14:48:55.101Z | 2021-11-24T14:48:55.101Z | <p>The OpenZeppelin ERC721 Contract Library (I am using the Upgradeable version, but I assume that the behaviour should be the same in the “standard” non-apgradeable version) has the setApprovalForAll function, which enables an NFT owner to grant an operator to sell any of his Tokens on his behalf. I have used this function in one of my projects, whereby NFT owners grant (solely) my Smart Contract address, the ability to sell their Tokens on their behalf. I have noticed however, that once the setApprovalForAll function has been called by an owner, anyone could call the safeTransferFrom function and not only my Smart Contract or the Owner. This could constitute a major vulnerability in some existing smart contracts, in which the developer would expect that once the setApprovalForAll function has been called, that it would grant only the addresses found in the corresponding mapping to have the ability to call the safeTransferFrom function, but it actually grants anyone this ability.</p>
<p>To reproduce this vulnerability, I have implemented the following:</p>
<p>I have the following function in my ERC721 Smart Contract, which itself calls the safeTransferFrom function:</p>
<pre><code class="lang-auto">function tokTransfer(address payable from, address to, uint256 tokenId, uint256 price) external payable {
require(msg.value >= price);
this.safeTransferFrom(from, to, tokenId);
...
}
</code></pre>
<p>Token owners have called the setApprovalForAll on my Smart Contract, granting it authorisation to sell their tokens on their behalf. However, I am able to call this function directly in Truffle with the following statement (using the Purchaser account (i.e. accounts[2]) as the “from” parameter (i.e. _msgSender)):</p>
<pre><code class="lang-auto">instance.tokTransfer(accounts[1], accounts[2], 1001, '2500000000', {from: accounts[2], value: '2500000000'})
</code></pre>
<p>I can actually call my function, which itself calls the safeTransferFrom OpenZeppelin function, while the Sender (_msgSender) of the Transaction does not satisfy the require statement in the function below (found in the OpenZeppelin Library).</p>
<pre><code class="lang-auto"> function safeTransferFrom(
address from,
address to,
uint256 tokenId,
bytes memory _data
) public virtual override {
require(_isApprovedOrOwner(_msgSender(), tokenId), "ERC721: transfer caller is not owner nor approved");
_safeTransfer(from, to, tokenId, _data);
}
</code></pre>
<p>I have used the account (accounts[2]), which corresponds to the purchaser in the transaction above to make it clear and to emphasise on the vulnerability, but any account could be used for the “from” parameter. Also, please note that I am testing this using Ganache, just in case that this issue does not exist on the public Testnets or the Main Blockchain (I haven’t tested it on these yet), although I would expect it to behave the same.</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>
<p>Joseph F</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 20 | 4,514 | 0 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/safetransferfrom-can-be-called-by-anyone-once-setapprovalforall-has-been-granted-on-one-address/7554/1 |
61 | 7,554 | 7,554 | safeTransferFrom can be called by Anyone once setApprovalForAll has been granted on one address | safetransferfrom-can-be-called-by-anyone-once-setapprovalforall-has-been-granted-on-one-address | 21,870 | 2 | 587 | rmeissner | Richard Meissner | 2021-11-24T20:26:11.032Z | 2021-11-24T20:27:48.595Z | <p>Probably more a question for the openzepplin forum or solidity forum.</p>
<p>I didn’t look into it in detail, but one thing to note: when you call a function of a the contract with <code>this.</code> it will trigger an internal transaction and therefore <code>msg.sender</code> in the called method will be the contract itself. Therefore it doesn’t matter what sender actually called your tok method.</p>
<p>Edit:</p>
<p>Tgis behavior is for example mentioned in this section of the solidity docs: <a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.10/contracts.html#getter-functions" class="inline-onebox" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Contracts — Solidity 0.8.10 documentation</a></p> | null | 1 | 0 | 19 | 73.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/safetransferfrom-can-be-called-by-anyone-once-setapprovalforall-has-been-granted-on-one-address/7554/2 |
61 | 7,554 | 7,554 | safeTransferFrom can be called by Anyone once setApprovalForAll has been granted on one address | safetransferfrom-can-be-called-by-anyone-once-setapprovalforall-has-been-granted-on-one-address | 21,873 | 3 | 4,214 | JosephF | JosephF | 2021-11-24T23:10:00.461Z | 2021-11-24T23:10:00.461Z | <p>Thank you a millions times <a class="mention" href="/u/rmeissner">@rmeissner</a> You are absolutely right. The “this” keyword was messing up everything. After removing it, everything works as expected and unauthorised accounts are no longer able to call the transfer function. Regarding posting this post on this Forum, I had actually reported the issue on the OpenZeppeling Forum, but they were the ones who had actually suggested me to bring it up here (perhaps because of a potential vulnerability). Again, thank you very, very much and have a wonderful day!</p> | 2 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 38.8 | 0 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/safetransferfrom-can-be-called-by-anyone-once-setapprovalforall-has-been-granted-on-one-address/7554/3 |
61 | 2,943 | 2,943 | Constrained Resource Clients: Mar 2019 Update | constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update | 9,307 | 1 | 327 | shazow | Andrey Petrov | 2019-03-18T18:49:38.724Z | 2024-08-02T11:42:20.163Z | <p>Hi friends,</p>
<p>Let’s do another update thread!</p>
<p><em>Quick recap:</em> We’re talking about Ethereum clients that can run under constrained resource conditions, such as on phones or browsers or embedded devices or even <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eth2-in-eth1-light-clients/2880">on-chain inside a contract</a> <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/open_mouth.png?v=12" title=":open_mouth:" class="emoji" alt=":open_mouth:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20">.</p>
<h3><a name="request-for-updates-from-each-participating-project-1" class="anchor" href="#request-for-updates-from-each-participating-project-1"></a>Request for updates from each participating project:</h3>
<ul>
<li>Short summary: What is your project and its goal? (This can change over time)</li>
<li>Roadmap now: What is the currently working and available to try?</li>
<li>Roadmap next: What is being worked on over the next few months?</li>
<li>Current challenges and concerns: Do you need help with anything? Are there unknowns you’re accounting for that could be nailed down by another participant?</li>
</ul>
<h3><a name="participants-2" class="anchor" href="#participants-2"></a>Participants</h3>
<p>To all projects mentioned: Please post an update as described above.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://github.com/chainsafesystems/denode" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Denode </a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/noot">@noot</a> ChainSafe ansermino</li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Go-Ethereum</a> (LES/ULC): <a class="mention" href="/u/zsfelfoldi">@zsfelfoldi</a></li>
<li><a href="https://infura.io/" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Infura</a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/ryanschneider">@ryanschneider</a> egalano tueric</li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/MetaMask/mustekala" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Mustekala</a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/dryajov">@dryajov</a></li>
<li><a href="https://slock.it/" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Slock.it </a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/cjentzsch">@CJentzsch</a></li>
<li><a href="https://status.im/" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Status</a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/mandrigin">@mandrigin</a></li>
<li><a href="https://vipnode.org/" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Vipnode</a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/shazow">@shazow</a></li>
<li><a href="https://walleth.org/(LES/ULC)" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">WallETH</a>: <a class="mention" href="/u/ligi">@ligi</a></li>
</ul>
<p>If you’re hit with a link/mention limit, format the excess ones in plaintext.</p>
<p>If you’d like to join this list, please go ahead and post your update and I’ll make sure to explicitly include you next time.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 35 | 117 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update/2943/1 |
61 | 2,943 | 2,943 | Constrained Resource Clients: Mar 2019 Update | constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update | 9,308 | 2 | 327 | shazow | Andrey Petrov | 2019-03-18T19:22:17.093Z | 2019-03-18T19:22:17.093Z | <h3>Short Summary</h3>
<p><a href="https://vipnode.org/" rel="nofollow noopener">Vipnode </a> is building an economic incentive for running full Ethereum nodes which service light clients. It works by providing a coordinator (a vipnode pool) which connects paying clients with participating hosts.</p>
<h3>Roadmap: Now</h3>
<p>Vipnode v2.0 release happened last month (<a href="https://medium.com/vipnode/vipnode-2-0-released-9af1d65b4552" rel="nofollow noopener">announcement blog post</a>). The demo pool is still running on mainnet nodes but using Rinkeby for payments. I’m not in a position to run a mainnet payments pool right now, but I’m very open to other people trying it.</p>
<ul>
<li>Instructions to try it here: <a href="https://github.com/vipnode/vipnode#quickstart" rel="nofollow noopener">https://github.com/vipnode/vipnode#quickstart</a>
</li>
<li>Recent blog post: <a href="https://medium.com/vipnode/vipnode-2-0-released-9af1d65b4552" rel="nofollow noopener">https://medium.com/vipnode/vipnode-2-0-released-9af1d65b4552</a>
</li>
</ul>
<h3>Roadmap: Next</h3>
<p>There is a growing collection of ideas for a v3.0 milestone, but the current challenge is funding this project. Feels like financial support for non-ETH2.0 projects has died down since the end of last year.</p>
<p>I’m not sure I’ll be able to continue work on Vipnode for now as I’m figuring out what to do for money this year.</p>
<p>But hypothetically, these are things I’d want to focus on if I were able to continue working on Vipnode:</p>
<ul>
<li>Support for ULC (ultra-light clients), which was merged into Geth.</li>
<li>Add “mini-Infura” support to pools which provides a web3-compatible JSONRPC endpoint that gets loadbalanced between hosts, and metered similar to clients (so you can use something like MetaMask as a client without running a light node).</li>
<li>Add more ops and infrastructure-management features to vipnode, such as monitoring (alerts from the pool if your nodes go down), host-to-host peering (if you’re running a bunch of hosts), per-node analytics.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Challenges and Concerns</h3>
<ul>
<li>Financial support for Vipnode is a problem. I have a <a href="https://gitcoin.co/grants/32/vipnode" rel="nofollow noopener">Gitcoin grant setup for Vipnode</a> which is appreciated and partially covers ongoing maintenance costs, but not enough to continue advancing Vipnode.</li>
<li>In general, it’s not clear that timing for Vipnode is good right now. The network utilization is still low, and light clients are still not standard in any mainstream client. I’m sure there will come a time when it makes a lot of sense, and hopefully we’ll be in a good position for it when it does. Infrastructure/ops features seem like a better timely focus for now.</li>
