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Long Bang, 22 April 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 3, d. 4, pp. 1–2. 47 Light infantry weapons are handweapons, smaller cannons, but not larger cannons and anti-air artillery. 48 ‘PRC and DRV’, report, 8 June 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, pp. 38–39. 49 According to Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 420–422, Stalin had harboured doubts about Ho Chi Minh’s own ideological orthodoxy for many years and became especially suspicious when Ho sought to establish a relationship with the United States in the months immediately following the Pacific War. Stalin also disliked how the ICP formally abolished itself in November 1945. According to Duiker, Stalin’s suspicion became particularly obvious in 1947 when the Soviet Union granted recognition to Indonesia, but not the DRV, perhaps because he doubted that the Vietminh would be victorious against the French. (However, as shown in Chapter 1 of this study, the Soviet Union did not recognize Indonesia until January 1950). During Ho’s visit to Moscow in early 1950, Stalin’s dislike of him was clearly on display, and it was only due to Chinese pressure that Stalin agreed to recognize the DRV. Apparently one of the reasons why Stalin changed his mind on this issue, and proclaimed his readiness to support the DRV, was to prevent a possible Beijing – Washington alliance. 50 The only reference to this trip in the Russian archives can be found in correspondence between Ho and Stalin before and immediately after Ho’s stay in Moscow. See letters from Ho Chi Minh to Stalin (Filippov) and letters from Stalin to Ho Chi Minh, 30 September, 17 October and 19 November 1952, RGASPI, f. 558 (Stalin), op. 11, d. 295. 51 Chinese historian Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 38, has not been able to find any details on these talks in Chinese archives. 52 Ho Chi Minh to Stalin (Filippov) and letters from Stalin to Ho Chi Minh, 30 September, 17 October and 19 November 1952, RGASPI, f. 558 (Stalin), op. 11, d. 295. 53 From March until November 1953, V.V. Kuznetsov held the position as Soviet ambassador to the
PRC parallel to his post as deputy foreign minister. He remained in his post as first deputy foreign minister until 1977. 54 Record of conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov – Zhou Enlai, 16 June 1953, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 46, pa. 362, d. 12, pp. 112–113. 55 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 38–42. The results of the land reform and its implications for the Sino-Vietnamese relationship will be discussed in Chapter 4. 3 The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954 1 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 131. 2 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, London: Pimlico, 1991, pp. 207–208. 3 See e.g. Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement at the Geneva Conference of 1954’. Paper presented at the Symposium on ‘The First Indochina War: Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Cold War’, 1–3 November 2002, at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, Austin, Texas, p. 31. [Cited with the written permission of the author, Ang 2002]. According to Chen Jian, Zhou Enlai made a particularly important independent decision during the last days of the conference when he persuaded both the Soviets and especially the Vietnamese to change the Communist demand on the demarcation line from the 16th to the 17th parallel. 4 Qiang Zhai, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’, The China Quarterly (129), 1992, p. 121. 170 Notes 5 Gaiduk, Ilya V., Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 49–50, argues that Moscow threw the Vietnamese over in 1954. The Geneva Conference and the use of the DRV as a pawn in a Great Power game serves as a perfect example of this. 6 Chen Jian, Mao’s China, pp. 133–134. 7 The abbreviation SVN (State of Vietnam) will be used for South Vietnam until the referendum and proclamation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) on 23 October 1955. 8 In a later account of the Geneva conference, Soviet analysts underlined that
‘the first days in Geneva showed that the People’s Republic of China, as a great power, was not only interested in deciding the urgent international problems in Asia and other parts of the world, but also ready to actively take part in solving these problems’. See ‘The Geneva Conference and PRC’, SEAD report, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48, pa. 408, d. 136, p. 4. 9 Record of conversation, Molotov – John Foster Dulles (US Secretary of State), 13 February 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 25, d. 7, pp. 31–32. 10 Record of conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) – Charles Bohlen (U.S. ambassador), 17 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 026, op. 2, pa. 4, d. 2, p. 42. 11 Ibid. 12 Foreign Minister Molotov’s report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, see RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94; or download from: http:// www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/index_f.htm (Harvard Project on Cold War Studies). 13 Record of conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov – Charles Bohlen, 19 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 026, op. 2, pa. 4, d. 2, pp. 49–50. 14 They based their reports and recommendations on conversations between the Soviet ambassador in Beijing and Chinese officials, as well as on reports and analytical documents written by Soviet embassy officials in China. 15 Chen Jian, Mao’s China, p. 140. 16 Many states had recognized the PRC, including the UK, India and Norway, but not France or the United States. In addition, the PRC had not yet got access to the United Nations, as ROC (Taiwan) represented China in that forum. 17 Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, pp. 4–5. In his speeches, Zhou used the carrot and stick analogy, arguing that the carrot should be used to tempt the French, while the stick should be used to deal with the Americans. 18 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam
Wars, p. 50; Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, pp. 4–5. 19 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 50–51. 20 Excerpts from Molotov’s diary: Reception for Chinese Ambassador Zhang Wentien, 6 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 5, pp. 10–15; see also Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 51–52. 21 SEAD memorandum to Molotov, Gromyko, Zorin, Novikov, Federenko, Sobolov, Soldatov and Lavrishchev, 17 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 389, d. 107, p. 5. 22 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 23 Ibid., p. 6. 24 Ibid., pp. 6–7. The perceptive reader has probably already wondered about my use of the terms ‘Vietnam’ and ‘Indochina’ in the last few paragraphs. My use of the territorial names here reflects the Soviet background document for these arguments. 25 Ibid., AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 389, d. 107, p. 7. 26 The International Control Commission was set up during the Geneva conference. It consisted of members from Poland, Canada and India, with India holding the chairmanship. Its task was to supervise the fulfilment of the Geneva Conference and a separate commission was set up for each of the three Indochinese countries – Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 27 Before, during and after the conference, the Chinese perceived the Soviets as somewhat pessimistic with regard to what could be achieved in Geneva. See Qiang Notes 171 Zhai’s argument that in contrast to the Chinese the Soviets expected rather little from the final outcome of the conference. Qiang Zhai, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’, p. 121. 28 MID USSR – Plans for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, 4 April 1954, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, pa. 106, d. 7, pp. 23–26. These plans contained among other things references on how to relate to France, the question of Vietnamese partition, as well as the necessity to include
the clause demanding the end to US interference. However, by early April the Soviet position seems clearer and more articulated. 29 Komitet Informatisii report to Kirill Novikov from N. Solodovnik, 16 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, pp. 120–121. 30 MID USSR – Plans for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, 4 April 1954, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, pa. 106, d. 7, pp. 23–24. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Record of conversation, General-Lieutenant Petruschevskii – a Chinese official, top secret – one copy only, 30 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 7, d. 15, p. 61. 35 Ibid. 36 Deputy foreign minister V. Zorin to Foreign Minister Molotov, 16 January 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 159, p. 3. 37 The contents of ambassador Nguyen Long Bang’s report was used in background materials for the Geneva conference, but the report was first handed in to the Soviet foreign ministry on 14 May 1952. Komitet Informatsii report ‘The People’s Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’, 8 June 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, pp. 28–48. For a more detailed discussion of the report, see Chapter 2. 38 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981, pp. 154–160; Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991, pp. 30–33; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 43–44. 39 For a detailed account of Chinese preparations for Dien Bien Phu, see Chen Jian, Mao’s China, pp. 131–138 and Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 43–49. 40 The classic work on Dien Bien Phu is Bernhard Fall’s, Hell in a Very Small Place: the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, London, 1967
; see also Duiker, The Communist Road, pp. 160–162. 41 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 46 42 Ibid., p. 49. During the first part of the conference from 26 April to 7 May 1954, the participants tried to solve the problems in Korea. Randle 1969: 157–168. 43 On the Chinese stand, see e.g. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 52. 44 On the question of Chinese, Korean and DRV participation, we have seen that the Soviets took a much tougher stand. From the very beginning, they argued that China should play an important role during the conference. Soviet preparatory materials for the conference also clearly state that DRV participation was self-evident. See SEAD memorandum to Molotov, Gromyko, Zorin, Novikov, Federenko, Sobolov, Soldatov and Lavrishchev, 17 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 389, d. 107, p. 5; and also MID USSR – Plans for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, 4 April 1954, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, pa. 106, d. 7, pp. 23–26. 45 Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954. The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 8. 46 Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, pp. 11–12. 47 Chen Jian, Mao’s China, pp. 140–141. 48 Foreign Minister Molotov’s report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94, p. 21. 49 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 57. 50 Foreign Minister Molotov’s report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94, p. 19. 172 Notes 51 Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, p. 12. 52 The citation is taken from Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 55. 53 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars,
pp. 52–53. 54 Ibid., p. 52. 55 ‘The Geneva Conference and PRC’, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48, pa. 408, d. 136, pp. 13–27; and Foreign Minister Molotov’s report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94. 56 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 60–61. 57 Chen Jian, Mao’s China, pp. 142–143; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 60. 58 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 60–61. 59 Komitet Informatisii report to Kirill Novikov from N. Solodovnik, 16 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, p. 123. 60 Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, p. 16. 61 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 61; Christopher E. Goscha, ‘Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887–1954’, Nias Reports, No. 28, Nordic Institute for Asian Studies, 1995, pp. 145–146. 62 ‘The Geneva Conference and the PRC’, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48, pa. 408, d. 136, p. 14. 63 Ibid., p. 16. 64 Record of conversation, V.V. Vaskov – Mao Zedong, 5 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 397, d. 7, pp. 69–70. 65 Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, pp. 22–25. 66 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1945–1995, Vol. 1 (1945–1975), Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000, p. 122. 67 Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, pp. 26–27. 68 Foreign Minister Molotov’s report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum
on the Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94. 69 Ibid., pp. 25–27. 70 ‘The Geneva Conference and the PRC’, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48, pa. 408, d. 136, p. 21. 71 Ibid., pp. 25–27. 72 Rumours say that delegates to the conference stopped the clock in the Palais de Nations to help Mendès-France keep his deadline. 73 Vietminh was the name of the Vietnamese patriots fighting the French from 1946 to 1954, which were in effect the Communist armed forces. After the Geneva conference the armed forces of the DRV were organized into the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). In 1960, when the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was founded, many of its founding members were former Vietminh soldiers. Stanley I. Kutler (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996, p. 565. 74 Randle, Geneva 1954, p. 596. Article 14 (a) in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam. 75 Randle, Geneva 1954, pp. 570–571. Article 6 and 7 in the Final Declaration. 76 The Final Declaration was positively agreed to by four out of the nine participants at the conference, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China. 77 Young, The Vietnam Wars, pp. 41–42. 78 Randle, Geneva 1954; J.L. Nogee and R.H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (3rd edn), New York: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 110–111; Cameron, Allan W., ‘The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The Origins of Involvement’ in W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, Waltham: GinnBlaisdell, 1970, pp. 189–196; Qiang Zhai, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’, p. 113. 79 Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg (eds), ‘77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977’, CWIHP Working Paper
No. 22, 1998, p. 42. Notes 173 4 Together for Communism? Sino-Soviet cooperation and the rebuilding of North Vietnam, 1954–1957 1 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Li Zhimin, June/July 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 149. 2 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam. A Political History, London: Andre Deutch, 1969, pp. 415–429; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, pp. 22–71. According to a report from the Komitet Informatsii in late December 1954 Ho Chi Minh had many supporters in the South. Information gathered from different news correspondents reporting from Saigon and foreign press releases indicated that Ho would receive 90 per cent of the votes in South Vietnam if there were to be general elections at that time. Komitet Informatsii to Novikov, 29 December 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 7, d. 16, pp. 117–130. 3 Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991, p. 45. 4 Ambassador Lavrishchev was already well acquainted with the situation in Vietnam, as well as with its leaders, from his participation at the Geneva Conference. 5 Molotov to Lavrishchev, 30 September 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8, pp. 23–26. 6 Ibid. 7 The Lien Viet (Unified National Front) was founded in 1946, reorganized in 1951, and in 1955 renamed the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VNFF). Ralph B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol. 1, Revolution versus Containment, 1955–61, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, pp. 62–64. The development of the VNFF is described in Carlyle A. Thayer, War By Other Means. National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-nam 1954–60, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992, pp. 27–32, 40–43, 46–48. 8 Molotov to Lavrishchev, 30 September 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8, pp
. 23–26. 9 Ibid. 10 Herring, George C., America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979, pp. 47–48. 11 Herring, America’s Longest War, p. 48. 12 In South Vietnam there were three large religious sects: the Binh Xuyen, whose armed elements were in control of Cholon, in the area nearby Saigon, and the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, both of whom literally ran states within the state. It was the American decision of 31 December 1954, to support South Vietnam directly rather than channelling the aid via France, that enabled Diem to take control over the sects. The shift in American policies strengthened Diem and weakened the sects, as it deprived them of the financial support they had received through the French. Herring, America’s Longest War, p. 51; Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 21–22. 13 Novikov to Molotov, 29 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 156, pp. 1–2. 14 When the government in Hanoi feared that serious famine was about to hit the country in late 1954 and early 1955, it turned to Moscow and Beijing for assistance. The October harvest had failed, and since partition the DRV was deprived of the important food supplies from southern Vietnam. The critical situation was eventually solved by shipping rice from China on Soviet ships to the DRV; see record of conversation, Novikov – DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Long Bang, 28 October 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 5, p. 78; and MID to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8, p. 10. 15 Record of conversation, Novikov – Pham Van Dong, AVP RF, 27 July 1954, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 158, p. 46. 16 Novikov to Molotov, 29 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 156, p. 2. 17 Ibid.; Molotov to Lavrishchev, 30 September
1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8, pp. 23–26. 174 Notes 18 V.V. Kuznetsov to Molotov, 11 January 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 10, d. 15, pp. 1–2. 19 Instructions for negotiations with the governmental delegation from the DRV, June/ July 1955, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 8, pa. 117, d. 30, pp. 12–21 [Hereafter Instructions June/July 1955]. 20 Instructions June/July 1955: 12. 21 For estimates of Soviet assistance to India, see Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, London: MacMillan, 1992. 22 A total of eight agreements on long-term credits and non-refundable aid were signed in the years from 1955 to 1962. For Soviet overviews of assistance to the DRV both from the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries see, ‘Economical, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’, SEAD memorandum, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 58–79. For the main figures in this document, see Appendix; an earlier estimate of Soviet assistance to the DRV can be found in Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, pp. 189–192. 23 Instructions June/July 1955: 12–21; by 1955 Chinese–North Vietnamese military cooperation was already well organized. When established on April 17, 1950 the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) consisted of advisors that could assist the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) headquarters, three full divisions, and finally an officers training school. Altogether the CMAG would count 281 people – of which 79 were advisors and their assistants. See Qiang Zhai 2000: 19. 24 General Antonov to Deputy Foreign Minister V.A. Zorin, 10 June 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 8, p. 32. 25 Ibid. 26 Record of conversation between General-Lieutenant Petruschevskii – a Chinese official, top secret – one copy only, 30 March 1954, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 9, pa. 7, d. 15, p. 61. 27 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 74. 28 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956–1962, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1997, pp. 13–18. 29 V.A. Zorin to the CC CPSU, 23 September 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 8, p. 57. The memo to the CC CPSU only contains references to the withdrawal of political and economic advisors and does not include the military advisors. However, as the military advisors played a very important role, it is safe to assume that the ambassador was referring to these as well. Keeping the Chinese military advisors in place was even more valuable to the Soviets than keeping the other advisors. This was because the Soviets had always been cautious about introducing Soviet military advisors into Vietnam, first of all not to offend the Chinese, who had a much longer tradition of supporting the Vietnamese in that field, and second to avoid increased US focus on North Vietnam. 30 V.A. Zorin to the CC CPSU, 23 September 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 8, p. 57. 31 Record of conversation, L.I. Sokolov – Chinese Ambassador to the DRV, Luo Guibo, 8 December 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 5. 32 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 206; see also Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 74. 33 Ulam, Adam B., Expantion and Coexistence. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973 (2nd edn) Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974, pp. 558–560. 34 Randle, Robert F., Geneva 1954, The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 571. 35 George M. Kahin, Intervention: How America became Involved in Vietnam, New York: Knopf, 1986, p.