</ul>
<p>(Any questions/suggestions are welcome, by the way!)</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 32 | 11.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update/2943/2 |
61 | 2,943 | 2,943 | Constrained Resource Clients: Mar 2019 Update | constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update | 9,310 | 3 | 14 | lrettig | Lane Rettig | 2019-03-18T20:19:28.113Z | 2019-03-18T20:19:28.113Z | <p>Random question: does doing things inside of a zero-knowledge proof count as resource constrained? ZK-SNARKs and STARKs, for instance, are still very limited in terms of the sorts of computations that can be performed within their circuits.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 29 | 15.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update/2943/3 |
61 | 2,943 | 2,943 | Constrained Resource Clients: Mar 2019 Update | constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update | 9,311 | 4 | 327 | shazow | Andrey Petrov | 2019-03-18T20:24:25.105Z | 2019-03-18T20:24:25.105Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="lrettig" data-post="3" data-topic="2943">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/lrettig/48/14_2.png" class="avatar"> lrettig:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>does doing things inside of a zero-knowledge proof count as resource constrained?</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>If you’re asking whether that’s relevant to this working group, then I’d qualify the constrained resource <em>clients</em> part. If someone is building an Ethereum client implementation that executes inside of a zero-knowledge proof (<img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/open_mouth.png?v=12" title=":open_mouth:" class="emoji" alt=":open_mouth:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"> <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/open_mouth.png?v=12" title=":open_mouth:" class="emoji" alt=":open_mouth:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20">) then yea, totally.</p> | 3 | 0 | 1 | 30 | 41 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update/2943/4 |
61 | 2,943 | 2,943 | Constrained Resource Clients: Mar 2019 Update | constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update | 9,609 | 5 | 1,545 | dominic | Dominic Letz | 2019-03-28T10:38:25.996Z | 2019-03-28T10:38:25.996Z | <h3>Short Summary</h3>
<p><a href="https://diode.io" rel="nofollow noopener">Diode</a> is a project focused on complementing internet PKI with certificate pinning in Ethereum blockchains, making mechanisms such as ENS available to constrained IoT devices, it’s initiated and run at Exosite an IoT company to fix some of the long-standing PKI issues.</p>
<p>At its core is the ability to connect constrained devices to an Ethereum blockchain to allow them to read contract state data and validate the corresponding Merkle proofs. The algorithm we developed coined BlockQuick is a gateway-free reputation based method for embedded devices to get a trustable understanding of a relatively recent block. We haven’t published the full paper yet, as we’re still looking for an independent reviewer - so please hands up if anyone has the time.</p>
<h3>Roadmap: Status</h3>
<p>The Diode Proof-of-Concept is functional but also work in progress. It comes in two parts</p>
<ol>
<li>Full Ethereum Node, but modified in block headers, node-to-node, and node-to-edge protocols.</li>
<li>Light Client (go) running on a raspberry pi.</li>
</ol>
<h3>Roadmap: In Progress - Proto</h3>
<ul>
<li>Get the BlockQuick paper reviewed and published</li>
<li>Improve PoC implementations to include Light Client incentive structure</li>
</ul>
<h3>Roadmap: Next - Testnet</h3>
<ul>
<li>Release full Diode whitepaper including light client incentive structures</li>
<li>Release Testnet & Sources</li>
<li>Port the Light Client to C and onto a real embedded device
<ul>
<li>Device Targets: Arduino, Embedded Chip, e.g., CC3220, Mobile Phone</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3>Roadmap: Far Future</h3>
<ul>
<li>Commercial Application for IoT devices</li>
</ul>
<h3>Challenges and Concerns</h3>
<p>ETH1 vs. ETH2 brings a lot of changes that directly affect BlockQuick, some of them good, some we don’t know yet.</p>
<ul>
<li>Signatures in Beacon chain are a good thing, something we’re having right now to add in our ETH1 variant. Though changes of consensus group and quick block authorship changes might be an issue for the reputation system, this needs further investigation.</li>
<li>BLS vs. ECDSA looks like a huge step. Usage if BLS signatures could also for the light client protocol have significant advantages but the maturity of BLS seems still very low and before embedded devices will have hardware accelerated BLS support is likely going to be a couple of years.</li>
</ul> | null | 0 | 0 | 17 | 38.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/constrained-resource-clients-mar-2019-update/2943/5 |
61 | 11,777 | 11,777 | Updating Ethereum Magicians Categories - Late 2022 | updating-ethereum-magicians-categories-late-2022 | 31,052 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2022-11-17T18:13:44.573Z | 2022-11-17T18:13:44.573Z | <p><a class="mention" href="/u/matt">@matt</a> has some ideas about improving our categorization to better separate core EIPs from ERCs, this topic is to track this set of changes for late 2022.</p>
<p>Also, for reference, this is similar work done in 2021: <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/updating-ethereum-magicians-categories-2021/5813" class="inline-onebox">Updating Ethereum Magicians Categories - 2021</a></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 13 | 27.6 | 2 | true | true | true | 1 | false | null | /t/updating-ethereum-magicians-categories-late-2022/11777/1 |
61 | 11,777 | 11,777 | Updating Ethereum Magicians Categories - Late 2022 | updating-ethereum-magicians-categories-late-2022 | 31,055 | 2 | 303 | abcoathup | Andrew B Coathup | 2022-11-18T00:47:22.138Z | 2022-11-18T00:47:22.138Z | <p>I think it would be good to split EIPs and ERCs.<br>
A subcategory for linking from EIPs in the repo to discuss would be good, with templates suggesting what to post.</p>
<ul>
<li>Core EIPs
<ul>
<li>EIP discussion</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>ERCs
<ul>
<li>ERC discussion</li>
<li>Ideas</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul> | null | 0 | 0 | 11 | 17.2 | 3 | true | false | true | 1 | false | null | /t/updating-ethereum-magicians-categories-late-2022/11777/2 |
61 | 22,992 | 22,992 | Wait & see protection to reduce risk of justifying the wrong chain | wait-see-protection-to-reduce-risk-of-justifying-the-wrong-chain | 55,832 | 1 | 8,529 | mxs | Sébastien Rannou | 2025-02-26T01:53:52.302Z | 2025-02-26T16:17:52.430Z | <h1><a name="p-55832-wait-and-see-1" class="anchor" href="#p-55832-wait-and-see-1"></a>Wait and see</h1>
<p><em>Thanks to <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/u/ralexstokes">ralexstokes</a> & <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/u/ManuNLP/">ManuNLP</a> for reviews & feedback.</em></p>
<p>This post describes an approach to minimize the risk during Ethereum upgrades to avoid the Pectra/Holesky scenario where the wrong chain was justified due to a bug present in 3 implementations of execution clients.</p>
<p>It does not imply changes to the specs or the Ethereum protocol, but it requires all beacon nodes to play this game. A parallel to this approach would be the Doppelgänger protection, which isn’t bullet-proof but somewhat easy to implement and can save the day.</p>
<h2><a name="p-55832-overview-2" class="anchor" href="#p-55832-overview-2"></a>Overview</h2>
<p>At the transition moment of the fork, beacons enter a wait-and-see mode where they arbitrarily mute 40% of their validators: muted validators continue to propose blocks but do not attest. Knowing 40% of the network is not attesting, observe what the 60% voting ones are doing and act depending on it.</p>
<h3><a name="p-55832-smooth-upgrade-3" class="anchor" href="#p-55832-smooth-upgrade-3"></a>Smooth upgrade</h3>
<p>If the 60% agree on the same view, the beacon unmutes its validators and the chain finalizes. 40% of the validators lose 1 attestation during this process.</p>
<p><img src="https://hackmd.io/_uploads/HypPr_i5yx.png" alt="Screenshot 2025-02-25 at 09.52.47" width="567" height="500"></p>
<h3><a name="p-55832-upgrade-with-bugs-4" class="anchor" href="#p-55832-upgrade-with-bugs-4"></a>Upgrade with bugs</h3>
<p>If the 60% don’t agree on the same chain, the beacon continues in muted mode for 40% of its validators and waits for manual clarification. In this mode, the validators won’t cast a vote for a source higher than the one of the fork, because they don’t see 2/3 of the network vote on something (40% is down). The two sides are stuck.</p>
<p>Network enters inactivity leak but there is time for client teams to investigate what is going on and provide a fix. Once the fix lands, the bogus clients are upgraded and agree on the same view.</p>
<p><img src="https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rJeW6Osc1x.png" alt="Screenshot 2025-02-25 at 10.25.04" width="570" height="500"></p>
<p>They key point is that, as long as a consensus client doesn’t see 2/3 of the network voting on the same target, its source vote will stay at a stuck position. When the network upgrades in the right fork, it will be able to see a target with 2/3 and increase its source vote. There is no surrounding involved so no slashing.</p>
<p><img src="https://hackmd.io/_uploads/ByGiP_ickg.png" alt="Screenshot 2025-02-25 at 10.02.11" width="690" height="445"></p>
<h2><a name="p-55832-examples-5" class="anchor" href="#p-55832-examples-5"></a>Examples</h2>
<p>Assuming a coordinated bug on 80% of the network (3/4), beacon knows 40% is randomly down, on the 60% up statistically it sees:</p>
<ul>
<li>3/4 vote for 1 thing (~45% of the network), side A,</li>
<li>1/4 the other (~15% of the network), side B.</li>
</ul>
<p>Bug is identifed on side A and fixed, everyone upgrades and moves to side B, beacons see 60% agree on the same target there, accept to vote on it as you see it the same, 2/3 is reached and the network continues.</p>
<h2><a name="p-55832-downsides-6" class="anchor" href="#p-55832-downsides-6"></a>Downsides</h2>
<ul>
<li>It only works during specific periods where a beacon “knows 40% of validators is randomly down”, it won’t prevent such bugs during normal operations,</li>
<li>It costs some attestation misses (likely 1-2 or so if it everything goes fine, but it’s ridiculously small compared to the risks),</li>
<li>An attacker not playing by the rules can lure the network into believing there is 60% agreement, this would defeat this protection: this is not a bullet-proof protection, and is more to prevent bug scenarios.</li>
</ul> | null | 0 | 0 | 22 | 269.4 | 1 | false | false | false | 4 | false | null | /t/wait-see-protection-to-reduce-risk-of-justifying-the-wrong-chain/22992/1 |
61 | 6,602 | 6,602 | State Management Review | state-management-review | 19,793 | 1 | 3,605 | norswap | null | 2021-07-05T15:27:34.723Z | 2024-08-02T11:44:18.795Z | <p>Hey everyone,</p>
<p>I’m taking part in the core developer apprenticeship, and as a part of that I did a deep dive on the various concerns and proposals connected to state management in Ethereum.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.notion.so/norswap/State-Expiry-Statelessness-in-Review-8d531abcc2984babb9bf76a44459e611" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Link to the review</a></p>
<p>I thought I’d post it here for exposure. I’m very open to comments / suggestions / contributions!</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 25 | 325 | 2 | false | false | false | 4 | false | null | /t/state-management-review/6602/1 |
61 | 6,602 | 6,602 | State Management Review | state-management-review | 19,802 | 2 | 2,190 | matt | matt | 2021-07-05T18:00:53.718Z | 2021-07-05T18:00:53.718Z | <p>Nice write up <a class="mention" href="/u/norswap">@norswap</a>! In the future if you wouldn’t mind, it’s generally preferable to write the text in the post itself. It makes quoting easier <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/slight_smile.png?v=12" title=":slight_smile:" class="emoji" alt=":slight_smile:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"></p>
<blockquote>
<p>To give you an idea, a full node (which maintains the state, but does only keeps the N (usually N=128) latest blocks) <a href="https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chaindefault">must currently store > 400 GB</a> (or more than double that if using Geth). This is still better than archive nodes (who keep the whole block history), which must store <a href="https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chainarchive">a whopping 7.5 TB</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Generally the state is one of the smaller portions of data fast synced nodes store. Depending on the exact storage model, should be something like 30-60 GB. Headers, block bodies,<br>
receipts, and caches take up a lot of the rest of the data. Not sure how much keeping the last N blocks worth of state takes up, but generally these aren’t simple copies, they’re state diffs.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>or more than double that if using Geth</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Geth nodes I’ve synced recently are closer to 430 GBs.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A Merkle tree is a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radix_tree">radix tree</a> (a compressed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trie">trie</a>)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I think you mean a <em>Modified Patricia</em> Merkle Tree <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/slight_smile.png?v=12" title=":slight_smile:" class="emoji" alt=":slight_smile:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a contract might not know in advance which state it is going to access — which makes it impossible to provide proof for</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is called <a href="https://ethresear.ch/t/state-provider-models-in-ethereum-2-0/6750">Dynamic State Access</a> (DSA)!</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If a transaction wants to access older state, it must use a special instruction to regenerate the state, supplying the state’s value, along with a witness (proof) for that value.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I don’t think an instruction (as in an EVM instruction) would be the main mechanism that hydrates a state element. I expect a new transaction type will support witnesses and at the beginning of the transaction the state will be inserted into the current active state.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>First, it requires some nodes to keep the checkpointed state. This can be a significant amount of data (twice the size of the normal state if implemented naively). Because it’s so much data, nodes will keep at most the state of a single checkpoint — meaning you’ll have to download the hundreds of GB of the checkpoint state before your source nodes move on to the next checkpoint.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I don’t think this is true. Fast sync isn’t checkpointed like warp sync or something, the db you’re syncing is always changing under you. The network isn’t storing old checkpoints AFAIK. It’s just using the pivots that are inherent to geth’s handling of block reorgs.</p>
<p>–</p>
<p>Overall, awesome write up. Thank you for sharing!</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 24 | 14.8 | 4 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/state-management-review/6602/2 |
61 | 6,602 | 6,602 | State Management Review | state-management-review | 19,814 | 3 | 3,605 | norswap | null | 2021-07-06T12:39:50.812Z | 2021-07-06T12:39:50.812Z | <p>Thanks, this is exactly the kind of review I was looking for!</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the future if you wouldn’t mind, it’s generally preferable to write the text in the post itself. It makes quoting easier</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Noted!</p>
<p>Edit: wouldn’t have worked, as I can only put two links in a post as a “new user” <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/cry.png?v=12" title=":cry:" class="emoji" alt=":cry:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Generally the state is one of the smaller portions of data fast synced nodes store. Depending on the exact storage model, should be something like 30-60 GB. Headers, block bodies,<br>
receipts, and caches take up a lot of the rest of the data. Not sure how much keeping the last N blocks worth of state takes up, but generally these aren’t simple copies, they’re state diffs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Amended that section to be more precise. Can the size of the state be tracked somewhere, short of running a node with custom code and measuring it there?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Geth nodes I’ve synced recently are closer to 430 GBs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Do you know what explains the discrepancy with <a href="https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chaindefault" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chaindefault</a> ?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I think you mean a <em>Modified Patricia</em> Merkle Tree <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/slight_smile.png?v=12" title=":slight_smile:" class="emoji" alt=":slight_smile:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Got to push back a bit here - a patricia tree is a radix tree! In fact, the wikipedia page for radix tree says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Donald R. Morrison first described what Donald Knuth, pages 498-500 in Volume III of The Art of Computer Programming, calls “Patricia’s trees” in 1968.[6] Gernot Gwehenberger independently invented and described the data structure at about the same time.[7] PATRICIA trees are radix trees with radix equals 2, which means that each bit of the key is compared individually and each node is a two-way (i.e., left versus right) branch.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>“modified patricia tree” is a term that is almost 100% associated with Ethereum. For someone that’s not into blockchains but has a CS background, you can immediately tell what a radix tree, whereas a patricia tree is a much more obscure term.</p>
<p>I’ll add the term though, it’s good to have it mentionned.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is called <a href="https://ethresear.ch/t/state-provider-models-in-ethereum-2-0/6750" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">Dynamic State Access </a> (DSA)!<br>
I don’t think an instruction (as in an EVM instruction) …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>True, included!</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t think this is true. Fast sync isn’t checkpointed like warp sync or something, the db you’re syncing is always changing under you. The network isn’t storing old checkpoints AFAIK. It’s just using the pivots that are inherent to geth’s handling of block reorgs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You’re right, I must have gotten warp & fast sync conflated. I’ll read up & update that section. Tell me if you know a good writeup on this.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Overall, awesome write up. Thank you for sharing!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thanks <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/pray.png?v=12" title=":pray:" class="emoji" alt=":pray:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"></p> | 2 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 12.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/state-management-review/6602/3 |
61 | 6,602 | 6,602 | State Management Review | state-management-review | 19,815 | 4 | 2,190 | matt | matt | 2021-07-06T13:23:00.734Z | 2021-07-06T13:23:00.734Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="norswap" data-post="3" data-topic="6602">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/norswap/48/4243_2.png" class="avatar"> norswap:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>Can the size of the state be tracked somewhere, short of running a node with custom code and measuring it there?</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Geth added some db introspection with v1.10.0, maybe that helps? I think Erigon also has similar tools.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Do you know what explains the discrepancy with <a href="https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chaindefault">https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chaindefault</a> ?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Usually if you compare a recently fast synced node to a full node that was fast synced awhile ago, you’ll see a discrepancy. This is because <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2021/03/03/geth-v1-10-0/">pruning is really hard</a>. There may also be things that are generated for newly full synced blocks (after fast sync completes) that you don’t have for pre-fast-synced blocks.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="norswap" data-post="3" data-topic="6602">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/norswap/48/4243_2.png" class="avatar"> norswap:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>Got to push back a bit here - a patricia tree is a radix tree! In fact, the wikipedia page for radix tree says:</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Yes absolutely, but a merkle tree itself is not a radix trie. That is a very specific flavor.</p> | 3 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 27.6 | 4 | true | true | true | 1 | false | null | /t/state-management-review/6602/4 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,334 | 1 | 2,457 | dankrad | Dankrad | 2025-05-26T20:44:21.432Z | 2025-05-26T20:44:21.432Z | <h1><a name="p-59334-real-time-proving-has-arrived-1" class="anchor" href="#p-59334-real-time-proving-has-arrived-1"></a>Real-time proving has arrived</h1>
<p>Last week, Succinct announced that they had achieved real time proving:</p>
<p><div class="lightbox-wrapper"><a class="lightbox" href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/original/2X/5/5d29b1952c7a99a8ecf65ddda7e96759fed62229.png" data-download-href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/5d29b1952c7a99a8ecf65ddda7e96759fed62229" title="image"><img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/5/5d29b1952c7a99a8ecf65ddda7e96759fed62229_2_350x500.png" alt="image" data-base62-sha1="di9JrRoX3Ax6h5IwuJcCpfZonXj" width="350" height="500" srcset="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/5/5d29b1952c7a99a8ecf65ddda7e96759fed62229_2_350x500.png, https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/5/5d29b1952c7a99a8ecf65ddda7e96759fed62229_2_525x750.png 1.5x, https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/5/5d29b1952c7a99a8ecf65ddda7e96759fed62229_2_700x1000.png 2x" data-dominant-color="EAEAEB"><div class="meta"><svg class="fa d-icon d-icon-far-image svg-icon" aria-hidden="true"><use href="#far-image"></use></svg><span class="filename">image</span><span class="informations">732×1045 329 KB</span><svg class="fa d-icon d-icon-discourse-expand svg-icon" aria-hidden="true"><use href="#discourse-expand"></use></svg></div></a></div></p>