93. 36 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 21–23, 37–40, 48–49. Notes 175 37 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 85; David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success. The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–61, New York: Colombia University Press, 1991, pp. 125–128; Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 48–49. 38 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 71–73. 39 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Pham Hung, 23 March 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 36–38. 40 On the situation of fulfilling the Geneva Agreement – short information, 11 (13) August 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 14, d. 16, p. 98. 41 Record of conversation, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V.V. Kuznetsov – General Secretary of the Lao Dong, Truong Chinh, 28 February 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 2, p. 3. 42 Ibid. 43 Record of conversation between Zimyanin – Pham Hung and Ung Van Khiem, 20 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 75. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., pp. 75–77. 46 According to Truong Chinh the Vietnamese had now realized that the chances of convening a new Geneva conference were slim. See record of conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V.V. Kuznetsov – General Secretary of the Lao Dong, Truong Chinh, 28 February 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 2, pp. 3–8. 47 Ambassador Zimyanin’s thoughts were expressed in a memorandum entitled ‘Some questions on the fulfillment of the Geneva agreement on Indochina’, 2 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 14, d. 16, p. 58. 48 ‘Some questions on the fulfillment of the Geneva agreement on Indochina’, 2 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 14, d.
16, p. 62. 49 Smith, An International History, pp. 64–67; see also Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’, p. 28. 50 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’, pp. 27–28. 51 See e.g. Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah A. Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1989, pp. 149–150; Ulam, Expantion and Coexistence, pp. 572–599; Nogee, J.L. and R.H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (3rd edn), New York: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 119–126; Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus. A History of the USSR, New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 239–241. 52 According to Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders later complained repeatedly that Khrushchev’s secret speech came as a surprise to the CCP and other Communist parties. See ‘Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance’ Westad, Odd Arne (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the SinoSoviet Alliance, 1945–1963, Stanford, 1998, p. 260 and n. 73. 53 Ambassador Suren Akopovich Tovmasyan to MID, 17 October 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 31, d. 3, p. 44. To exemplify the Vietnamese attitude the report underlines that the Vietnamese did not want to show a Soviet film critical to Stalin. According to Politburo member Le Duc Tho showing such a film could lead to new discussions on the errors committed during land reform. Nor did the Lao Dong share the opinion of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries with regard to Albania. According to officials at the Soviet embassy Ho Chi Minh gave the impression of feeling sorry for Enver Hoxha. The political letter is concluded by underlining that ‘Ho Chi Minh is, despite his weaknesses, a friend. The embassy recommends that the contact between the two countries be strengthened in all fields.’ 54 Smyser, William R., The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism Between Russia and China, 1956–1969, Athens, Ohio: Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series (55), 1980, p. 6. 55 Record
of conversation between Soviet Ambassador Mikail Vassiljevich Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 84–95. 176 Notes In this conversation Nguyen Duy Trinh presents the discussion during the 9th Plenum of the Lao Dong CC (quote from p. 93); see also Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese, pp. 5–12. These pages contain a discussion of Hanoi’s reaction to the Twentieth Congress. 56 In 1956 Le Duan held the position of regional secretary in Nam Bo, which was the southernmost region of the Party’s political apparatus in Vietnam. Brigham, Robert K., Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War, Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 7. 57 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 57–59. 58 Record of conversation, Soviet Ambassador Mikail Vassiljevich Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 95. 59 Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 90–91. 60 Ibid. p. 85. 61 According to Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 67–68, parts of the proposal were approved and would allow a consolidation of the party’s forces and provide a basis for ‘political violence’ should that ever become necessary. However, such steps were only to be undertaken by cadres in the South using their own resources in accordance with the programme of the Fatherland Front. 62 Anastas Mikoyan allegedly made full reports from all his trips abroad. I have so far not been able to localize these reports, nor have I seen other researchers refer to them. 63 According to Ang Cheng Guan the lack of a joint communiqué at the end of Mikoyan’s visit suggests that the Vietnamese and the Russians could not reach a unity of views. See Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists, p. 21. An explanation as just could be that the working character of the trip did not
call for such communiqué. 64 Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin – Pham Van Dong, 18 May 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 117–118. Pham Van Dong reveals that he has not completely understood Mikoyan’s ideas on the tempo of the DRV’s transition into a Socialist state. According to the ambassador this would be worked out as soon as the Three-Year plan for the DRV’s national economy was ready. 65 Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 95. 66 Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin – Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh, 16 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 55–58. 67 Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 84–95. Accounts of this situation in available Soviet documents confirm the notion that Ho’s position within the party remained the same, and was not in any way endangered by the revelations during the rectification of errors campaign. 68 Record of conversation, Sulinov – representative in charge of economic and financial questions at the PM’s office, Buy Kong Chung, 29 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 57–60. Soviet official Sulinov has no title in the document or any organisational affiliation. His inquiries into the internal affairs of the DRV, and the fact that he has no title or organization may indicate that he represents either the GRU or the CPSU. 69 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Li Zhimin, June/July 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 149. 70 Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983
, p. 4. 71 Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, p. 5. 72 Buttinger, Vietnam, pp. 418–419. 73 Young, The Vietnam Wars, p. 50; Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, London: Pimlico, 1991, pp. 240–241; Buttinger, Vietnam, pp. 425–437. 74 The most careful estimate indicating between 3,000 and 15,000 executions was made by Moise 1983. Fall, Bernard B., The Two Viet-Nams. A Political and Military Analysis, Notes 177 London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1963, on the other hand, operates with a much higher figure – 50,000 executions. See also Young, The Vietnam Wars, p. 50. 75 Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, p. 237. 76 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 10 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 38–40. 77 Land reform in North Vietnam was based much on the experiences had in China and had also to some degree been supervised by Chinese advisors. See record of conversation, Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 28 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 75–85; see also Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, p. 238. Moise’s book compares land reform in China and Vietnam and is the most extensive study on the topic. 78 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 7 September 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, p. 93. 79 His birth name was Dang Xuan Khu. 80 P.J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1963, pp. 43–46; Edwin Moise has modified the view that the DRV went disastrously wrong due to slavish imitation of the Chinese land reform. He argues that Chinese influence is real and that the Vietnamese reform was based on Chinese models, but the Lao Dong did not copy these models precisely/correctly and that the mistakes made were due to misconduct of the reform and not because they imitated the Chinese. See Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam
, pp. 234–236. 81 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 7 September 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, p. 93. This was also about the same time as Le Duan came up north. 82 Record of conversation, Soviet chargé d’affaires A.M. Popov – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 25 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, p. 54. 83 Extract from the journal of Soviet chargé d’affaires, A.M. Popov, 10 December 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 93–99. 84 In a June 1957 reference to the Lao Dong Politburo members Le Duan is listed as recently back from South Vietnam, currently preparing a report on the situation in Nam Bo. Pham Hung is listed as occupied with questions concerning South Vietnam, allocating and organizing people in the South, and in charge of the leadership’s questions regarding the fight for reunification of the country. See record of conversation, Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 12–14 June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 220–235. Le Duc Tho’s role and his strengthened position in 1956 are underlined by R.B. Smith, An International History, 1983: 66. Tho is, however, not mentioned as a Politburo member in 1957 but reappears in 1959. 85 The disturbances were caused by religious discrimination against the local Catholic community, which had increased during the conduct of land reform. Members of the Catholic community were advised by an ICC Fixed Team to petition for regrouping to the south. The ICC Fixed Teams were groups with members from all the three ICC countries – Poland, India and Canada – which supervised and controlled that the provisions of the Geneva agreement were followed in both zones, especially the ceasefire agreement. When villagers assembled to present their grievances to the Canadian member of the ICC FT, the local militia attempted to disperse the demonstrators. These attempts proved ineffective, and reinforcements were called in. As a result violence broke out and shots were fired. All attempts at mediation failed. Finally troops were sent in to control the demonstrators and arrest the leaders
. The numbers killed and injured remain unknown, but according to the official version ‘several persons were killed and many more were wounded’. Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 94–95. Quote from p. 95. 86 Record of conversation, A.M. Popov – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 19 November 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 75–76. 87 A. Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 17 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 9, pa. 134, d. 56, p. 1. 88 Copy from the Embassy’s Yearly report from 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 19, p. 80 – found in a document dated 12 November 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 30, 178 Notes d. 20, p. 64. This is a one-page copy from the yearly report of 1956 (filed in 1957). Yearly reports are still unavailable to researchers in the AVP RF. 89 Ibid. 90 Record of conversation, Pavel Iudin, Soviet ambassador in Beijing – Van Tziao Chan (Head of the CC CCP department of relations with brotherly parties), January 1956, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 49, pa. 410, d. 9, pp. 27–29. 91 Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy, p. 7. 92 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 21 June 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 129–133. 93 Ibid., p. 129. 94 Ibid., pp. 129–133. 95 After the signing of the Geneva agreement in July 1954, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong allegedly said that he did not think there would be any elections. See Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, p. 15; Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 6–7. 96 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 21 June 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 129–133. 97 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ung Van Khiem and Ph
am Hung, 23 June 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 137. 98 Ibid., pp. 137–140. 99 Smith, An International History, p. 64. 100 The Great Vanguard of the Vietnamese People. The History of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Moscow: Polizdat, 1981, p. 115. 101 Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 92. 102 Ibid., pp. 104–106. 103 Gaiduk, Ilya V., Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, Chapters 5 and 6 argue that in 1956, as well as in 1959, the North Vietnamese leadership deliberately held back information and misled both the Soviets and the Chinese aiming to force them into supporting a military reunification struggle in Vietnam. 104 Yang Kuisong argues that Mao’s conciliatory attitude in the mid-1950s was a diplomatic tactic determined by realistic policy needs, and that his endorsement of compromise and peace in Southeast Asia would begin to waver once the international situation changed. That is exactly what happened when Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Yang Kuisong (transl. Qiang Zhai), ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington D.C., February 2002, pp. 15–16. 105 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Luo Guibo, 11 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 41–42. 5 Reunification by revolution? The Soviet and Chinese role in Vietnamese reunification plans, 1957–1961 1 The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, Document 1, § 6, see Randle, Robert F., Geneva 1954, The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 570. 2 Pham Van Dong’s protest letter of 25 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 3, pp. 4–5. 3 Record of conversation, Soviet Ambassador Zimyanin – Chinese Ambassador Luo Guibo, 30 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12
, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 48. 4 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Li Zhimin, 18 September 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 6, p. 70. 5 Duiker, William J., The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981, p. 182; Duiker, William J., Sacred War. Nationalism and Revolution in a Notes 179 Divided Vietnam, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 115; Thayer, Carlyle A., War By Other Means. National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-nam 1954–60, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989, pp. 159–160. There is no trace in available Soviet archival documents of any discussion on the topic between the Soviets and the Vietnamese prior to the announcement of the counterproposal. 6 Extract of directive from the CC CPSU to the Soviet delegation to the Second Session of the UN General Assembly, 29 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 18, d. 18, p. 6. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991, p. 53. 10 Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, pp. 110–112. 11 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ung Van Khiem, 30 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 50–51. 12 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 30 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 52. 13 Ibid. 14 Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 160; Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, p. 112. 15 Duiker, The Communist Road, p. 182; Pike, Douglas, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987, p. 42. 16 Yearbook of the United Nations 1957, pp. 111–113. 17 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Pham Van Dong, 18 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp.