<p>We should see this as an amazing success, and as the time the big bet Ethereum made on ZK is paying off.</p>
<p>Can we scale the L1 as much as we want now? Is anything possible? For good reasons, we started discussing the limits: <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/formalizing-decentralization-goals-in-the-context-of-larger-l1-gaslimits-and-2020s-era-tech/23942" class="inline-onebox">Formalizing decentralization goals in the context of larger L1 gaslimits and 2020s-era tech</a> – in short: Even in a world where most nodes can relax and only verify data availability and execution proofs, we want to make sure that the production of these don’t become singular choke points for the network and so we must keep some limits on how powerful we allow them to be. A good guideline is that if some people are still able to run them from home, it becomes hard to maintain a global ban.</p>
<p>There is one type of node that can’t really be distributed: A stateful node that remains able to follow the state and compute updated state roots (for example RPC, but also as part of the proving pipeline).</p>
<p>Proving is a bit more interesting, because in principle it is highly parallelizable not just across a single machine but across globally distributed networks, even with limited bandwidth; think of just splitting a block into many miniblocks to prove them. However, there are calls to apply our limits directly to provers:</p>
<p><div class="lightbox-wrapper"><a class="lightbox" href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/original/2X/6/6e766c05d35c9bd3db2dc580d43dd5aacbd0e01d.png" data-download-href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/6e766c05d35c9bd3db2dc580d43dd5aacbd0e01d" title="image"><img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/6/6e766c05d35c9bd3db2dc580d43dd5aacbd0e01d_2_690x373.png" alt="image" data-base62-sha1="fLceRabm669QANe4wcQWpc4KgdD" width="690" height="373" srcset="https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/optimized/2X/6/6e766c05d35c9bd3db2dc580d43dd5aacbd0e01d_2_690x373.png, https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/original/2X/6/6e766c05d35c9bd3db2dc580d43dd5aacbd0e01d.png 1.5x, https://ethereum-magicians.org/uploads/default/original/2X/6/6e766c05d35c9bd3db2dc580d43dd5aacbd0e01d.png 2x" data-dominant-color="F1F2F2"><div class="meta"><svg class="fa d-icon d-icon-far-image svg-icon" aria-hidden="true"><use href="#far-image"></use></svg><span class="filename">image</span><span class="informations">738×400 109 KB</span><svg class="fa d-icon d-icon-discourse-expand svg-icon" aria-hidden="true"><use href="#discourse-expand"></use></svg></div></a></div></p>
<p>I think while these are good goals for the Ethereum network to have, we should “suspend” the strict decentralization limits for proving for the next few years. Provers have improved by many orders of magnitude over the last few years, with proving overhead improving from the trillions to just around a million today. We can expect several more orders of magnitude over the next few years (with <a class="mention" href="/u/vbuterin">@vbuterin</a> believing it will ultimately be only a single digit overhead – almost a one million times improvement from today to go). This may take some years to materialize (and might ultimately depend on new types of hardware specialized in proving), but I suggest we should not repeat the mistake from the last few years: Let’s “suspend” the rules and be less strict about L1 provers for five years.</p>
<h2><a name="p-59334-why-its-ok-to-be-more-relaxed-about-proving-2" class="anchor" href="#p-59334-why-its-ok-to-be-more-relaxed-about-proving-2"></a>Why it’s ok to be more relaxed about proving</h2>
<p>There are several good reasons why proving can be more relaxed than other parts of the stack:</p>
<h3><a name="p-59334-h-1-unlike-other-parts-of-the-stack-scaling-back-does-solve-proving-3" class="anchor" href="#p-59334-h-1-unlike-other-parts-of-the-stack-scaling-back-does-solve-proving-3"></a>1. Unlike other parts of the stack, scaling back does solve proving</h3>
<p>One of the reasons we were always extremely careful about scaling the L1 was that there was “no going back” – yes you can lower the gas limit again, but the large state size and its downsides remain. However, there is no such “ratchet effect” for proving. If we scale to 3 gigagas, and a global regulatory attack on provers happens, we can go back to today’s gas limit, and even though the state has grown, this does not really affect proving (except for slightly larger state witnesses, but logarithmic growth is manageable in practice). The provers are not a very effective choke point.</p>
<p>In fact, we could design our consensus so that it locks in transactions before proving – the only thing the attack could do would be slowing down, a graceful degradation.</p>
<h3><a name="p-59334-h-2-proving-can-be-ultra-parallelized-4" class="anchor" href="#p-59334-h-2-proving-can-be-ultra-parallelized-4"></a>2. Proving can be ultra-parallelized</h3>
<p>Should the vision of “single-digit overhead proving” not materialize, there are still other ways to make sure that we won’t have prover chokepoints. At the cost of stlightly increased latency, we can distribute proving across tens, hundreds or even thousands of machines. While it would not be a strict “one out of n” honesty assumption on these, it would still be an honest minority assumption.</p>
<h2><a name="p-59334-lets-not-repeat-our-previous-mistakes-5" class="anchor" href="#p-59334-lets-not-repeat-our-previous-mistakes-5"></a>Let’s not repeat our previous mistakes</h2>
<p>Proving at scale is a huge win for Ethereum. It’s an industry that was bootstrapped both by many community investments and the rollup-centric roadmap. Not using these powers now that we have them would be our biggest mistake yet.</p>
<p>While we would probably be in a better place if we had decided on a moderate scaling L1 roadmap of ca. 10x in 2021, we understandably did not go for it: At the time, 10x did not seems to be enough of a factor to matter, and it wasn’t clear how to continue from there. Yet, we are paying dearly for this, as Ethereum would have probably stayed much more competitive over the last few years had it continued to make strong investments in L1 engineering.</p>
<p>We should not repeat this mistake now by choking scaling again due to concerns about prover decentralization. Prover centralization, for all the points mentioned above, is different: (1) It probably won’t last, (2) it’s not permanent (we can scale back), and (3) if push comes to shove we can slightly increase latency and distribute them.</p> | null | 3 | 0 | 109 | 5,691.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 19 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/1 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,335 | 2 | 7,588 | ihagopian | Ignacio Hagopian | 2025-05-26T22:49:58.294Z | 2025-05-27T01:13:02.792Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="dankrad" data-post="1" data-topic="24346">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/dankrad/48/2962_2.png" class="avatar"> dankrad:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>If we scale to 3 gigagas, and a global regulatory attack on provers happens, we can go back to today’s gas limit, and even though the state has grown, this does not really affect proving (except for slightly larger state witnesses, but logarithmic growth is manageable in practice). The provers are not a very effective choke point.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Regarding this, I’m thinking of two consequences:</p>
<ol>
<li>The base fee will probably skyrocket, which would have a big impact on existing applications—potentially making many of them not viable anymore and affecting many users. I think it is worth considering this impact for the proposed fallback strategy.</li>
<li>If the network has a 3 gigagas throughput, the state size would have grown massively. To prove, you still need to run a full node (i.e. full state) and be able to access it fast enough to generate the witness for proving.</li>
</ol>
<p>Regarding the latter, maybe you’re thinking that the computational resources are the dominant factor compared to running a distributed system that can store and access the full state fast enough? (Clarif: I’m assuming the ban also cover builders)</p> | null | 2 | 1 | 80 | 101 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/2 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,340 | 3 | 2,457 | dankrad | Dankrad | 2025-05-27T07:58:56.838Z | 2025-05-27T07:58:56.838Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="ihagopian" data-post="2" data-topic="24346">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/ihagopian/48/8788_2.png" class="avatar"> ihagopian:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>The base fee will probably skyrocket, which would have a big impact on existing applications—potentially making many of them not viable anymore and affecting many users. I think it is worth considering this impact for the proposed fallback strategy.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Yes, in the case of such an attack, usage of Ethereum L1 would have to be reduced massively and be more restricted to the high value use cases that actually require the high level of censorship resistance it provides.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="ihagopian" data-post="2" data-topic="24346">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/ihagopian/48/8788_2.png" class="avatar"> ihagopian:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>If the network has a 3 gigagas throughput, the state size would have grown massively. To prove, you still need to run a full node (i.e. full state) and be able to access it fast enough to generate the witness for proving.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>This is why I would still apply the stricter limits to stateful nodes (probably even much lower than the suggested $100k/10 kW limits and more around “beefy home computer with some extra SSDs”). Realistically this is still very possible and the main limit here is going to be bandwidth.</p> | 2 | 1 | 1 | 73 | 99.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/3 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,345 | 4 | 13,832 | RostyslavBortman | Rostyslav Bortman | 2025-05-27T09:29:38.849Z | 2025-05-27T09:29:38.849Z | <p>If we go down this path, the permanent growth of state for full nodes could become so massive that we risk replicating Solana’s current problem - where only centralized RPC providers can realistically operate. This undermines the very decentralization Ethereum is trying to preserve. Relaxing prover decentralization may be fine short-term, but relaxing node requirements risks long-term centralization.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a market structure dominated by a few RPC providers is one that will face strong pressure to deplatform or censor users</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In saying that, I do want us to find a way to use Ethereum real time proving which was achieved recently as soon as possible.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 63 | 37.6 | 0 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/4 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,347 | 5 | 11,959 | soispoke | null | 2025-05-27T11:27:44.950Z | 2025-05-27T11:27:44.950Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="dankrad" data-post="3" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/dankrad/48/2962_2.png" class="avatar"> dankrad:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>Yes, in the case of such an attack, usage of Ethereum L1 would have to be reduced massively and be more restricted to the high value use cases that actually require the high level of censorship resistance it provides.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>I don’t think it’s acceptable to have a threat that could render a large portion of users (including businesses and institutions built on Ethereum) unable to use the chain because they’re priced out in the event of a regulatory attack on provers. What would the priced out users do then? (h/t <a class="mention" href="/u/ihagopian">@ihagopian</a>)</p>
<p>That would mean a network where censorship resistance is only guaranteed for the wealthiest N% of users so it doesn’t really work.</p> | 3 | 2 | 1 | 56 | 76.2 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/5 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,349 | 6 | 2,457 | dankrad | Dankrad | 2025-05-27T12:17:14.163Z | 2025-05-27T12:17:14.163Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="soispoke" data-post="5" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/soispoke/48/13615_2.png" class="avatar"> soispoke:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t think it’s acceptable to have a threat that could render a large portion of users (including businesses and institutions built on Ethereum) unable to use the chain because they’re priced out in the event of a regulatory attack on provers. What would the priced out users do then? (h/t <a class="mention" href="/u/ihagopian">@ihagopian</a>)</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>You are arguing that since there is a risk that they might be priced out, we should never offer it at all. That seems crazy to me.</p>
<p>In the case where this attack happens, the user previously on L1 will have to move to L2s. This has some downsides:</p>
<ul>
<li>The users lose atomic composability with L1, which is presumably the main reason they were there</li>
<li>Ethereum loses the network effects of having central liquidity</li>
</ul>
<p>However, if the provers fail, they get the same benefits they would get now without scaling the L1.</p> | 5 | 1 | 1 | 54 | 85.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 4 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/6 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,350 | 7 | 1,114 | gballet | Guillaume Ballet | 2025-05-27T12:34:48.629Z | 2025-05-27T12:34:48.629Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="ihagopian" data-post="2" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/ihagopian/48/8788_2.png" class="avatar"> ihagopian:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>To prove, you still need to run a full node (i.e. full state) and be able to access it fast enough to generate the witness for proving.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>not only that, but we also have to assume that the number of actors with the whole state will have greatly decreased by then, since most users would simply run a stateless validator.</p> | 2 | 0 | 1 | 54 | 65.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/7 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,351 | 8 | 11,959 | soispoke | null | 2025-05-27T13:07:11.766Z | 2025-05-27T13:18:10.067Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="dankrad" data-post="6" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/dankrad/48/2962_2.png" class="avatar"> dankrad:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>You are arguing that since there is a risk that they might be priced out, we should never offer it at all. That seems crazy to me.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Ah no that’s not what I was arguing. I think we should offer it, I was just arguing for defining a reasonable prover budget so we minimize the chances of a regulatory ban shutting down <em>all</em> provers. This way we minimize the chances of users ever getting priced out in the first place.</p>
<p>I also don’t have super restrictive limits in mind, but if we can temporarily reduce chances of catastrophic events by defining some requirements that would still allow us to get a ton more scaling compared to today, I think there is value in doing that.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="netdev" data-post="9" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/netdev/48/14375_2.png" class="avatar"> netdev:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>A large portion of users have already been priced out of Ethereum L1 for many years</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Right, but (1) I don’t remember people being very happy about it, and (2) it’s one thing to be priced out, it’s another to suddenly have to shut down services provided on L1 due to a sudden change in regulation.</p> | 6 | 0 | 2 | 54 | 75.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/8 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,352 | 9 | 12,954 | netdev | netdev | 2025-05-27T13:13:28.531Z | 2025-05-27T13:13:28.531Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="soispoke" data-post="5" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/soispoke/48/13615_2.png" class="avatar"> soispoke:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t think it’s acceptable to have a threat that could render a large portion of users (including businesses and institutions built on Ethereum) unable to use the chain because they’re priced out in the event of a regulatory attack on provers. What would the priced out users do then? (h/t <a class="mention" href="/u/ihagopian">@ihagopian</a>)</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>A large portion of users have already been priced out of Ethereum L1 for many years</p> | 5 | 1 | 1 | 54 | 45.8 | 1 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/9 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,355 | 10 | 12,865 | lex-node | _g4brielShapir0 | 2025-05-27T15:23:46.344Z | 2025-05-27T15:23:46.344Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="dankrad" data-post="1" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/dankrad/48/2962_2.png" class="avatar"> dankrad:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>a global regulatory attack on provers</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>this is the first time that I, a lawyer, am hearing of fears of regulatory attacks on provers…any particular reason for this fear or links to related discussions I can take a look at? I don’t normally think of proving as a high regulatory-risk activity. . .</p> | null | 1 | 1 | 51 | 40.2 | 0 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/10 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,360 | 12 | 2,457 | dankrad | Dankrad | 2025-05-27T18:08:34.630Z | 2025-05-27T18:08:34.630Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="lex-node" data-post="10" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/lex-node/48/14285_2.png" class="avatar"> lex-node:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>this is the first time that I, a lawyer, am hearing of fears of regulatory attacks on provers…any particular reason for this fear or links to related discussions I can take a look at? I don’t normally think of proving as a high regulatory-risk activity. . .</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>This is less about law as it is and more about “what potentially could be”. The idea is that if there is any single chokepoint (e.g. 1 or a handful of provers worldwide) then this would be the easiest way to attack Ethereum, by preventing the prover from proving blocks that include some transactions. One way would be through regulations.</p> | 10 | 1 | 1 | 53 | 60.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/12 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,361 | 13 | 12,865 | lex-node | _g4brielShapir0 | 2025-05-27T18:53:15.631Z | 2025-05-27T18:53:15.631Z | <p>makes sense, thanks ser</p> | 12 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 40.6 | 0 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/13 |
61 | 24,346 | 24,346 | Relaxing the prover hardware requirements for the next few years | relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years | 59,463 | 14 | 13,846 | tim-clancy.eth | tim-clancy.eth | 2025-05-29T18:37:15.439Z | 2025-05-29T18:37:15.439Z | <aside class="quote no-group quote-modified" data-username="dankrad" data-post="1" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/dankrad/48/2962_2.png" class="avatar"> dankrad:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>For good reasons, we started discussing the limits: Formalizing decentralization goals in the context of larger L1 gaslimits and 2020s-era tech (<code>https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/formalizing-decentralization-goals-in-the-context-of-larger-l1-gaslimits-and-2020s-era-tech/23942</code>)</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>I am glad that we are already thinking of what limits are reasonable and formally defining them; being rigorous about requirements for solo stakers (<code>https://hackmd.io/DsDcxDAVShSSLLwHWdfynQ?view</code>) (local and non-local block building) is long overdue.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="dankrad" data-post="1" data-topic="24346">
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<img alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/dankrad/48/2962_2.png" class="avatar"> dankrad:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>I think while these are good goals for the Ethereum network to have, we should “suspend” the strict decentralization limits for proving for the next few years.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Which of <a class="mention" href="/u/vbuterin">@vbuterin</a>’s suggested requirements are you proposing suspending?</p>
<ol>
<li>We still need to demonstrate real-time proving of the worst-case block anyways. If it’s much worse than the average case this seems like a good motivation to do some repricing.</li>
<li>We also need to formally verify anyways.</li>
<li>This seems to be the only limit to consider.</li>
<li>Whatever the gas limit ends up being will also heavily impact the limit.</li>
</ol>
<p>I’ll add a requirement of my own. It goes without saying that the prover must be fully Free Software (<code>https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#fs-definition</code>) as well; i.e. the SP1 CUDA prover is currently distributed as an unlicensed binary. It would not be tolerable for Ethereum to rely at its core upon something closed source.</p>
<p>So it all boils down to the kW. This specific mostly-realtime demo was 160x4090s for that under ~100kW figure. Even though we only need a single honest, parallelizable prover I don’t want to go nuts with this. I don’t have enough faith that if we start at 1MW we won’t decide to 10x throughput instead of making proving 10x cheaper the next time proving undergoes a 10x in performance.</p> | null | 0 | 1 | 38 | 302.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 3 | false | null | /t/relaxing-the-prover-hardware-requirements-for-the-next-few-years/24346/14 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,520 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-18T17:28:28.846Z | 2019-01-18T17:34:44.214Z | <p>This is to discuss the notion of an “abort switch”, which would enable a more ordered withdrawal of a planned network upgrade in installed Ethereum clients should a bug or security vulnerability require that the upgrade be delayed. In the current configuration, clients must issue an update and coordinate a software update with miners and other runners of nodes.</p>