14–15. 18 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Pham Van Dong, 7 March 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 96. 19 Ibid., pp. 91–97; Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 157. 20 The exchange of visits started with the trip of the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, K.Y. Voroshilov, to Hanoi from 20 to 23 May 1957, followed by Ho Chi Minh’s visit to the Soviet Union in July. Before Ho’s visit, Soviet ambassador Zimyanin urged the North Vietnamese to carefully plan questions related to material aid from the Socialist countries to the DRV, see record of conversation, Zimyanin – Vo Nguyen Giap, 29 May 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 182–183; during this period Ho Chi Minh also went on a tour of Korea, China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (July–August 1957), to Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution (October–November (December) 1957) and to India and Burma (February 1958), see Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 165–166, 169–173. The main aim of these trips was to secure support for the economy of the DRV and also for the reunification of the country. 21 Said about the visit to Burma and India, see record of conversation, Soviet chargé d’affaires A.M. Popov – Ung Van Khiem, 31 January 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 8, pp. 18–22. 22 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ung Van Khiem, 27 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 41–43. For exact numbers on Soviet specialists in the DRV see Appendix. 23 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Luo Guibo, 22 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 26. 24 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Pham Van Dong, 27 April 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op
. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 156–161 25 Ibid., p. 159, in the Russian text the words ‘many obligations’ had been put in quotation marks ‘mnogo nagruzok’. 26 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Vo Nguyen Giap, 29 May 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, p. 17, d. 5, pp. 182–183. 27 When he took on the post as ambassador in 1957 Leonid Ivanovich Sokolov was well acquainted with the situation in Vietnam. He began his diplomatic career as advisor at 180 Notes the Soviet embassy in Hanoi in 1954 where he stayed until 1956. In 1957 he returned to Hanoi to assume the post of Soviet ambassador, after a year’s work within the central administration of the Soviet foreign ministry in Moscow. See Diplomaticheskii slovar, tom III, Moskva: Izdatelstvo ‘Nauka’, 1986, p. 383. 28 Record of conversation, Soviet ambassador Leonid Ivanovich Sokolov – Vo Nguyen Giap, 25 February 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 8, pp. 31–33. 29 Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 177. 30 Record of conversation, Sokolov – Pham Van Dong, 3 May 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 6, pp. 101–104. 31 Economic, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the DRV, memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department in MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, p. 60. 32 ‘Questions that might be posed during conversations with the Vietnamese friends’, draft, SEAD, 30 January 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 24, d. 13, pp. 14–16. 33 Economic, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the DRV, memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department in MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 58–79. Previous estimates of Soviet economic and military assistance to the DRV in the period show a
stable level of assistance with only smaller variations from one year to another. For estimates, see Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, p. 139; Thakur, Ramesh and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, London: MacMillan, 1992, p. 117. 34 According to Soviet documents, the 15th Plenum was held from December 1958 to February 1959, but the general assumption in the literature of when it was held is January. See ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, pp. 102–108. On the last page of the document was added: ‘The report has been based on materials from MID, the General Staff of the Soviet Army, and KGB by the Council of Ministers.’ For Le Duan’s report, see Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 183–185; King C. Chen, ‘Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War’, Political Science Quarterly, 90 (2) 1975, pp. 244–246. 35 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Li Zhimin, 18 September 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 6, p. 69. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Truong Chinh, 8 June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 199–206. 39 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 12 and 14 June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 220–235. This document contains information on the different members of the Politburo and their tasks. Compared to earlier accounts of Politburo and Central Committee members it shows that leaders known to be in favour of a new and more aggressive strategy towards the South are gaining more power in the top party leadership. 40 On 15 April 1958 Pham Van Dong informed Soviet ambassador Sokolov that the party had appointed two additional deputy prime ministers to strengthen the government. The two appointees were members of the Politburo
, Truong Chinh and Pham Hung. With regard to Pham Hung’s appointment Dong said: ‘It has to be taken into account that the appointment of Pham Hung, who is a Southerner, and has worked for a long time in South Vietnam, calls for certain political consequences in the plans of the fight for a peaceful reunification of the country.’ See record of conversation, Sokolov – Pham Van Dong, 15 April 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 8, p. 95. 41 The word ‘Thum’ is not a Vietnamese name. The closest English translation of the Vietnamese word ‘thùm’ is ‘stinking’ or ‘smelling bad’. Notes 181 42 Record of conversation, Second Secretary at Soviet embassy G. Kadumov – official at the DRV Ministry of State Security ‘Thum’, 4 April 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 10, pp. 202–203. 43 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 10, p. 203. The document presented above is impressive because of the frankness in the discussion. It is rare in the sense that such information was not often provided, and if so usually in a much vaguer tone. There seem to be two possible explanations as to why this Vietnamese official was so frank with a low-ranking embassy official. Thum may have been an informant or a message deliverer from the DRV internal circle, informing on the general mood among the regrouped and, by doing so, implicitly warning the Soviets that the pressure on DRV policy makers from the regrouped in favour of armed struggle was increasing. His information may also have been a test case, implying that he was a person used by the party leadership to find out how the Soviets felt about armed struggle to reunify Vietnam. He might also have been one of the Southern regroupees himself, with a preference for armed struggle. The ideas of Thum’s possible role in this record of conversation originates from an e-mail correspondence with Vietnamese historian Nguyen Vu Tung on 24 September 1996. See also Olsen 1997: 104–105. 44 MID (Deputy Foreign Minister) to Soviet ambassador L.I. Sokolov, 16 April
1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 3, pp. 15–19. 45 Young, The Vietnam Wars, pp. 60–61. 46 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 123, 128–129. 47 Chen Jian, ‘China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–69’, The China Quarterly, 1995 (142), p. 358. 48 Chen Jian, ‘China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–69’, p. 358. 49 Although Mao was cautious when Hanoi decided to renew armed struggle in South Vietnam, he was also irritated by the Soviet unwillingness to carry on revolution. Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington, D.C., February 2002, p. 18. 50 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies. The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 184, 204–205; Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 180. 51 Record of conversation, Sokolov – Ho Chi Minh, 16, 17, 19 January 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, p. 24. 52 Record of conversation, Soviet embassy advisor A.M. Popov – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 12 March 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 24, d. 7, p. 168. 53 Record of conversation, Sokolov – Le Duan, 15 April 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 102–107. 54 Record of conversation, A.M. Popov – Truong Chinh, 21 May 1959, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 24, d. 7, pp. 265–268. 55 ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the Southeast Asia Department in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, pp. 102–108; for Hanoi
’s decisions in 1959/60 see King C. Chen, ‘Hanoi’s Three Decisions’, pp. 244–246. 56 King C. Chen, ‘Hanoi’s Three Decisions’, p. 240. 57 Zimyanin to Malin, 16 October 1959, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 52, pa. 442, d. 5, p. 52. The actual contents of the discussion are not known, but a note referring to the meeting was found in Soviet files on China. The note confirms that a meeting between Khrushchev, Mao, Kim Il Sung, and Ho Chi Minh took place in Beijing on 2 October 1959, and that the discussion evolved around the future strategy in South Vietnam. See also Pravda, 1 October 1959. 58 ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 104. 59 Ibid. 182 Notes 60 Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 187–187; Smith, Ralph B., An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol. I, Revolution versus Containment, 1955–61, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 168. 61 From Sokolov’s journal. Record of information presented in MID DRV by deputy foreign minister Ung Van Khiem for the heads of diplomatic representation from the Socialist countries, 15 April 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 6, pp. 91–97. 62 Record of conversation, Chervonenko – Chan Ti Binh, 3 February 1961, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 7, p. 37. 63 Smith, An International History, Vol. I, p. 184. 64 Ibid., pp. 184–185. 65 Brigham, Robert K., Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War, Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 1. 66 ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 104. 67 The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Soviet embassy in Hanoi to MID, 14 November 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, pp. 84–92. Quote from page 84. 68 ‘On the si’On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 107. 69 Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 184, 204–205; Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 180; Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 230–233; Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–1961, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 325–327. 70 Record of conversation, Chervonenko – Chan Ti Binh, 8 October 1960, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 53, pa. 454, d. 9, p. 35. 71 According to Chan Ti Binh, the Chinese deputy foreign minister said that, for example, this would affect the deliverance of equipment received from the DDR and Hungary, which could not be installed and sent to Vietnam for use because of the departure of the Soviet specialists. Record of conversation, Chervonenko – Chan Ti Binh, 8 October 1960, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 53, pa. 454, d. 9, p. 35. 72 Ibid., pp. 37–38. 73 Record of conversation, chargé d’affaires N.I. Godunov – Ho Chi Minh, 22 June 1960, AVP RF, f. 179, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 6, pp. 160–162, quote from p. 161. 74 Record of meeting, Soviet advisor Godunov – representatives from the Socialist countries, 24 August 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 29, d. 9, pp. 179–180. The Lao Dong Fourpoint text was
not in the file, and no further comments to the four points were made. 75 Soviet ambassador Suren Akopovich Tovmasjan to MID, 17 October 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 3, pp. 35–57, quote from p. 48. 76 Young, The Vietnam Wars, p. 82. 77 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 112. 78 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 112–113; Ralph B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol II, The Struggle for South-East Asia, 1961–1965, London: Macmillan, 1985, p. 38. 79 Political letter from Ambassador Tovmasian to MID. ‘Some Questions on the Activities of the CC Lao Dong after the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in 1960’, 17 October 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 3, p. 42. 80 Ibid., pp. 44–45. 81 Record of conversation, Councellor Soviet embassy in the DRV Nikolai I. Godunov – Le Duan, 9 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, p. 24. 82 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, pp. 24–27. Citation from p. 27. 83 Record of conversation, N.I. Godunov – Hoang Van Tien, DRV Acting Foreign Minister, 5 July 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, p. 116. For an account of Notes 183 the NLF’s foreign relations see Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy for the early 1960s particularly Chapters 1 and 2. 84 According to a Soviet report the DRV managed to establish a number of bases in South Vietnam due to the use of these aircraft, and they also flew in three complete infantry batallions and a considerable number of officers for 20 batallions. See ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f.