<p><a class="mention" href="/u/alexeyakhunov">@AlexeyAkhunov</a> on Gitter at <a href="https://gitter.im/ethereum/AllCoreDevs?at=5c420383cb47ec3000640ddc">08:49</a> PST</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Regarding the upgrade switch that <a class="mention" href="/u/karalabe">@karalabe</a> brought up: I wanted to comment, but did not want to take more time on the call. I think it can be designed in a way that it does not present centralisation vector. I see it as a voting multisig with a very limited power - to skip a network upgrade. Any abuse of this power would be accountable, because we will see who pulled the trigger. Normally, the discussion and emergency call would still happen, and only after that, the key holders will “do their duty”. If someone does it before the agreement call, it is clearly seen. And, of course, the membership of the multisig is regularly reviewed, and inactive participant removed. Also, if the multisig becomes completely compromised, removal of its powers can still be done via hard-fork coordinated in the “usual” way</p>
<p>And, of course, it should be opt-in from the clients</p>
<p>I think we should not shy away from such mechanism. Informal structures that make these kind of decisions already exist, and we know that. Making them formal actually make the process MORE transparent, not less</p>
</blockquote> | null | 0 | 0 | 27 | 240.4 | 2 | true | true | true | 2 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/1 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,529 | 2 | 1,037 | ajsutton | Adrian Sutton | 2019-01-18T21:19:52.832Z | 2019-01-18T21:19:52.832Z | <p>A single global abort switch introduces at least the perception of centralisation, even if there are mitigations and accountability around that. Basically, it looks really bad and will generate a lot of bad PR. That’s not good for the overall health of the Ethereum ecosystem.</p>
<p>A couple of alternatives that have a very similar effect:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Each client creates its own abort switch contract, controlled by the developers of that client. This is much closer to the current level of control where the milestone blocks are put into the client by the client developers and users go with them. It’s basically just an automatic upgrade mechanism for the client’s network config.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Just implement automatic upgrade in clients. This could be for the whole client or specifically for the chain config. The main issue here is that security conscious deployments (like crypto-currency nodes) generally don’t like automatically deploying code from the internet. Limiting the upgrade to just chain config would make that simpler without needing the complexity of querying smart contracts (it would not be able to add new milestones since they’d require additional code to support it, but it could change when implemented milestones took effect).</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>In either case you’d want to allow users to choose whether they use it.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 20 | 14 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/2 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,531 | 3 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2019-01-18T21:55:43.143Z | 2019-01-18T22:08:11.369Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="ajsutton" data-post="2" data-topic="2480">
<div class="title">
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<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/ajsutton/48/1102_2.png" class="avatar"> ajsutton:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>Each client creates its own abort switch contract, controlled by the developers of that client.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>This actually may go a long way toward mitigating perceptions of centralization.</p>
<p>As <a class="mention" href="/u/alexeyakhunov">@AlexeyAkhunov</a> has mentoned recently, I am not sure that perception of centralization (or what I would call a governing committee) is important, because the governing committee already exists in the form of the self-organized group of core devs. <strong>The governance (in the sense of cybernetics) of network upgrades is simply not very well engineered right now.</strong></p>
<p>If the contract must be a single one for all participating clients, formalization of a release window for network upgrades w/ an abort switch does not even have to be as “centralized” as it currently is. Other stakeholders can be given keys to the process.</p>
<hr>
<p>As a separate matter: a key design consideration is what I would call OpsEx. Operator Experience, which means that whatever is implemented has to achieve the goals within the context of those miners, exchanges, and others operating these nodes.</p>
<p>Some potential features of a release window switch contract:</p>
<ul>
<li>A multisig is maintained, not a new one for each release. Network upgrades are designated by a code, the first number / “MAJOR” in semantic versioning.</li>
<li>Votes on the multisig are given to stakeholder groups as opposed to individuals, perhaps the core devs and miners are given more weight. They are called keyholders.</li>
<li>The block number for the next upgrade, window length, etc. is proposed and voted on in the multisig contract.</li>
<li>At any time within the window, keyholders assert that the next upgrade should be aborted. Enough votes, and the current window is aborted.</li>
<li>A client can configure to ignore this release window contract.</li>
</ul> | 2 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 24 | 2 | true | true | true | 1 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/3 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,543 | 4 | 1,241 | esaulpaugh | Evan Saulpaugh | 2019-01-19T05:29:04.718Z | 2019-01-19T05:29:04.718Z | <p>Do you think an abort switch could hurt the predictability of hardforks or at least the perception of predictability? How do we even measure predictability or the perception of predictability or the value of either?</p>
<p>I’m not sure I see the cost-benefit working in favor of the switch, but I have a risk-tolerant bias and it’s inherently difficult to assess the probability of black swan events (such as a last-second (last-12 hours) vulnerability discovery).</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 19 | 8.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/4 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,545 | 5 | 1,125 | bbin | null | 2019-01-19T11:26:30.754Z | 2019-01-19T11:26:30.754Z | <p>I agree with <a class="mention" href="/u/alexeyakhunov">@AlexeyAkhunov</a> mostly, the centralization aspect of this is overblown and already exists in a sense. The power to abort the upgrade is fairly limited and highly accountable.</p>
<p>I tend to view consensus changes like client developers and other key people proposing an update, and the proposers would be the ones that can withdraw the proposal. Anyone would still be free to propose an update and deploy their own contract if they wish (compare “rouge” forks happening today).</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 19 | 8.8 | 1 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/5 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,558 | 6 | 14 | lrettig | Lane Rettig | 2019-01-19T15:54:30.390Z | 2019-01-19T15:54:30.390Z | <p>I support this. I don’t think it changes the existing mechanism at all, it just makes it a bit more explicit and a bit more transparent, and avoids a bit of the <a href="https://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm" rel="nofollow noopener">“tyranny of structurelessness”</a> that exists today. There is already a relatively small group that makes these decisions, and node operators already trust the client developers by choosing to run their code and download their updates. (In the case of parity, there is even already an opt-in auto-upgrade mechanism.)</p>
<p>As long as this is opt-in for node operators I see no issue. Yes, key distribution is challenging but I agree with giving out keys to various trusted groups of stakeholders and I think we can achieve 80% trust with 20% effort, and iterate from there. Again, it should be opt-in so no one is forced to participate if they don’t want to.</p>
<p>If we’re worried about last-second changes we can bake in a minimum threshold of, say, a few hundred blocks, after which the trigger can no longer be thrown.</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 19 | 58.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/6 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,565 | 7 | 1,037 | ajsutton | Adrian Sutton | 2019-01-19T22:02:20.781Z | 2019-01-19T22:02:20.781Z | <p>Reflecting on the ConstantiNOPEle scenario, it turns out that we were able to abort a fork with a little over 24 hours between deciding to abort and the fork block. If we had a kill switch like this and the vast majority of people opted into it we would have had an extra 24 hours to discover the problem and decide to abort.</p>
<p>So when we think about the trade offs involved here, we need to weigh the engineering effort, perceptions and any security risks against the benefit of an extra 24 hours to make an abort decision and saving 24 hours of cat herding effort that was required.</p>
<p>Looking at it that way, I don’t think the trade offs are worth it. Though, I do like the idea of clients supporting (opt-in) auto-update since that has a wider range of benefits (e.g. deploying a fix for a client specific bug or security issue).</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 19 | 53.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/7 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,573 | 8 | 1,241 | esaulpaugh | Evan Saulpaugh | 2019-01-20T07:23:14.382Z | 2019-01-20T07:28:21.488Z | <p>It’s one thing to have node operators each decide whether to set an opt-in flag (like a sort of SegWit User-Activated Soft Fork type deal) and it’s quite another to <em>distribute keys</em> to a small minority who will have the ability to hold the network hostage to the status quo. Keys which could be stolen or lost. I just want to make sure we’re not considering such a thing.</p>
<p>Unless we want every client to fork in two, with one team that accepts one of Sauron’s rings of power and one that doesn’t.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 17 | 13.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/8 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,603 | 9 | 1,037 | ajsutton | Adrian Sutton | 2019-01-21T22:55:42.737Z | 2019-01-21T22:55:42.737Z | <blockquote>
<p>a small minority who will have the ability to hold the network hostage to the status quo</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The difficulty bomb effectively rules out the status quo option long term and this doesn’t give power to force a different hard fork, just delay/abort an already installed one. Stolen or lost keys are pretty easy to handle by deploying updated clients pointing at a different contract and the worst case damage is still just that a hard fork is delayed.</p>
<p>So technology-wise it checks out pretty well, but your comment is a very good example of the public perception we’d be constantly battling.</p> | 8 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 27.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/9 |