079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 107. 85 The Soviet documents do not say anything about the pilots who flew the planes, but in later discussions over the same matter the Vietnamese complain about the lack of educated pilots. It is therefore possible that these planes were equipped with Soviet pilots who could effectively have stopped all attempts to use the planes for purposes other than those approved by Moscow in advance. See Chapter 7 of this book. 86 Although this has yet to be documented, one cannot disregard the possibility that opinions within the Soviet government on whether to support the Vietnamese differed. Until all existing documents on Soviet involvement in Vietnam have been released (intelligence reports, military records, personal papers) it remains impossible to document that incidents of tacit approval that were in opposition to the general Soviet line in Vietnam could have been forced through by individuals or groups within the Soviet leadership positive to the introduction of insurgency in South Vietnam. 6 The fight over Laos, 1961–1962 1 Deng Xiao Ping to Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Stephan Chervonenko, 30 September 1961, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 8, p. 177. 2 Anderson, David L., Trapped By Success. The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–61, New York: Colombia University Press, 1991, p. 191. 3 For the period from 1954–60, the Vietnam fund in the AVPRF contains much information on the situation in Laos. This continued also after a separate Laos fund was opened in 1955. 4 Smith, Ralph B., An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol. I, Revolution versus Containment, 1955–61, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 111; Anderson, Trapped By Success, p. 191; Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars. Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford, 2000, p. 294. 5 Record of conversation, Sokolov – Ung Van Khiem, 28 February 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 68–73; in late May the same year Pham Van Dong informed the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi that if necessary the DRV was ready to support Laos with arms and other supplies needed for war. See record of conversation, Sokolov – Pham Van Dong, 26 May 1959, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 123–126. 6 Record of conversation, Sokolov – Ung Van Khiem, 28 February 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 68–73, AVPRF; record of conversation, Sokolov – Ung Van Khiem, 9 March 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 74–77. 7 Record of conversation, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Pushkin – Ung Van Khiem, 12 January 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 4, p. 1. 8 Ibid., pp. 1–3. 9 ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 107. 10 Anderson, Trapped By Success, p. 191. 11 Abramov was originally assigned Soviet ambassador in Cambodia from 1959 to 1962 but was serving as ambassador to Laos simultaneously. That would also explain his swift arrival in Laos. 12 This refers to the International Control Commission set up during the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. The commission consisted of representatives from India, 184 Notes Poland and Canada with India as head of the commission. The commission was set up with these particular members in order to have one representative from the Western side, Canada; one from the Socialist countries, Poland; and finally, a member that was regarded as neutral, India. The changed role and position of India would turn out to be an issue at the Geneva conference on Laos in 1961–62. 13 Captain Kong Le was collaborating with the Pathet Lao forces. 14 Hall, David K., ‘The Laos Neutralization Agreement, 1962’ in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (eds) U.S. – Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford UP: NY, 1988. 15 Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasslov, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. Partners in the Struggle for Laos, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 73. 16 Qiang Zh
ai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 100. 17 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 108. 18 All in all the PRC delegation consisted of some 50 men and women, and according to Arthur Lall who represented India in Geneva, the Chinese delegation made quite an impression when entering the conference room in Geneva. Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 1–2. 19 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 99–100. 20 See e.g. Chinese comments on the Soviet need for their support; record of conversation, Gromyko – Chen Yi, 14 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 2–3. 21 Marek Thee, Notes of a Witness. Laos and the Second Indochinese War, New York: Vintage Books, 1973, pp. 17–18. 22 Record of conversation, Andrei Gromyko – Chen Yi, 14 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 2–3. Quote from p. 3. 23 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 24 ‘On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference (May–June)’ by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 33. 25 Such meetings were held on a regular basis throughout the conference. In addition to discussing strategies the main purpose of the meetings was to let the Soviets share information from their meetings with other foreign delegates and, more specifically, from their meetings with the other co-chair, Great Britain. 26 Meeting between the head of delegations from the Soviet Union, PRC, DRV and Poland, 15 May 1961, at 16 h 30 min, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 7–8. Sihanouk did, however, make it to Geneva in time to open the conference on May 16. 27 Ibid., p. 13. 28 Ibid. 29 Roberts, Geoffrey, ‘The Soviet Union in World Politics. Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945–1991’,
London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 53–54. 30 ‘On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference (May–June)’ by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8. 31 Ibid. 32 Meeting between the head of delegations from the Soviet Union, PRC, DRV and Poland, 15 May 1961, at 16 h 30 min, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, p. 19. 33 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 34 ‘On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference (May–June)’ by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 31. 35 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin – Zhang Hanfu, 15 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, pp. 1–5. During this conversation Zhang several times referred to the absence of the word independence in references to Laotian neutrality. According to the Chinese it was very important that whenever the word ‘neutrality’ was mentioned as the future status of Laos, ‘independence’ should be mentioned as well. 36 This was a question the Chinese raised several times in the early days of the conference. Notes 185 37 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin – Zhang Hanfu, 16 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 19. The Chinese position on the issue of Chiang Kaishistovs was also emphasized in the overall Soviet analysis on contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference (May–June), where it was concluded that after the negotiations during summer 1961 the Chinese had stopped insisting on the point about the Chiang Kaishistovs. See also 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 31. 38 ‘On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference (May–June)’ by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p
. 31. 39 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin – Zhang Hanfu, 16 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 20. 40 Apparently, Zhang then went to consult with Chen Yi, whose answer was that he would reconsider once again whether it would be wise for the Chinese to proceed with the issues of Chapter 4 of the agreement. In addition he wanted to hear the Soviet comments on the other Chinese proposals. See, ibid. AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, pp. 22–23. 41 Ibid., p. 20. 42 Ibid.; AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2. 43 Record of conversation, Chervonenko – Deng Xiao Ping, 30 September 1961, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 8, p. 177. 44 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956–1962, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1997, p. 194. 45 Thee, Notes of a Witness, p. 131. A discussion of Marek Thee’s account can also be found in Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’, pp. 194–196. 46 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin – DRV foreign minister Ung Van Khiem, 6 June 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 3. 47 Meeting between the heads of the four Socialist delegations, 7 June 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 6, pp. 30–36. 48 Arguments presented by the heads of the four Socialist delegations concerning the organization of the further work of the Geneva conference on Laos, 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 8, p. 23. 49 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 103. 50 Ibid. 51 In the new government, Souvanna Phouma became prime minister in charge of the Ministry of Defence; Phoumi and Souphanouvong both became deputy prime ministers, each with veto power over cabinet decisions and departmental decisions in defence
, interior and foreign affairs. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 104–105. 52 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 106. 53 ‘On the PRC reaction to the formation of a Lao government’, Soviet embassy in Beijing to MID, 18 June 1962, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 55, pa. 489, d. 67, pp. 223–225. Quotes from p. 225. 54 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Pham Van Dong, 19 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, p. 54. 55 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Ung Van Khiem, 8 September 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, pp. 200–201. 56 Record of conversation, Soviet chargé d’affaires in Hanoi P.I. Privalov – Nguyen Zyan, Deputy director of the Asian Department in the DRV foreign ministry and Cham, Head of the department of foreign trade with Socialist countries in the Vietnamese ministry of trade, 9 July 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 61. 57 Record of conversation, P.I. Privalov – DRV Acting Premier Minister Le Than Ngi, 24 August 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 89. 58 Ibid. 59 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Pham Van Dong, 7 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 103–104. 186 Notes 60 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Pham Van Dong, 24 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 129–130. The passage on how the Soviet Union was the best choice to assist the DRV in their help to Laos was followed by a personal comment made by Ambassador Tovmasyan saying: ‘I personally agree with him.’ (l. 130). 61 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34,
d. 7, p. 134. 62 The conference on Laos in Geneva was emphasized by Deng Xiao Ping in the end of September 1961 as an example of the fact that Moscow and Beijing were still able to cooperate on the international arena, although they did not agree on everything else. See record of conversation, Chervonenko – Deng Xiao Ping, 30 September 1961, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 8, p. 177. 63 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 106. Quotation marks in the original. 64 Ibid., pp. 106–108. 65 Ibid., p. 111. 7 From disinterest to active support, 1962–1965 1 ‘On the situation in South Vietnam’, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 104. 2 Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington, D.C., February 2002, p. 22. 3 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Duong Bac Mai, 18 December 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 226. 4 In January 1962 Chan Ti Binh, the DRV ambassador in Beijing, told Chervonenko that Ho Chi Minh claimed that he would fight against disagreements within the Communist camp ‘until his last drop of blood’. Chan Ti Binh added that without the Soviet Union there would not have been a Communist camp, that disagreements would have to be solved in a friendly way, and that they should be able to find a common course. See, record of conversation, Soviet ambassador to Beijing, Stephan Chervonenko – Chan Ti Binh, 15 January 1962, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 55, pa. 480, d. 6, p. 11. Chan Ti Binh’s attitude was probably rather representative of how the Vietnamese dealt with the widening split in the early part of the 1960s. 5 In January 1962, according to the Soviet embassy, the Vietnamese put much more effort into the celebration of the Chinese recognition of the DRV, than the Soviet recognition. Also, when celebrating the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Lao Dong, it was
the role of the CCP that was underlined, as well as the role of the Chinese Communists in the Vietnamese revolution. See, memorandum by the Soviet embassy in the DRV – written by L. Kotov, 2nd Secretary, ‘Some aspects of the Vietnamese– Chinese relationship’, 10 April 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, pp. 6–8. 6 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 8; see also Chen Jian 2001: 211. 7 Regionally Laos was the main issue that contributed to a closer Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Leaders in Hanoi and Beijing held, to a large degree, similar positions on how to handle, and not least solve, the problems in Laos. Hanoi strongly wanted the air bridge to Laos to continue, mainly because they used it for two vital purposes: first, to bring personnel into South Vietnam and, second, to strengthen the Pathet Lao. These goals coincided with those of the Chinese, who in addition to supporting the Pathet Lao aimed to strengthen a second force in Laos, the group led by Kham Chan in the province of Phong Saly. Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 10; sources from the Chinese side also reveal how Beijing already during the Geneva conference in 1961 encouraged Hanoi to keep their forces in Laos in secret. See Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude’, p. 21. 8 Economic, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 58–79. However, the Soviets had Notes 187 several reservations with regard to the quality of this assistance and Vietnamese views on it. According to the SEAD report the Soviet embassy in Hanoi believed that the Vietnamese leadership realized that hoping for a fast economic development in the DRV in the next few years, based on Chinese assistance only, was an illusion. Chinese assistance to the DRV was characterized by overt mistakes, late deliveries and low quality of goods. (67) 9 L. Kotov, ‘Some aspects of the Vietnamese–Chinese relationship
’, 10 April 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 9. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., pp. 9–10. Quotation from p. 10. 12 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 113. 13 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Ho Chi Minh, 26 May 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 18–19. Quotation marks in original text. 14 Record of conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin – Ho Chi Minh, 7 June 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 4, pp. 11–12. 15 ‘Soviet–Vietnamese relations’, memorandum from the Southeast Asia Department, 2 June 1962, AVP RF, f. 079. op. 17, pa. 35, d. 13, pp. 40–41. 16 L. Kotov, ‘Some aspects of the Vietnamese–Chinese relationship’, 10 April 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, pp. 5–6. 17 These suggestions might indicate that there were different views also within the foreign ministry on how to deal with the situation in Vietnam, see AVP RF, memorandum written by A. Skoryokov, Suggestions for the further development of the political, economic and cultural relationship with the DRV and for regulation of international problems’, 15 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 35, d. 13, pp. 75–76. 18 L. Kotov, ‘Some aspects of the Vietnamese–Chinese relationship’, 10 April 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 28. 19 The Soviet embassy in Hanoi and the Southeast Asia Department in the Soviet foreign ministry came up with many ideas on how to increase Soviet influence in Vietnam, ranging from a visit by Nikita Khrushchev to increased economic assistance, but in 1962 none of these were implemented. 20 Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. From Stalin
to Khrushev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 261–262. 21 Kevin Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, London: UCL Press, 1998, p. 56. 22 LaFeber, Walter, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997, pp. 229–230. 23 The Soviet dependence on other Socialist embassies to obtain information on developments in Vietnam and especially the Sino-Vietnamese relationship coincided with Mao’s decision to support the armed struggle in Vietnam. See Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude’, p. 22. 24 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Findinski and Marek Thee, 8 and 10 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 107. 25 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Czechoslovak Ambassador to the DRV, Gerold, 11 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 110. Both quotations from p. 110. 26 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 111. Quotations in the original text. 27 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 111. 28 Ibid. 29 The wording was ‘Opiratsa na svoi sily’ – ‘Depend on one’s own forces’. 30 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 111. 31 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Findinski, 20 November 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 201. 32 Memorandum written by A. Skoryokov, ‘Suggestions for the further development of the political, economic and cultural relationship with the DRV and for regulation 188 Notes of international problems’, 15 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 35, d. 13, pp. 75–77. Quotation from p. 76. 33 Record of conversation
, Tovmasyan – leader of the Polish delegation to the ICC Pokhorilts and Findinski, 11 October 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 164. 34 Ibid., p. 165. 35 Memorandum, ‘The PRC delegation to the DRV’, L. Kotov, 2nd Secretary of the Soviet embassy in the DRV, 11 November 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 138. 36 The Soviet embassy placed significance on the fact that Ung Van Khiem had placed a Soviet flag on his car during the visit. See, ibid. ‘The PRC delegation to the DRV’, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 140. 37 Ibid., p. 148. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., pp. 148–149. 40 Xuan Thuy (DRV foreign minister 1963–65, and DRV representative at the Paris Peace Talks). 41 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Duong Bac Mai, 18 December 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 226. 42 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 228. The last part of the sentence had quotation marks in the original text. 43 In late February 1964, after the visit of Le Duan’s delegation to Moscow, Soviet ambassador to the DRV Tovmasyan, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador to the DRV, Shedelevski, provided a clear yes to the Poles’ direct question as to whether the DRV now was to be considered pro-Chinese. See record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Shedelevski, 28 February 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 99. 44 According to a report summarizing two such visits, neither delegation experienced any form of polemic fights, and the participants were in both cases very satisfied with the visits. See Memorandum on ‘Political results of the visits to the DRV of delegations from the Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Defence USSR’, 29 January 1963, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 17, pp. 1–3. 45 See e.g. record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Duong Bac Mai, 18 December 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 225–228; record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Duong Bac Mai, 29 June 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 6, pp. 249–256; record of conversation, Privalov – Duong Bac Mai, 21 October 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 41–44. 46 Memorandum ‘About Novotny’s visit to the DRV’, written by 3rd Secretary Soviet embassy in Hanoi, L. Boyko, 25 March 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, pp. 38–47. 47 ‘Liu Shaoqi’s visit to the DRV’, Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan to MID, 12 June 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, p. 70. Quotation marks in the original text; for the Chinese account, see Qiang Zhai 2000: 126. 48 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Polish chargé d’affaires Kazimir Hodorek, 9 March 1963, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 6, p. 76. Horodek further added that these efforts had made many Vietnamese worry that pro-Chinese groups now had full control over the propaganda machinery of the Lao Dong. They feared that these groups could resort to repression of those who did not share their points of view. However, it seemed as if the Vietnamese believed that as long as Ho Chi Minh remained in power it would probably not come to this, but if these groups were able to restrain Ho’s influence within the party this could happen. (78) 49 ‘Liu Shaoqi’s visit to the DRV’, Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan to MID, 12 June 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op
. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, p. 70. Quotation marks in the original text. 50 Ibid., pp. 79–80. 51 Ibid., p. 85. 52 SEAD memorandum, G. Zverev, 2nd Secretary, ‘The position of the DRV and the USSR in relation to South Vietnam’, 26 July 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, p. 164. Notes 189 53 Ibid., p. 165. 54 Ibid. 55 In the Soviet foreign ministry files containing records of conversations between the Soviet ambassador and high-ranking North Vietnamese officials for 1963, many documents had been censured and were not available to me while I was working in the reading room. However, later references to individual documents do indicate that the Vietnamese did receive a certain amount of weapons from the Soviets also in 1963, under the condition that it would be impossible to identify that these weapons were delivered by the Soviet Union. However, after the mention of these weapons most of the conversations between the ambassador and the highest-level Vietnamese officials have been restricted from view. See e.g. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, dd. 7–8. 56 Record of conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Georgevich Lapin – DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Van Kinh, 30 August 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 4, p. 4. 57 Ibid. 58 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Ho Chi Minh, 20 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 159–161. 59 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Gerold, 16 November 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, p. 37, d. 8, p. 72. 60 Ibid., p. 74. 61 King C. Chen, ‘Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War’, Political Science Quarterly, 90 (2), 1975. 62 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 125. Quotation marks from the original text. 63 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Dang Kim Xiang, DRV deputy minister of economy, 17 January 1964, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 16. 64 Ibid., p. 22. 65 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Xuan Thuy, 25 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 164–165. According to Tovmasyan, Truong Chinh was also supposed to participate during the lunch, but the table was only set for seven people, so there was no seat for him and he had to leave. 66 Duiker, William J., Ho Chi Minh: A Life, New York: Hyperion, 2000, p. 537. 67 Duiker’s emphasis on the fact that the North Vietnamese were eager not to completely alienate the Soviets, in spite of preference for the Chinese strategy by the majority of the Lao Dong leaders, coincides well with findings in Soviet foreign ministry files. If this is true, it gives increasing credit to the efforts of the local Soviet diplomacy in Hanoi that upheld a working relationship with the North Vietnamese authorities, even at a time when leaders in Moscow displayed less interest for developments in Vietnam. See Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, p. 537. 68 The inclusion of To Huu in the delegation was significant as he had made his debut as a political figure during the 9th Plenum when he publicly attacked the Soviet revisionism. See Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, p. 538. 69 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 126–127. Quotation marks in the original text on p. 127. 70 Tovmasyan’s diary. ‘Le Duan’s statements before departure to Moscow’. 26 January 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 26. 71 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Shedelevski, 28 February 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 98. 72 Ibid. 73 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Nguyen Van Vinh, 26 February 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, pp. 80–90. 74 Qiang Zhai
, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 127–128; and Gaiduk, Ilya V., The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996b, p. 10. 75 Gaiduk, Ilya V., Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 203–204. 190 Notes 76 This is based on an analysis of available records of conversations between Soviet embassy officials and Vietnamese leaders during 1963. Some might argue that the Vietnamese assertions of their loyalty to the Soviet Union were pure propaganda. However, the frequency of these assertions and the fact that the Soviet Union, in the end, was the only reliable partner in a war against the Americans support this view. Similar arguments on how Vietnamese leaders were reluctant to cut off all contact with the Soviet Union have been presented in Duiker 2000: 537–538. 77 Comments made by Pham Van Dong to Marek Thee, Polish representative in the ICC Laos, in December 1963. See AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, p. 112; for Pham Van Dong’s statement see record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Pham Van Dong, 16 January 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 14. Quotation marks in the original. After expressing that the conditions were not yet ripe, Pham Van Dong refused to talk more about the subject. 78 Record of conversation, Privalov – Gerold, 11 June 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 60. 79 Record of conversation, Privalov – Pham Van Dong, 18 June 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 91. 80 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 132; and Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, pp. 12–13. 81 Record of conversation, Privalov – Le Duc Tho, 10 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 202–206; and record of conversation, Privalov – Pham Van Dong, 15 August 1964, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 216. 82 For hints on improvements in the Soviet–Vietnamese relationship, see record of conversation, Privalov – Bibov, DDR chargé d’affaires in Hanoi, 16 July 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 141–142; and record of conversation, Privalov – Pham Van Dong, 9 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 195–197. 83 Record of conversation, Privalov – Pham Van Dong, 9 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 197. 84 For the exchanges on the U Thanth issue, see record of conversation, Privalov – Pham Van Dong, 21 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 233–234; and record of conversation, Privalov – Hoang Van Tien, 29 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 242. When delivering the answer to the U Thanth information to Privalov, the exchange was so secret that everyone except Privalov and Tien had to leave the room. Tien also underlined that he had written the answer himself. 85 These Vietnamese concerns were referred to by the DDR ambassador to the DRV, Bergold. See record of conversation, Privalov – Bergold, 17 September 1964, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 8, pp. 12–15. 86 Record of conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Lapin – DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Van Kinh, 23 December 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 4, p. 6. Conclusion: Changing Alliances 1 Record of conversation, Gromyko – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 11 April 1965, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 2, p. 13. 2 Record of conversation, Shcherbakov – Pham Van Dong, 19 February 1965, AVP RF
, f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 4, p. 53. 3 Record of conversation, Shcherbakov – Pham Van Dong, 3 March 1965, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 4, pp. 63–64. 4 Record of conversation, Chervonenko – Liu Zhao, 23 March 1965, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 58, pa. 516, d. 5, p. 46. 5 Ibid., pp. 48–49. 6 Ibid. Notes 191 7 Record of conversation, Gromyko – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 11 April 1965, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 2, pp. 12–13. 8 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 17. 9 For the classical interpretations of Moscow’s view on the Geneva settlements, see, for example, Randle, Robert F., Geneva 1954, The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969; Nogee, J.L. and Donaldson R.H., Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (3rd edn), New York: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 110–111; Cameron, Allan W., ‘The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The Origins of Involvement’ in W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, Waltham: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, pp. 189–196; Qiang Zhai, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’, The China Quarterly (129), 1992, p. 113. See also Olsen, Mari, ‘Solidarity and National Revolution. The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954–1960’, Defence Studies 4/97, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1997, Chapter 1. 10 According to Nigel Gould-Davies an ideologically driven state would seek to replicate its domestic system, while in a similar situation a traditional security-seeking state would attempt to expand their territory. The expansion of ideological states is thus more geoideological than geopolitical. Likewise, ideological states define security in terms of the expansion of their own domestic system, and threat in terms of the expansion of their adversary’s domestic system.
See ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 101–104. 11 For a detailed analysis of Soviet perceptions of the change in DRV’s Southern strategy, see also Olsen, ‘Solidarity’, Chapter 5. 12 See e.g. Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg (eds), ‘77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 22, 1998, pp. 142–143. A similar notion can be found in Ilya Gaiduk’s latest work, where he talks about Geneva primarily as a way to secure peace in Southeast Asia and prevent American intervention, rather than a way to safeguard the future of a fellow Communist state exemplified by the Soviet view on Vietnamese partition as unproblematic. See Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, Chapter 3 and Conclusion. 13 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 111. 14 However, that question cannot be answered satisfactorily until we gain full access to Vietnamese foreign policy archives. 15 According to Marilyn Young, Washington assimilated the war in Vietnam ‘in the worldwide fight against Communism in general and its Asian branch in particular’. See The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991, p. 30. 16 Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 12–15; Vladislav Zubok, ‘Stalin’s Plans and Russian Archives’, Diplomatic History, 21 (Spring 1997), p. 303. 17 Macdonald, Douglas J., ‘Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, pp. 183–184. 18 Douglas J. Macdonald suggests that in order to explain how and why states act, both
ideational and structural analyses are necessary. Ultimately, the study of formal ideology, intersecting with structural considerations, offers an efficient and relatively economical means to do so. See ‘Formal Ideologies’, p. 194. 192 Notes Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong Central Committee 1 Attached list, 11 June 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 7. 2 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Ho Chi Minh, 7 September 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, p. 93. 3 Record of conversation, A.M. Popov – Ho Chi Minh, June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 93–99. 4 Record of conversation, Zimyanin – Nguyen Duy Trinh, 12–14 June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 220–235. 5 Record of conversation, Sokolov – Le Duc Tho, 6 June 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 130–133. 6 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan – Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Xuan Thuy, 25 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 164–165. Appendix 2: Economic assistance and specialists from the Socialist camp to the DRV, 1955–19621 1 Long-term credits and non-refundable aid from other socialist countries to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (in million roubles), total sums from 1955 to 1962. Memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department in MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 58–79. Bibliography Adelman, Jonathan R. and Deborah A. Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1989. Anderson, David L., Trapped By Success. The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–61, New York: Colombia University Press, 1991. Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second
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Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1999). Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington, DC, February 2002. Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991. Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962. ——, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, New York: Pegasus, 1967. Zubok, Vladislav, ‘Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Infor- mation, 1952–53’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 4, 1992. ——, ‘Stalin’s Plans and Russian Archives’, Diplomatic History, 21 (Spring 1997). Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushev, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Index August Revolution 1–3 Autumn border campaign (1950) Democratic Republic of Vietnam 22–3 approaches to America and Soviet Bangkok ‘Representational Office of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’ 2, 12 Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in Moscow and 5–11 29–30 Berlin conference Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–63 [Westad (ed.)] xvi Calcutta Conference (1948) Central Office for South Vietnam 4, 7–8 (COSVN) 90 China Dien Bien Phu campaign military assistance to DRV 36–8 22–6 Moscow and Communist victory in 14–16 preparations for the Geneva conference 30–1 readiness to assist DRV 17 representation in DRV and Soviet 18–19 responsibility for colonial liberation struggles in Asia 19–20 China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–75 (Qiang Zhai) xvi Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) 22–4, 37, 54 Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG) 23–4 Cold War International History Project xvi (CWIHP) Cominform 5–6 Union 3 China versus Soviet representation in 18–19 11 Chinese aid Chinese military assistance Chinese recognition Dien Bien Phu campaign discussions and misunderstandings 16–17