61 | 2,480 | 2,480 | Abort switch for clients in order to withdraw a planned upgrade to mainnet | abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet | 7,629 | 10 | 18 | AlexeyAkhunov | Ledgerwatch | 2019-01-22T21:31:12.594Z | 2019-01-22T21:31:12.594Z | <aside class="quote no-group" data-username="ajsutton" data-post="9" data-topic="2480">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/ajsutton/48/1102_2.png" class="avatar"> ajsutton:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>So technology-wise it checks out pretty well, but your comment is a very good example of the public perception we’d be constantly battling.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Public perception can be changed via some gentle yet persistent education. Until now, the public perceptions like that are based on somewhat illusory notion that all the decision in Ethereum are made by public “referendum” of some sorts. Which is obviously not true. For the sake of efficiency, some of the limited, revokable powers are with the smaller groups of people. If the Constantinople delay were to be decided in a same way as EIP inclusion into hard-fork is decided, it would never happen on time, and that would be reckless.</p>
<p>Again, I am happy for this improvement (other people do not view it as an improvement, of course) not to be implemented, because hopefully it will not be required very often. <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/hugs.png?v=12" title=":hugs:" class="emoji" alt=":hugs:" loading="lazy" width="20" height="20"></p> | 9 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 22.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/abort-switch-for-clients-in-order-to-withdraw-a-planned-upgrade-to-mainnet/2480/10 |
61 | 6,488 | 6,488 | Rework ERC process from EIPs | rework-erc-process-from-eips | 19,519 | 1 | 1,675 | anett | Anett Rolikova | 2021-06-15T09:47:30.317Z | 2021-06-15T09:47:30.317Z | <p>TL:DR if we are going to create ERC editor and whole process around it, let’s remake it completely and don’t try to just rebuild the EIP process as ERCs are different thing from EIPs.</p>
<p>ERCs are now days compared to EIPs and for the most people they seems similar to EIPs.</p>
<p>I personally feel like ERCs should be probably renamed and the structure redirected / delegated<br>
on creating more of a list / wiki / technical documentation alike source for dApp devs. ERCs should be seen as technical documentation of how solidity & Smart Contracts functions works. ERCs are defining how something could work, when building dApp developer basically just puts together a couple of solidity contracts together which some of them are documented as ERCs, adds bits of solidity coding and that’s how the dApps are being built</p>
<p>I mean that ERCs are more of a documentation and we should not push ERCs to be in Final. ERCs are not EIPs, ERCs deserves a better naming, better sorting and documented better. Ethereum Devs deserves to be aware of the ERCs as technical documents which could help them build projects.</p>
<p>I noticed initiative brought by <a href="https://github.com/ethereum-cat-herders/EIPIP/issues/61">Ethereum Cat Herders of separating ERCs from EIPs</a> in the <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs">ethereum/eips</a> repo. I do support separation of ERCs from EIPs, but if there is going to be allocated someone to do the work of separating ERCs from EIPs why the work needs to be done the same as it is with Protocol layer standards? Protocol Layer Standards - EIPs needs to have its formalised process but ERCs don’t need to go through <a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1">the same approval process</a>.</p>
<p>I do think that ERCs deservers to be understood and marketed differently, they are different so why we should apply the <a href="https://hackmd.io/@poojaranjan/ERC-Process">same process to ERCs</a> than we do to EIPs? I’m not a fan of pushing ERCs to go to “final” status as the final status does not really tells us anything about the standard. A Solidity function, a feature, documenting how something could be implemented does not need to be implemented on Ethereum chain, all it needs to is to be used by developers and implemented into a projects.</p>
<p>I’m happy to work out this proposal more and outline the process for ERCs.</p>
<p>Encouraging Ethereum Devs to share your ideas on what do you think about ERCs, and how would you change this process.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 24 | 179.8 | 3 | true | false | true | 3 | false | null | /t/rework-erc-process-from-eips/6488/1 |
61 | 6,488 | 6,488 | Rework ERC process from EIPs | rework-erc-process-from-eips | 19,520 | 2 | 2,190 | matt | matt | 2021-06-15T15:33:55.401Z | 2021-06-15T15:33:55.401Z | <p><em>tldr; I think the ERC process is okay, the EIP process should be overhauled, and more people need to proactively guide and discuss ERC standards</em></p>
<p>–</p>
<p>It seems like there is a misconception here, probably because how convoluted the process EIPs follow now is.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="anett" data-post="1" data-topic="6488">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/anett/48/3020_2.png" class="avatar"> anett:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>I’m not a fan of pushing ERCs to go to “final” status as the final status does not really tells us anything about the standard.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Originally, <em>final</em> meant that an EIP was on mainnet and was therefore unable to be changed further. This obviously doesn’t make sense for ERCs because we don’t have an equivalent consensus mechanism as “it’s on mainnet”. The simple deployment of a standard should not be enough to solidify the standard–in fact, this behaviour should really be frowned upon as it can unfairly push a standard to final before consensus on certain issues is reached.</p>
<p>However, as of some time in 2020, this isn’t what “final” means in the EIP repository. Final means the standard is <em>final</em> and will not be changed further, except for nonnormative changes. It may have very little chance of ever going into a hardfork.</p>
<p>I’m in favor of keeping the ERC process similar to now. I actually think this new process of focusing on the <em>standard</em> rather than the <em>governance</em> makes a lot of sense for ERCs. It’s actually EIPs that I’d like to see be <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/replace-the-yellow-paper-with-executable-markdown-specification/6430">treated differently</a>. I don’t think enough people are involved in core development to sustain such a fragmented process. I’d rather governance and core EIPs go hand-in-hand. Having “final” EIPs that have very little chance of going to mainnet is not useful, and may even just suck bandwidth from people whose bandwidth is already severely limited. This isn’t to say that people aren’t welcome to bring their core changes and iterate on them until they feel they’re “final”. We’re an open ecosystem and this is always an option. But generally, core developers will make minor tweaks to proposals that are accepted. Making your EIP final before release on mainnet is imminent is not productive.</p>
<p>We’re getting off track.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="anett" data-post="1" data-topic="6488">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/anett/48/3020_2.png" class="avatar"> anett:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>EIPs needs to have its formalised process but ERCs don’t need to go through <a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1">the same approval process</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>I disagree. I think it’s also important to build strong, universally accepted standards in ERCs. I think we’re in a place today where the top 1-3 projects have substantial control over what “standards” are in place on Ethereum. If Uniswap decided it would support a new ERC-20 incompatible token, the community would scramble to add support.</p>
<p>I feel like the ERC space is too reactive. Most people/teams react to immediate needs, rather than consider future desires. I would really like to see some people in the space <a href="https://trac.ietf.org/trac/wgchairs/">step up and help lead</a> the discussions on how to improve smart contract standards. Are we really going to just accept ERC-20 compatibility as absolute?</p>
<p>Thank you <a class="mention" href="/u/anett">@anett</a> for raising this. I do agree, ERCs are very different from EIPs!</p> | null | 1 | 1 | 22 | 129.4 | 4 | true | true | true | 3 | false | null | /t/rework-erc-process-from-eips/6488/2 |
61 | 6,488 | 6,488 | Rework ERC process from EIPs | rework-erc-process-from-eips | 19,594 | 3 | 8 | wschwab | wschwab | 2021-06-20T09:44:34.623Z | 2021-06-20T09:44:34.623Z | <p>A thought I keep on coming back to is encouraging ecosystem interaction in ERCs.</p>
<aside class="quote no-group" data-username="matt" data-post="2" data-topic="6488">
<div class="title">
<div class="quote-controls"></div>
<img loading="lazy" alt="" width="24" height="24" src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/user_avatar/ethereum-magicians.org/matt/48/2725_2.png" class="avatar"> matt:</div>
<blockquote>
<p>If Uniswap decided it would support a new ERC-20 incompatible token, the community would scramble to add support.</p>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<p>Yes, but it would be nice if they would at least release it as an ERC first. Uniswap released NFTs with <code>permit</code> in their v3, I wish they would’ve taken the time to ERC it. That would at least allow for ecosystem review/conversation before it’s out in the wild.</p>
<p>fwiw, I also would push to keep “Final” for ERCs, I feel like we need to figure out why so few make it there. Is it because of a lack of incentive? It does make it hard to tell the difference between a low- and high- quality ERC when even high-quality ERCs with traction are sometimes still in “Draft”.</p> | null | 0 | 1 | 17 | 23.4 | 3 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/rework-erc-process-from-eips/6488/3 |
61 | 13,047 | 13,047 | Fork-safe tokens | fork-safe-tokens | 34,466 | 1 | 4,780 | Pandapip1 | null | 2023-02-24T20:33:50.149Z | 2023-02-24T20:34:38.850Z | <p>This is an extremely rough draft of an idea I recently had.</p>
<p>Since the <code>CHAINID</code> opcode exists, tokens can store the balance per chain ID. Before a hard fork, users can transfer their assets to the new (un)forked network. This would be different than <em>bridging</em> the tokens, as the new network doesn’t exist yet. Instead, when the new network is formed, the balance is split so that the total supply across all chains remains unchanged.</p>
<p>This would be particularly useful for stablecoins like DAI, because it would get around the problem of “we can only support one network since the supply doubles every hard fork.”</p>
<p>Prototype interfaces:</p>
<pre data-code-wrap="solidity"><code class="lang-plaintext">contract ERC20ForkSafe is ERC20 {
event TransferFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 amount);
function transferToFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address to, uint256 amount) external;
function transferFromToFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address from, address to, uint256 amount) external;
function isTransferAvailable(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId) external view returns (bool);
}
</code></pre>
<pre data-code-wrap="solidity"><code class="lang-plaintext">contract ERC721ForkSafe is ERC721 {
event TransferFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 tokenId);
function transferToFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function transferFromToFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function isTransferAvailable(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId) external view returns (bool);
}
</code></pre>
<pre data-code-wrap="solidity"><code class="lang-plaintext">contract ERC1155ForkSafe is ERC1155 {
event TransferFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount);
function transferToFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address to, uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount) external;
function transferFromToFork(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId, address from, address to, uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount) external;
function isTransferAvailable(uint256 fromChainId, uint256 toChainId) external view returns (bool);
}
</code></pre> | null | 0 | 0 | 13 | 77.6 | 2 | false | false | false | 1 | false | null | /t/fork-safe-tokens/13047/1 |
61 | 18,274 | 18,274 | On-chain images in AVIF? | on-chain-images-in-avif | 45,008 | 1 | 5,515 | MidnightLightning | Brooks Boyd | 2024-01-22T15:22:02.634Z | 2024-01-22T15:22:02.634Z | <p>When contracts wish to save/generate image data on-chain, I’ve typically seen contracts generate SVG (vector) or PNG images (raster) as the output. For raster-style graphics, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AVIF" rel="noopener nofollow ugc">AVIF</a> image format is making some headway as an updated and more flexible (can be lossy or loss-less, still or animated) means to save graphics. General guides I’ve read indicate it can be smaller in filesize than JPEG or PNG, but that it’s more CPU-intensive to achieve that.</p>
<p>The CPU-intensity seems to be from finding the most optimized way to compress arbitrary image data, so smart contracts may not be able to do the most optimum compression of a dynamic image (since “more CPU” would equate to “more gas cost”), but if the resulting file (if an off-chain process generated it) is a smaller filesize, saving that directly on-chain would be more cost-effective.</p>
<p>Has anyone else attempted generating AVIF files from a smart contract? With many NFT imagery consisting of different graphics for different traits being layered on top of each other, AVIF’s ability to create spatial layers may be an effective way to present dynamic content of that type?</p> | null | 0 | 0 | 19 | 148.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/on-chain-images-in-avif/18274/1 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,645 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-12-14T06:38:00.627Z | 2018-12-14T06:40:20.060Z | <p>I wanted to get some feedback on this idea I had, what do you think about having a single page on the wiki which can help volunteers find tasks and mini-projects they can work on?</p>
<p>This list would be broken down by Ring or upcoming Gathering, and indicate who to contact, plus allow an indicator of when a task has been picked up by someone.</p>
<p>Example:</p>
<hr>
<p><img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/sparkles.png?v=9" title=":sparkles:" class="emoji" alt=":sparkles:"> <strong>Wonderful Things You Can Do To Help Out</strong> <img src="https://ethereum-magicians.org/images/emoji/twitter/sparkles.png?v=9" title=":sparkles:" class="emoji" alt=":sparkles:"></p>
<p><strong>Operations Ring Tasks</strong></p>
<p>Contact: <a class="mention" href="/u/jpitts">@jpitts</a></p>
<p>Mini Project: “Gather Rings and Contacts from Prague”</p>
<p>In a HackMD, list out all Rings and other groups who gathered in Prague, see if any are not listed in the Scrolls or in the Forum under Working Groups. Reach out to those involved in unrepresented Rings from Prague and see if they want to keep it going here on the Forum or organize in upcoming events. Help these Rings get formed.</p>
<p><strong>Council of Paris Tasks</strong></p>
<p>Contact: <a class="mention" href="/u/tomislavmamic">@tomislavmamic</a></p>
<p>Mini Project: “Rings In Paris”</p>
<p>Reach out to each of the Ring contacts listed in the wiki and see who is likely to gather in Paris, and what they might need. Create a wiki topic on the Forum listing these Rings and Contacts out.</p>
<p>See notes from a recent call: <a href="https://hackmd.io/A0n82QlKR9G6LKe6mj9SiQ" class="inline-onebox">Council of Paris meeting notes - HackMD</a></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 23 | 139.6 | 2 | true | true | true | 3 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/1 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,653 | 2 | 249 | AtLeastSignificant | At Least Significant | 2018-12-14T18:29:38.509Z | 2018-12-14T18:29:38.509Z | <p>Would be nice if we could integrate it with this: <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/community-list-of-shit-to-do-google-doc-of-chores-tasks-things-to-be-done/535">Community list of "shit-to-do" - Google doc of chores, tasks, things to be done</a></p> | null | 1 | 0 | 20 | 134 | 2 | false | false | false | 2 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/2 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,654 | 3 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-12-14T18:55:53.080Z | 2018-12-14T18:55:53.080Z | <p>Yeah I should start with updating this doc, get the Rings to update it too, then find ways to promote/position it prominently.</p>
<p>I am finding that there is a general issue with “findability” of key resources, so also thinking about how to improve that.</p> | 2 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 8.6 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/3 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,657 | 4 | 80 | boris | Boris Mann | 2018-12-14T20:08:23.893Z | 2018-12-14T20:08:23.893Z | <p>I still think teaching people how to use Github Issues is the right way to go. We need flow and movement on issues – not another list.</p> | null | 1 | 0 | 17 | 103.4 | 2 | false | false | false | 4 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/4 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,658 | 5 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-12-14T20:33:39.222Z | 2018-12-14T20:33:39.222Z | <p>That is a good point, and we can encourage a nice feedback loop. A lot of it is visibility I think, and forming habits.</p> | 4 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 28 | 2 | true | true | true | 1 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/5 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,674 | 6 | 168 | pet3rpan | null | 2018-12-15T10:39:39.838Z | 2018-12-15T10:39:39.838Z | <p>It definitely requires some pushing and poking + communications (<a class="mention" href="/u/jpitts">@jpitts</a> good to see that you have picked up the github issue on a welcoming post into the magicians)</p> | 5 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 12.8 | 2 | false | false | false | 0 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/6 |
61 | 2,214 | 2,214 | How to get community involvement in your Magicians' Ring | how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring | 6,722 | 7 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-12-18T08:47:40.614Z | 2018-12-18T08:47:40.614Z | <p>I created a larger project for energizing the Rings.</p>
<p><a href="https://github.com/ethereum-magicians/scrolls/projects/5">https://github.com/ethereum-magicians/scrolls/projects/5</a></p>
<p>Much of the project involve reaching out to Ring contacts, helping RIngs use the Issues, and bringing attention to “pickup tasks” with a special GH page which is promoted.</p> | 6 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 7.4 | 2 | true | true | true | 0 | false | null | /t/how-to-get-community-involvement-in-your-magicians-ring/2214/7 |
61 | 14 | 14 | Open invitation to participate in a Fellowship | open-invitation-to-participate-in-a-fellowship | 17 | 1 | 1 | jpitts | Jeth Pitts | 2018-02-17T03:25:45.107Z | 2018-02-23T23:37:40.482Z | <p><em>Greg Colvin and I would like to invite the community to come together and participate in improving the Ethereum improvement process (and so much more).</em></p>
<p><em>Some notes to the reader:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><em>This proposal is to jump-start the process. Help us shape this effort by getting involved on the ethereum/governance Gitter channel and attending our workshop at EthCC.</em></li>
<li><em>This proposal is written up in a Google Doc located at <a href="http://goo.gl/DrJRJV">http://goo.gl/DrJRJV</a>.</em></li>
</ul>
<p><em>And now for the proposal:</em></p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Towards a Fellowship of Ethereum Magicians</strong></p>
<p>Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.<br>
— Arthur C. Clarke</p>
<p>We propose to create a Fellowship within which the Ethereum community can self-organize to maximize technical opportunities, share ideas and work together effectively, online and in person, across national, organizational and other boundaries.</p>
<p><strong>Fellowship Vision</strong></p>
<p><strong>The Goal.</strong> To keep Ethereum <em>The Best It Can Technically Be.</em></p>
<p><strong>The Mission.</strong> <em>To Nurture Community Consensus</em> on the technical direction and specification of Ethereum.</p>
<p><strong>The Work.</strong> Primarily, high-quality <em>Ethereum Improvement Proposals</em> (EIPs), accepted by a consensus of the Community.</p>
<p><strong>Fellowship Principles</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>
<strong>Open Process.</strong> Any interested person can participate in the work, know what is being decided, and make his or her voice heard on the issue.</li>
<li>
<strong>Individual Participation.</strong> Membership is not formal. We are a Fellowship of individuals rather than organizations, companies, governments or interest groups.</li>
<li>
<strong>Technical Responsibility.</strong> The Fellowship accepts responsibility for all aspects of the Ethereum protocol specification. The Fellowship may take responsibility for related specifications proposed to it in the future.</li>
<li>
<strong>Technical Competence.</strong> The Fellowship seeks consensus on proposals where we have the necessary competence. The Fellowship is willing to listen to technically competent input from any source.</li>
<li>
<strong>“Rough Consensus and Running Code.”</strong> Consensus is not unanimity or majority vote. Rather, it is based on the combined technical judgement of our participants and our real-world experience in implementing and deploying our specifications.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Fellowship Practices</strong></p>
<p><strong>Online Presence</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Curated web pages, including information about the Fellowship, a calendar of upcoming events, and links to useful resources.</li>
<li>Accessible discussion forums, with at least a threaded web interface and email integration.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>In-Person Work</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Triannual meetings, two coordinated with Devcon and EthCC and one in July.</li>
<li>Meetups, discussions, presentations, workshops, hackathons, and other relevant activities. These can organized by participants on an ad-hoc basis or with the sponsorship of the Fellowship.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Iterative Workflow</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Participants do research, gain experience, present their work, and make proposals.</li>
<li>Proposals are discussed and reworked, online and in person, until consensus is reached.</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p><em>Call to action: please contribute to the Google Doc located at goo.gl/DrJRJV. Any comments about specifics can be posted here. In order to ensure adequate coverage of this important document, I intend to expand on the rationale behind each section and item.</em></p> | null | 0 | 0 | 105 | 331 | 2 | true | true | true | 5 | false | null | /t/open-invitation-to-participate-in-a-fellowship/14/1 |
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