produce the needed items. As a result, by the end of 1769, imports of British products would decline by nearly half. In addition to the new taxes, Townshend proposed suspending the New York assembly and negating its legislative initiatives for its refusal to comply with the Quartering Act. He also suggested creating a Board of Customs Commissioners to be headquartered in the colonies. (Boston was chosen as the headquarters site.) By the end of June 1767, the new taxes and these additional proposals had all been approved. Townshend also had new vice-admiralty courts set up in Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston to process violators of the new customs taxes. The customs commissioners proved overbearing and their agents rapacious, in effect harassing American merchants (John Hancock of Boston prominent among them), often in hopes of obtaining unfavorable judgments and thus securing their share of forfeitures (one-third the value of each ship and its cargo). The new courts, operating without juries, provided an unsympathetic venue for defendants. Ironically, Townshend would not be among those harvesting the sour fruits of his policies—he died suddenly on September 4, 1767.11 MASSACHUSETTS RESPONDS One widely distributed response to the Townshend Acts appeared in John Dickinson’s Letters from an American Farmer, in which he argued, among other points, that the Townshend duties violated Americans’ constitutional rights as British citizens. Dickinson wrote from Pennsylvania, and his prudently worded views were well received throughout the colonies. His letters were published in England at the behest of Benjamin Franklin.12 Characteristically less prudent, Massachusetts radicals plotted a more active opposition. Initially, however, their response took the judicious form of influencing the House of the Massachusetts General Court (legislature) to send a request in January 1768 to the earl of Shelburne, secretary of state for the southern department with the authority to recommend colonial policy, that the Townshend Acts be repealed. Then, in February, James Otis and Samuel Adams persuaded the Massachusetts House to approve a circular letter drafted by Adams, to be sent to each of the other colonial legislatures, advocating that the legislatures “harmonize with each other”—a politic plea for unity and cooperation. The letter also reiterated the colonists’ constitutional rights, asserted the impossibility of attaining colonial representation in Parliament, and, although conceding Parliament’s supreme legislative authority, pointed out that Parliament nevertheless derived its authority from the
British constitution and was therefore subject to constitutional restrictions in passing legislation. In March, the Virginia House of Burgesses reacted strongly to the letter, approving forceful protests to the king and Parliament that insisted on the House of Burgesses’ equality with Parliament. In May, it issued a harshly worded circular letter of its own, advocating joint measures by the colonies against any British policy that tended to “enslave them.” Ensuing events in Boston and London hurtled the controversy toward violence. In Boston, the new customs commissioners determined to enforce cus- Prelude to Revolt 9 toms procedures rigidly and to squelch smuggling. After a failed confrontation with John Hancock over his having customs officials forcibly ejected from his brig Lydia—the attorney general supported the legality of the ejection—the commissioners decided to make a lesson of Hancock and in June had the British man-of-war Romney seize his sloop Liberty. A Sons of Liberty mob assembled at the wharf to oppose the seizure but were unsuccessful, so the mob attacked and beat the comptroller and a customs collector supervising confiscation of the Liberty and then hunted down and beat other customs officials. The following day, the terrified customs commissioners and their families fled to the Romney. Governor Francis Bernard’s efforts to manage the situation failed utterly, and within a week the Sons of Liberty controlled Boston. Under orders of his recalcitrant superiors, Bernard demanded that the Massachusetts House rescind the circular letter. When the demand was rejected—by a 92 to 17 vote—he dissolved the legislature.13 Meanwhile, in London, outraged by the circular letter despite its moderate wording, the government had decided to send troops to Boston for quartering as a standing army. The ships carrying the troops arrived in Boston at the end of September, and, on October 1, the 14th and 29th Regiments disembarked to establish quarters in the city. Responses to the Boston events evolved slowly in the other colonies, solidifying American opposition to the Townshend Acts and support for the circular letter. And the harshness of the British troops’ occupation of Boston—including the affront of rapes, assaults, robberies, and public beatings and executions of attempted army deserters on Boston Common—as a violation of personal liberties would generate a smoldering fire of resentment among the citizens.14 THE BOSTON MASSACRE On the first day of August 1769, Governor Bernard, admitting that the situation in Boston was hopeless, set sail for England,
leaving Thomas Hutchinson, the American-born lieutenant governor, in charge. The lieutenant governor soon had a precedent for things to come in the city. Troops had been stationed in New York City since 1766, following the colony’s opposition to the Quartering Act, and they had collided continually in riots and brawls with mobs organized by the British troops fire on a riotous mob, killing or wounding 13 men during the Boston Massacre. ( Boston Massacre, courtesy of Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library) 10 The American Revolution local Sons of Liberty. In mid-January 1770, after some soldiers chopped down the city’s liberty pole as a taunt to the Sons of Liberty, an ensuing battle ended with one American dead and many others wounded. Soon after, in early March, brawls erupted from soldier-citizen confrontations in Boston. On the snowy night of March 5, these confrontations culminated in a fatal riot as a mob menaced Pvt. Hugh White, the sentry on guard at the customs house on King Street. At the nearby main guard station, Capt. Thomas Preston watched anxiously as the mob grew, some armed with clubs and swords, and tempers rose. Preston decided to march to White’s assistance with a force of six privates and one corporal. Once aligned with White, they found themselves surrounded by surly rioters who hurled snowballs, ice, and shouts of “Kill them!” Preston ordered his men to load their muskets. Suddenly, a hurled piece of ice hit one of the privates, causing him to slip and fall to the icy ground; regaining his footing, he fired his musket into the crowd. The other soldiers paused momentarily and then fired their muskets. Eight men in the crowd fell wounded; three others died instantly, among them AfricanAmerican freeman Crispus Attucks; another succumbed a few hours afterward; and a fifth man died several days later from his wounds. The next day, disorder prevailed as an angry mob of a thousand roamed the streets. Hutchinson had Preston and the other soldiers involved confined to jail, diffusing some of the anger. On the following day, accepting the inevitable, he ordered the 14th and 29th Regiments withdrawn from the city to Castle William in Boston Harbor. Surprisingly, in the days and weeks that followed the Boston Massacre (as Americans quickly dubbed the shooting), the mood in the city grew calm. Local leaders turned their attention
now Governor Hutchinson to convene the Massachusetts General Court (legislature) to consider this issue. Hutchinson refused. In response, Adams easily persuaded the Town Meeting to create a Committee of Correspondence to propound the colonists’ rights and grievances and to exchange communications with the other colonies.17 THE TEA ACT CRISIS The popular commodity tea now inspired the confrontation that eventuated in open rebellion. During the entire colonial period, the British East India Company enjoyed a monopoly on all trade between India and the rest of the British Empire. The company had thereby reaped enormous profits for many years, but military expenses and the cumulative effects of corruption and inefficiency had recently jeopardized its finances. At that point, the company had 17 million pounds of tea stored in English warehouses as a result of American merchants’ nonimportation boycotts and smuggling of cheaper Dutch tea. To alleviate the East India Company’s financial problems, the North ministry, in May 1773, passed an act, the Tea Act of 1773, that would allow the company to export its warehoused tea directly to the American colonies instead of distributing it through the standard practice of selling goods to English wholesalers who then resold them to American wholesalers for distribution to American retail merchants. The tea would also be exempted from the regular export duties and assessed only the reduced tax remaining on tea from the Townshend Duties (to sustain Parliament’s right to tax the colonies), so that it would be cheaper even than the smuggled Dutch tea but still return a huge profit to the company. In addition, only American merchants of proven loyalty to the Crown would be entitled to sell the tea. This blatant act of favoritism enraged American radicals and merchants, especially those supplied through smuggling operations. The opponents realized that the act ultimately signified that Parliament could grant control of any segment of American commerce to any company it chose. The East India Company selected its consignees in various American ports and set about shipping 1,700 chests of tea to them. Captains of American ships in London refused to transport the tea, so it was loaded aboard English ships. Threatened by radicals led by the Sons of Liberty, consignee merchants in Charleston, New York, and Philadelphia relinquished their control of the tea. Local authorities in Charleston had the tea unloaded and stored unsold, and those in the other two ports had the ships bearing the tea returned to England unloaded. 12 The American Revolution But, surprisingly, the Boston consignees resisted the radicals’ pressures
, and so the company dispatched three ships laden with tea chests that would arrive in Boston Harbor in late November and early December.18 THE BOSTON TEA PARTY Because the Sons of Liberty could not intimidate the Boston consignees, Sam Adams reverted to the tactic of mob pressure. On November 28 the tea-bearing ship Dartmouth arrived in harbor. Aroused by Adams’s harangues, crowds roamed the city’s streets, determined to prevent the tea from being unloaded. Governor Hutchinson insisted the tea would be unloaded, the taxes collected, and the law enforced. But the Dartmouth remained moored in the harbor unloaded, soon joined by two other tea ships, while all waited for the 20-day limit during which the duty must be paid on the Dartmouth’s cargo to expire on December 16. During the final days of November, Adams drew mass meetings of 5,000 to the Old South Meeting House that drafted resolutions and sent them to the consignees, demanding that the tea be returned to England. Backed by the governor, the consignees rejected the demands. The Boston Committee of Correspondence turned to garnering support from committees in nearby towns and throughout New England. Another mass meeting held on December 14 sent a demand to the Dartmouth’s owner, Francis Rotch, to request clearance for the ship’s return to England. Rotch, accompanied by 10 men sent by the meeting, toured the customs offices, seeking clearance. The customs collector denied the request, and on the 16th, Governor Hutchinson, noting that Rotch lacked clearance, refused him a pass for the Dartmouth to sail past Castle William. Hutchinson planned to seize the tea for nonpayment of the duty. Rotch appeared at an evening meeting at Old South Meeting House to report his failure, and Sam Adams announced that nothing more could be done—apparently a signal to action, for the crowd responded with war whoops and raced from the building to the wharf. There, about 50 men, faces darkened and costumed as Indians, boarded all three of the tea ships, hoisted the tea chests on deck, smashed open the chests, and hurled them into the harbor’s waters as Patriots hurl East India Company tea into Boston Harbor. ( The Boston Tea Party, courtesy of Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library) Prelude to Revolt 13 the assembled crowd cheered their support. The “Indians” claimed to be “making saltwater tea.�
and fuels would be allowed to enter the harbor, but no oceangoing vessels. The Massachusetts Regulatory Act (or Massachusetts Government Act) changed the colony’s royal charter—an Prelude to Revolt 15 unprecedented action—increasing the powers of the royal governor, who could now appoint or remove most of the civil officials; banning town meetings; allowing the House of the legislature to be elected still but the Council to be appointed by the Crown; and empowering sheriffs, not freeholders, to select juries. And the Impartial Administration of Justice Act stipulated that any royal official who was accused of a capital crime would be sent either to England or to another colony for trial. In addition, in June, Parliament passed two more acts guaranteed to anger the colonists. A new Quartering Act essentially revised the acts of 1765 and 1766 to permit the billeting of troops with private families. Finally, the Quebec Act, although meant to conciliate Quebec’s French residents and unrelated to the four punitive acts, became viewed by the American colonists as one of the Intolerable Acts. It expanded the boundaries of the province of Quebec to include all the inland territory extending to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, thereby eliminating colonial land claims in the West. It also accepted French as an official language of the province along with English, restored French civil law, permitted Roman Catholics to hold offices, and officially recognized the Roman Catholic faith—this last considered an especial affront by American Protestants. As if to reinforce the British intent to subjugate the colonists, at least in Massachusetts, Gen. Thomas Gage arrived in Boston in mid-May to assume the post of governor. Nevertheless, many colonists accepted his appointment and even the Intolerable Acts. A group of Boston merchants, for example, offered to pay This cartoon entitled “The Able Doctor,” engraved by Paul Revere for the Royal American Magazine in June 1774, depicts America “swallowing the bitter draught.” (Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration) 16 The American Revolution the East India Company for the destroyed tea and thus satisfy the demand of the Boston Port Act. But the Boston radicals mobilized the Town Meeting to reject payment for the tea and called on the other colonies to cease all trade with Great Britain. The other colonies, with Rhode Island taking the lead in May, proposed holding a meeting of representatives from all the colonies and began to select their delegates.21 THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS The Continental Congress convened
in Philadelphia on September 5, 1774. Only Georgia, where the residents were fearful of being denied the protection of troops during a continuing Creek Indian uprising, had decided not to send delegates. Those attending from the 12 other colonies represented a wide spectrum of political views. Although few had met previously and many voiced disagreements, the delegates generally admired one another and completed their meeting with a strong sense of achievement. Samuel Adams and his cousin John Adams attended as representatives from Massachusetts; George Washington, Peyton Randolph, and Richard Henry Lee, from Virginia; Silas Deane, from Connecticut; John Jay, from New York; John Dickinson and Joseph Galloway, from Pennsylvania; Christopher Gadsden, Edward Rutledge, and John Rutledge, from South Carolina. The delegates chose Peyton Randolph as the Continental Congress’s president, decided each colony would have one vote, and began their debates. The most crucial issue focusing their debates concerned the definition of Americans’ rights. The delegates reached a final agreement that these rights derived from nature, from the British constitution, and from the various colonial charters. They also decided that all importation of goods manufactured in Britain or Ireland should cease effective December 1, 1774. But they managed to sidestep responding to the Suffolk Resolves, which requested the Continental Congress’s support for Massachusetts and were delivered to the Congress by Paul Revere on October 6.22 RESOLVES AND THE ASSOCIATION The two noteworthy achievements of the Continental Congress arose out of their areas of agreement. On October 14, the delegates approved a Declaration of Resolves of the Continental Congress. The declaration stressed that the law of nature, the British constitution, and the colonial charters constituted the foundation of the American colonists’ rights. It outlined some of these rights, including the unlawfulness of taxation and the imposition of standing armies without the colonists’ consent, and it condemned the Intolerable Acts. The Continental Congress also agreed on a policy of nonimportation of British goods into the colonies and nonexportation of American goods to Great Britain and created the Continental Association to effect this purpose. To enforce the association, the Continental Congress specified that committees should be elected “in every county, city, and town” and should be empowered with such tactics as inspections, public disclosure of offenders, ostracism, and other forms of peer pressure. Fearful of the economic consequences for their farmers, Virginia and South Carolina engineered an extension of the date for the beginning Prelude to Revolt 17 of nonexportation until September
10, 1775, so that Virginia farmers could sell their tobacco crops and South Carolina's farmers their rice. The ban on importing East India Company tea would begin immediately, and that on all other British goods on December 1, 1774. Members of the Continental Congress signed the association on October 20. On following days, the Continental Congress drafted petitions and addresses to King George III and to the people of Great Britain, America, and Quebec. The delegates rejected petitioning Parliament on the grounds that the petition could be construed as an American admission of Parliament’s authority. Their labors completed, the delegates dissolved the First Continental Congress on October 26, with the understanding that if events made it necessary, Congress would reconvene on May 10, 1775. The delegates traveled homeward, respectful of one another and garnering adulation from most Americans for their accomplishments. On this eve of revolution, the population of the 13 American colonies numbered about 2.5 million—a tenfold increase over the population of 1700. Notably, blacks comprised 500,000 of this total—that is, approximately 20 percent— almost entirely slaves; although the vast majority lived in the South (over half, in fact, in Virginia and Maryland), about 4,000 slaves and a few hundred free blacks lived in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. Philadelphia, the largest American city, now had 40,000 residents; New York, 21,000; Boston, 17,000; Charleston, 12,000; Newport, R.I., 11,000. By contrast, the population of London alone was approaching 1 million; the total population of England and Wales exceeded 8.5 million. In addition, Great Britain boasted the world’s largest navy and an army second to none. An observer devoted to literature might have characterized the impending conflict as the Lilliputians attempting to menace Gulliver.23 As a harbinger of things to come, while the Continental Congress had been completing its work, General Gage preemptively adjourned the Massachusetts legislature, motivating the representatives and additional delegates spontaneously selected to convene as the Provincial Congress. This surrogate legislature established the Committee of Safety, headed by John Hancock, and voted to recruit a militia of 12,000 men and to purchase guns and ammunition to arm them. As 1774 ended, prospects for peace and reconciliation between the American colonists and their mother country appeared increasingly bleak.24 BEYOND POLITICS Life continued in other venues despite war and rebellion, of course. Quite significantly and perhaps also ironically
, the Enlightenment formed the backdrop for the Seven Years’ War and the political events leading to the American Revolution. Whatever their politics or professions, the men involved in these events, both Britons and colonists, ingested the principles embedded in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government and Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Sir Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica with their implications of orderliness, even precise mechanisms governing both nature and society. Contemporaries also most likely knew something of Carolus Linnaeus’s advancements in biological taxonomy and perhaps even of Antoine Lavoisier’s promising work in chemistry, and on both sides of the Atlantic, they admired Benjamin Franklin’s experiments with electricity. 18 The American Revolution Such scientific advancements inspired a counterpart in David Hume’s extreme philosophic empiricism questioning the validity of reason and the certainty of any form of knowledge, thereby placing himself outside the mainstream of Enlightenment thinking and severely limiting his audience. But in France, Denis Diderot fostered rationalistic inquiry through his massive Encyclopédie, which defined the mechanistic views of the philosophes, while his contemporary and colleague Jean-Jacques Rousseau philosophized about human equality, the social contract, and the innateness of the educational process. Voltaire produced works—some incisively satiric and cynical—in history, philosophy, and literature that readers in England and America may well have read in French, then regarded as the international language.25 Although a lesser era in English letters compared with earlier ages, the decades of the 1750s through the 1770s nevertheless provided a few significant and popular authors. Prominent among the poets stood Thomas Gray. Oliver Goldsmith attained popularity as both poet and novelist, perhaps especially with his 1766 novel The Vicar of Wakefield. But the biographer, poet, critic, and compiler of the acclaimed Dictionary of the English Language, Samuel Johnson, held preeminence among British writers. Probably the only contemporary American writer whose prose found readers on both sides of the Atlantic was Benjamin Franklin, but, with the possible exception of the long-deceased Anne Bradstreet, the colonies were yet to produce a poet or novelist the English would deem worthy of note. Nonetheless, Philip Freneau at least gained a wide American audience for his poems reflecting the Patriots’ revolutionary zeal. His compatriot in this effort, Phillis Wheatley, a former slave whose poetry had gained wide recognition before the war, also composed poems ext
olling the Patriots’ cause.26 In art, however, Americans fared better. Bostonian John Singleton Copley’s accomplishments in portraiture already revealed him as an artist of exceptional talent. He had produced several renowned works by the early 1770s, including a portrait of poet Mercy Otis Warren, sister of James Otis and close friend of Abigail Adams, and a portrait of the gifted silversmith Paul Revere. As conflict between Massachusetts and Great Britain increased, Copley’s opportunities to paint portraits dried up. So he acceded to the urgings of artists in England and in June 1774 sailed for London, leaving as his principal successor the most accomplished Philadelphia portrait painter, Charles Willson Peale. In London, Copley would become an associate of his exact contemporary, Pennsylvanian Benjamin West, who had taught Peale during the years 1767 to 1769. The most celebrated American artist in history, West now ranked among the leading painters in Great Britain and was George III’s favorite artist. Exemplifying the neoclassicism of the time, West’s great works included The Death of General Wolfe, an enormously popular historical painting, completed in 1770. Among other painter colleagues of Copley in England, Sir Joshua Reynolds and Thomas Gainsborough shone brightest. Unfortunately for the future of native American art, neither Copley nor West would ever return to his home country.27 Charles Willson Peale also experienced the good fortune of studying with West, for more than two years in 1767–69, but then returned home to Philadelphia—a fortunate outcome for American art. Following Copley’s departure in 1774, Peale became the leading portrait painter in the thirteen colonies. As the Revolutionary War approached its end in 1781, he added an exhibition gallery to his Philadelphia studio and launched the ambitious undertaking of painting not Prelude to Revolt 19 only the major American military and civil leaders of the war but also leading foreign diplomats and ambassadors to the fledgling republic. These portraits comprise Peale’s greatest enduring legacy, and they have enjoyed consistent attention and admiration to the present time. Probably less accomplished as an artist than Peale, John Trumbull followed Peale’s and Copley’s lead, traveling to London in 1780 after ending his military career in order to study with Benjamin West. Unlike his predecessor Peale, who adopted West’s emphasis on portra
iture, Trumbull chose to pursue West’s other great interest, historic narrative painting. As Peale undertook to produce portraits of leading revolutionary figures in the war’s aftermath, so Trumbull chose to paint canvases depicting many of the war’s main events, although in his preliminary preparations for these works he also made portrait miniatures of George Washington and others. Most familiar of Trumbull’s works to the majority of Americans are the vast murals he painted for the Capitol rotunda in Washington. Trumbull’s contemporary Gilbert Stuart, later renowned for his portraits of George Washington, also sailed for London, arriving at age 19 in 1775, to remain as a student in West’s studio for the duration of the Revolutionary War.28 Although Christopher Wren had left a compelling architectural legacy in England, with other professionals such as the brothers James and Robert Adams following in his wake, the American colonies had not a single trained architect. Both private and public buildings replicated the Georgian style popular in England, with master builders or gentleman-amateurs deriving designs from such popular carpenter handbooks as Batty Langley’s The City and Country Builder’s and Workman’s Treasury of Designs (London, 1745) and such profusely illustrated architectural studies as A Book of Architecture (London, 1745) by James Gibbs, a devotee of Wren. George Washington, for example, used Langley’s book in preparing designs for many features of Mount Vernon, including the Palladian window on the mansion’s north end. The more talented amateur Thomas Jefferson employed mathematical principals and his own talents as well as such sourcebooks in designing the features of Monticello. Other amateurs, including physicians and carpenters, helped design many of the Georgian-style private and public buildings in or near Williamsburg, Charleston, Philadelphia, and Boston. The prominent lawyer Andrew Hamilton, for example, served as the primary designer of the State House in Philadelphia, subsequently known as Independence Hall, constructed during the years 1732–47 and probably the most important building in the colonies. As the Revolution impended, Philadelphia contained more than 4,700 brick structures. And, foreshadowing its much later role in the architectural avant garde, New York City by 1777 already boasted 6,000 buildings constructed of brick and tile, some as tall as six stories.29 POPULAR ARTS Among more popular art forms, burgeoning theater—then
ife and drum corps would lead both sides into battle and also convey orders through their tunes.30 Although it may seem unlikely, the philosophic, scientific, and artistic achievements of the Enlightenment in England and Europe influenced the courses of both American patriots and the British government as their conflict festered. For one thing, George III and other monarchs latched onto the concept of “enlightened despotism,” whereby they could portray themselves as champions of reason and progress while upholding their hereditary right to power and their authority as interpreters of natural laws—an underpinning, perhaps, of George III’s stubbornness. In the opposite camp, both friendly politicians in England and patriots in America grounded their political principles in the writings of Locke and Newton, as the Declaration of Independence would attest for the patriots. (Later, the United States Constitution would reflect the thinking not only of Newton and Locke but also of the French philosophes, most especially their progenitor Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu.) Finally, even art may advance nationalistic sentiments, as The Death of General Wolfe doubtless suggests, and thereby influence the course of events. All of these diverse factors contributed in some way toward making the ensuing American Revolution apparently inevitable. CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 1756 February 3: Responding to a French threat to invade England because of English seizure of French ships and subsequent imprisoning of French sailors, the Newcastle ministry issues a proclamation that instructs residents of the southern counties of England to drive their cattle inland in the event of a French landing. April 19: A French naval force invades British-con- trolled Minorca. May 20: A British fleet under the command of Adm. John Byng, sent to rescue Minorca and reinforce the Fort St. Philip garrison, still held by British soldiers, engages the French fleet there in battle. But Byng’s tactics prove ineffectual, and the French fleet escapes after crippling several of Byng’s 14 ships. Byng refuses to give chase. May 24: Having made no attempt to communicate with Fort St. Philip, Byng decides to retreat without landing on Minorca, thereby leaving the fort and Minorca to their fate—certain French control. He sets sail for Gibraltar. August 14: French troops commanded by Gen. Louis-Joseph de Montcalm-Gozon capture Fort Oswego in north-central New York. They neutralize the fort
’s military capabilities and return to Montreal. August 29: Frederick the Great of Prussia launches a preemptive invasion of Saxony, heading for Dresden, capital of Saxony. September 10: Frederick enters Dresden. October 1: Prussian and Saxon forces engage in battle at Lobositz. October 14: The Saxon army surrenders to the Prussians at Lobositz. The Saxon elector Frederick Augustus II, also king of Poland, retires to Poland, and Frederick the Great absorbs most of the Saxon army into his own. November: William Pitt becomes prime minister of Great Britain. November 24: Elected a member of the Royal Society on April 29, Benjamin Franklin personally attends a meeting and is formally inducted as a fellow of the society. 1757 March 14: Admiral Byng, who was brought home, court-martialed, and condemned to death because of Prelude to Revolt 21 ministerial and public anger over his failure at Minorca, is executed at Portsmouth. May 6: Prussian forces commanded by Frederick the Great defeat the Austrian army near Prague; the Austrians retreat into Prague, and the Prussians begin to lay siege to the city. June 18: An Austrian force commanded by Count Leopold von Daun and sent to relieve Prague defeats Frederick’s army at Kolin, forcing the Prussians to abandon the siege of Prague and retreat from Bohemia. June 26: French troops led by Gen. Louis-Charles Le Teller, duke d’Estrées, defeat the British at Hastenbeck, opening Hanover and Brunswick to French occupation. August 9: General Montcalm’s forces capture Fort William Henry at the southern tip of Lake George in New York. August 10: Indians serving with Montcalm massacre the British troops captured at Fort William Henry. August 30: A Russian army defeats a Prussian force at Gross-Jägersdorf but then surprisingly retreats. November 5: Troops of Frederick the Great, spearheaded by cavalry commanded by Gen. Friedrich Seydlitz, achieve victory over an Allied (Austrian, French, and Russian) army at Rossbach. December 5: Although greatly outnumbered, Frederick’s army surprises and overwhelms the Austrians to achieve a stunning victory at Leuthen. 1758 January 10: With Frederick occupied elsewhere, a force sent by Empress Elizabeth of Russia invades East Prussia with the intention of annexing the province. April 29
: A British fleet commanded by Adm. Sir George Pocock engages a French fleet commanded by Count Anne-Antoine d’Aché in the Bay of Bengal but with no decisive outcome. July 8: The French force under Montcalm, defending Fort Ticonderoga at the northern end of Lake George, defeats an attacking force of 17,000 British and colonial troops, inflicting 2,000 casualties. July 26: Following a 48-day siege, the French garrison at Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, surrenders to British forces commanded by Adm. Edward Boscawen and Gen. Jeffrey Amherst. The British capture 6,000 prisoners and raze the Louisbourg fortress. August 1: Admiral Pocock’s fleet again engages the French in the Bay of Bengal, again with an indecisive outcome, except that the French commander, d’Aché, decides to sail for the islands of the Indian Ocean. 22 The American Revolution August 25: Frederick’s troops engage the invading Russian army at Zorndorf in a ferocious battle that ends only with the fall of darkness. Both sides sustain horrendous casualties—the Prussians more than 37 percent of their 36,000-man force and the Russians 50 percent of their 21,000 troops. During the night, the Russians begin to fall back toward Landsberg and Königsberg. August 27: A British force led by Col. John Bradstreet captures Fort Frontenac (near present-day Kingston, Ontario). September 8: Admiral d’Aché’s fleet, having returned to the Bay of Bengal, once more engages in an indecisive battle. The French commander will, however, decide that the state of his ships obliges him to abandon the effort, leaving the British in control of the bay. September 12: After a forced march from Zorndorf, Frederick’s army arrives near Dresden, frightening off an Allied force, led by Count Leopold von Daun, that had threatened to destroy a British army commanded by Prince Henry. September 14: French troops at Fort Duquesne, Pennsylvania, crush a small British force of 850 men, led by Maj. James Grant, whom Brig. Gen. John Forbes has sent to reconnoiter the fort. Grant has made a tactical error in dividing his force, and the French inflict a heavy toll—killing 270, wounding 40, and taking many prisoners, including Grant. October 14: The Austrian force of 90,
000 men led by Daun defeats Frederick’s army of 37,000 at Hochkirch; the Prussians withdraw, unpursued by the shaken Austrians. November 20: Frederick reoccupies Dresden following a siege by Daun’s army, which has withdrawn to Prina on the news of Frederick’s approach. November 24: Learning that General Forbes’s army has advanced to within 15 miles of Fort Duquesne, French troops blow up some of the fort’s breastworks, set fire to the buildings, and embark on boats to retreat down the Ohio River. November 25: British troops occupy Fort Duquesne. The British immediately build a stockade and rename the site Fort Pitt (present-day Pittsburgh) in honor of William Pitt. 1759 February 12: The University of St. Andrews in Scotland awards an honorary doctor of laws degree to Benjamin Franklin. May 31: The Pennsylvania assembly enacts a law forbidding play performances, designating a fine of £500. July 26: Under threat of a siege by General Amherst’s army, the French abandon Fort Ticonderoga and withdraw to Crown Point, New York. August 1: A Prussian and British force of 45,000, commanded by Prince Ferdinand, defeats a superior French force of 60,000 at Minden, sending the French into retreat toward the Rhine, with Ferdinand in pursuit. August 12: Having crossed the Oder River the previous day, Frederick’s army of 50,000 becomes lost and divided in thick woods, engages an army of 90,000 Austrian and Russian troops at Kunersdorf, and suffers disastrous defeat. Frederick loses nearly half of his army. September 4: Deprived of any aid from Frederick following his disastrous defeat at Kunersdorf, Dresden once again falls to the Austrians. September 13: A British army commanded by Gen. James Wolfe defeats French troops commanded by General Montcalm in battle on the Plains of Abraham near Quebec. The British win control of the city, but both commanders die during the combat. November 20: In the Quiberon Bay off of Brittany, a British fleet, commanded by Adm. Sir Edward Hawke, engages a French fleet under Hubert de Brienne, count de Conflans, in a battle fought in the dark, off a rocky coast, during a severe gale, and on a lee shore—a unique battle in naval history. Two British ships wreck upon
the rocks, but they manage to capture or destroy five of the French ships, including Conflans’s flagship (the French commander washes ashore on a spar). The British victory leaves the French navy unable to mount offensive actions for virtually the remainder of the war. It also puts to rest a plan hatched by the ministry of King Louis XV of France to invade England. December 13: In Philadelphia, Michael Hillegas opens the first music shop in America. 1760 April 12: Pennsylvania-born artist Benjamin West, age 21, sets sail from Gloucester, Massachusetts, aboard the Betty Sally, bound for Italy to pursue his career as a painter. July 12: Frederick the Great’s army begins to lay siege to Dresden. July 29: Threatened by a large force commanded by Daun, Frederick abandons the siege of Dresden and withdraws toward Meissen. August 1: Frederick begins a march into Silesia, summoning a force led by Prince Henry to join him. August 7: As Colonel Montgomery’s expedition, sent to relieve Fort Loudon, Tennessee, has been defeated by the Indians and forced to return to South Carolina, a force of Cherokee captures the fort. Captain Demere surrenders his troops under condition that they be allowed to withdraw freely. August 10: Cherokee kill Demere’s troops as they are retreating toward Fort Prince George in South Carolina. August 17: Frederick reaches Breslau following a harrowing march to Liegnitz, his and Prince Henry’s combined force having been virtually surrounded en route by superior Austrian and Russian armies and having successfully engaged the Austrians as he marched. Frederick has duped the Russians into believing that he King George III ascended to the throne in 1760. (From The Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution, 2 vols., by B. J. Lossing. New York: Harper Brothers, 1851 and 1852.) Prelude to Revolt 23 inflicted total defeat on the Austrians, so the Russians begin a withdrawal from the area. October 9: A combined force of Cossacks, Austrians, and segments of the Empire Army captures Berlin. October 11: Learning that Frederick’s army is approaching Berlin, the occupiers abandon the city. October 25: King George II dies in London. He is succeeded by his grandson George III. November 3: Following an especially bloody engagement that rages into the darkness of night, Frederick forces the Austrians to withdraw from positions around Torgau, but at
terrible cost—30 percent of his force. Both sides are left so depleted that they will be incapable of confronting each other in any meaningful engagement for many months. November 29: An American militia force commanded by Maj. Robert Rogers occupies Detroit, accepting the surrender of the French commander Beletre. 1761 February 24: Speaking before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, James Otis delivers a strong political statement opposing English rule in America—the first such public statement of its kind in the colonies. August: Louis XV of France and Charles III of Spain enter into a “family compact” obligating Spain to declare war on Great Britain if France has not obtained a peace settlement by May 1, 1762. September 30: The Moro Castle citadel, Cuba, besieged by troops and ships commanded by Adm. Sir George Pocock, surrenders to the British. October 5: Opposed by George III and dismayed by the government’s refusal to declare war on Spain, William Pitt resigns. October 10: Havana surrenders to the British. 1762 January 5: Empress Elizabeth, the czarina of Russia, dies. The throne passes to Peter III, who immediately proposes bringing the war with Prussia to a peaceful conclusion. March 16: Prussian and Russian officials sign an armistice agreement. April 30: Oxford University confers an honorary doctor of civil law degree on Benjamin Franklin; his son William receives a master of arts degree during the same ceremony. 24 The American Revolution July 9: Totally alienated from her husband, Czar Peter III, and assisted by her lover, Gen. Grigory Orlov, Catherine II (the Great) proclaims herself empress of Russia and acquiesces in her husband’s assassination. October 29: Prince Henry, with the support of Major General Seydlitz’s cavalry, wins victory over the Empire Army at Freiberg. June 2: Two huge teams of Indians stage a game of lacrosse outside Fort Michilimackinak in Michigan—a subterfuge that draws British soldiers out of the fort to watch. Suddenly, the Indians arm themselves with weapons they had concealed. They massacre the soldiers, slaughter the fort’s occupants, and raze the fort. November 1: Benjamin Franklin arrives in Philadel- June 22: Indians involved in Pontiac’s Rebellion phia from England. November 2: Representatives of the warring nations meeting in Paris sign a preliminary draft of a peace agreement. 1763 February
10: Negotiators meeting in Paris, France, complete the Treaty of Paris, concluding the Seven Years’ War (French and Indian War). By the terms of the treaty, France cedes her territories in North America to Great Britain. By a separate treaty, Spain receives control of New Orleans and lands west of the Mississippi, with Great Britain acquiring control of the Floridas from Spain in exchange for restoring control of Cuba and the Philippine Islands to Spain. France is allowed to retain stations in India and on the slave coast of Africa, and the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique in the West Indies are returned to her. But because France is not allowed to fortify its stations in India, Britain gains the ascendancy on the subcontinent. April 27: At a meeting of representatives from the Algonquian tribes near Detroit, Pontiac—chief of the Ottawa and leader of the loose confederation among the Ottawa, Ojibway, and Potawatomi—outlines his plans to stage simultaneous attacks on the British frontier forts during May. Pontiac’s cohorts abhor English encroachments on Indian lands and exclusion of Indians from English forts. This is contrary to French practice; and French traders and hunters have encouraged the uprising. May 7: Pontiac leads Ottawa and other Indians in an attack on the fort at Detroit. Failing to take the fort, the Indians begin to lay siege to it. The raid marks the beginning of Pontiac’s Rebellion (also known as Pontiac’s War or, in England, as Pontiac’s Conspiracy). May 16: The Wyandot (Huron) in Pontiac’s Rebel- lion capture Fort Sandusky (now Sandusky, Ohio). May 25: The Indians capture Fort St. Joseph (now Niles, Michigan). May 27: The Indians capture Fort Miami (later Fort Wayne). unsuccessfully attack Fort Pitt. July 27: Indians begin a siege of Fort Pitt. July 31: At the Battle of Bloody Run, Pontiac achieves victory over a British force that is attempting to lift the siege of Fort Pitt. August 5: British troops, commanded by Col. Henry Bouquet, defeat an Indian force at the Battle of Bushy Run, freeing Bouquet to march to the relief of Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh). August 21: American artist Benjamin West arrives in London. October 7: Concerned over Pontiac’s Rebellion, continuing Indian attacks, and land speculators demanding grants on the trans
-Appalachian frontier, George III signs the Proclamation of 1763, which forbids settlers from crossing the Appalachian divide, a western boundary of the thirteen colonies defined by the proclamation, and also outlaws land purchases west of the divide. The proclamation also establishes three new colonies—Quebec, East Florida, and West Florida—in an effort to placate the settlers. Many settlers, however, denounce these measures for preventing their access to the West. October 12: Leaders of Pontiac’s allies, the Potawatomi, Ojibway, and Wyandot (Huron), discouraged by the unaccustomed tactic of siege warfare, make peace with the British. October 30: Having learned that he can expect no assistance from the French, Pontiac abandons the siege of Fort Pitt and withdraws with his Ottawa warriors to the Miami River. December 2: British officials instruct governors of the frontier colonies that they must obtain approval of any land grants that might include Indian areas— an effort to deter colonists from encroaching on the Indian territories. 1764 February 14: James Davenport receives a patent for spinning and carding machinery he has invented and founds the Globe Mills in Philadelphia. April 5: Parliament enacts the Revenue Act of 1764, known in the American colonies as the Sugar Act. The law imposes tariffs on sugar, wines, coffee, and numerous other products imported into America in large quantities. Its intent is to raise revenues to reduce the huge debt incurred during the Seven Years’ War and also to pay the costs of maintaining an army on the western frontier (estimated at £200,000 per year). The act also doubles taxes on European products imported via Great Britain and reduces to three pence the sixpence-per-gallon tax on foreign molasses, originally enacted in 1733. To ensure compliance and reduce smuggling and corruption, the law also creates new enforcement measures. 1765 March 22: Parliament enacts the Stamp Act, which imposes a tax on all legal documents, licenses, newspapers, almanacs, pamphlets, playing cards, and dice, requiring that they bear stamps to prove the tax has been paid. The act’s purpose is to raise revenues to pay the costs of defending the colonies; its provisions are to take effect on November 1. March 24: Provisions of the Quartering Act take effect. The act stipulates that whenever army barracks are unavailable or filled, British troops must be accommodated in inns and taverns or, if
necessary, in vacant homes or barns, at the expense of the colonists. It also requires that colonists provide troops with wagons and drivers, firewood, beer, candles, salt, vinegar, and other items at fixed rates. May 3: Dr. John Morgan and Dr. William Shippen, Jr., establish the first medical school in the colonies at the College of Philadelphia. May 29: Patrick Henry introduces five Resolves in the House of Burgesses meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, that attack provisions of the Stamp Act and the concept of taxation without representation. In supporting the Resolves, he asserts that only the legislatures in the individual colonies have the right to impose taxes within their colonies. During his speech, opponents interrupt him with shouts of “Treason!” Henry responds, “If this be treason, make the most of it.” The House passes the Resolves. May 30: After Henry and other delegates have left town, remaining members of the Virginia House of Burgesses rescind the provision in the Resolves, propounding that only the Virginia assembly can impose taxes on Virginians. But the Newport, Rhode Island, Prelude to Revolt 25 Mercury publishes the full original version of the Virginia Resolves, thus making possible their dissemination throughout the thirteen colonies. June: The General Court of Massachusetts issues a Circular Letter to all other colonial assemblies that invites them to elect delegates to attend a congress to discuss organizing a formal resistance to the Stamp Act’s provisions. July 10: George Grenville, head of the treasury and first minister since the spring of 1763, having become personally unacceptable to George III, is forced to resign, leaving Charles Watson-Wentworth, Lord Rockingham, to form a government. August 14: In Boston, mob violence, generated by the Sons of Liberty, targets Andrew Oliver, who has agreed to assume the post of stamp master. The rioters hang Oliver in effigy from a limb of a Newbury Street tree that becomes known as the Liberty Tree. At dusk they take down the effigy, march to a building purportedly intended to become the stamp office, and raze it. They move on to the home of Oliver, who has fled with his family. The mob beheads the effigy of Oliver, breaks windows in his house, and then drags the effigy to Fort Hill, where it is burned. Some rioters return thereafter to Oliver’s house, where they smash in the doors and destroy some of the furnish
ings. They stone and drive off Lt. Gov. Thomas Hutchinson, who has arrived at the house to try to persuade the mob to disperse. Royal Governor Francis Bernard, alarmed by these events, takes refuge in Castle William, a fortress in Boston Harbor. August 15: A delegation of Boston citizens visits Oliver and persuades him to resign as stamp master. August 26: During the night, Boston rioters attack and vandalize the homes of William Story, prominent Tory and deputy register of the admiralty, and Benjamin Hallowell, comptroller of customs. Then they proceed to Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson’s empty house and wreak havoc with both the structure and its furnishings. October 7–25: Twenty-seven delegates representing nine colonies meet in New York City as the Stamp Act Congress. The delegates approve 13 resolutions, the first three of which review the rights of Englishmen, prominently the right not to be taxed without Parliamentary representation; the fourth stresses the impossibility of the colonies’ being effectively represented in Parliament. The eighth resolution protests the Stamp Act duties as both a subversion of the 26 The American Revolution colonists’ rights and an excessive burden. The final resolves call for repeal of the Stamp Act while reaffirming the rights of British subjects to petition the Parliament. The Stamp Act Congress sets a strong precedent for future collective action. In addition, the congress’s petition to the king, drafted by John Dickinson, evokes Great Britain’s vested economic interest in the colonies, declaring, “By this Protection, she will forever secure to herself the Advantage of conveying to all Europe the Merchandizes which America furnishes, and of supplying thro’ the same Channel whatever is wanted from thence. Here opens a boundless Source of Wealth, and Naval Strength; yet these immense Advantages... are in Danger of being forever lost... by the late Acts of Parliament, imposing duties and taxes on these Colonies....” November 1: As Guy Fawkes Day approaches and coincident with the date when the Stamp Act is supposed to take effect, a Stamp Act riot erupts in New York City. The rioters execute and bury a symbolic “Liberty,” burn the colony’s governor in effigy, throw stones through windows, and vandalize the homes of officials before the riot is quelled. 1766 February 22: Responding to American colonists’ protests, opposition voiced in Parliament, and declining trade resulting from American merchants’ boycot
ts, the House of Commons votes 276 to 168 to repeal the Stamp Act. March 4: The House of Commons approves the Declaratory Act, which asserts that the American colonies are subordinate to both the king and Parliament and that Parliament has the power to enact laws that are binding on the colonies “in all cases whatsoever,” making clear Parliament’s authority not only to impose taxes but to legislate all matters affecting the colonies. March 17: The House of Lords approves the Com- mons’ repeal of the Stamp Act. March 18: King George III approves repeal of the Stamp Act, effective May 1. At the same time, the House of Lords approves the Declaratory Act. July 25: Unable to arouse continuing Indian rebellion and finally convinced that the British have the upper hand, Pontiac concludes a peace treaty with Sir William Johnson, superintendent of Indian affairs, at Oswego, New York. October: On South Street in Philadelphia, David Douglass, owner and manager of the American Com- pany of Comedians, builds the Southwark Theater, the first permanent theater in the American colonies. November 10: Under the auspices of the Dutch Reform Church, Queen’s College (later Rutgers) is chartered at New Brunswick, New Jersey. 1767 April 24: A production of Thomas Godfrey’s The Prince of Parthia opens at the Southwark Theater. June 29: Parliament approves the Revenue Act proposed by Charles Townshend, chancellor of the exchequer. The act imposes taxes—known as the Townshend Duties—on some English manufactures imported into the colonies, including lead, glass, painter’s colors, paper, and tea, to pay the salaries of royal colonial officials whose salaries have heretofore been provided by the colonial assemblies. September 4: Charles Townshend dies suddenly. October 1: Terms of the Suspending Act, approved by Parliament in June, take effect. As a punishment of the New York assembly for refusing to comply with the Quartering Act, the Suspending Act deprives the assembly of the right to pass legislation and declares null and void in advance any acts the assembly may approve in defiance of this act. October 28: Boston Patriots call a town meeting that approves a resolution encouraging a boycott of English goods and expansion of local manufacturing. December 2: The first of John Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies is published in the Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal
Advertiser. 1768 February 11: In the House of the Massachusetts General Court, a radical faction led by Samuel Adams and James Otis, having previously failed due to Royal Governor Francis Bernard’s opposition, now succeeds in gaining the assembly’s approval of a Circular Letter. The letter, to be sent to speakers of the assemblies of the other colonies, urges support of a united stand against the Townshend Acts. March: Responding to the Massachusetts Circular Letter, the Virginia House of Burgesses moves beyond the letter’s intent and approves sending protests to the king and Parliament against the Suspending Act and the Townshend Duties; their petition concedes that Parliament has jurisdiction over regulating imperial trade, while insisting that the House of Burgesses has equal rank with Parliament as a legislature. March 18: A rowdy crowd of all ages and both sexes parades through the streets of Boston celebrating the anniversary of the Stamp Act’s repeal. April: Boston merchant John Hancock has two minor customs officials forcibly removed from his brig Lydia when they go below decks without authorization or a writ of assistance. The royal customs commissioners have the Massachusetts attorney general file criminal charges against Hancock, but following an investigation, the attorney general drops the charges on the grounds that the customs officials have exceeded their authority and Hancock has acted legally in having them removed from the Lydia. May 8: In London, Benjamin Franklin publishes a British edition of John Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, which he has edited. The collection of letters is enormously popular and successful in the American colonies, generating the work’s publication not only in this British edition but also in a French edition. May 16: The Virginia House of Burgesses issues its own Circular Letter, advocating that the colonies take joint measures against any British policies that “have an immediate tendency to enslave them” and expressing hopes for a “hearty union” of the colonies. June 10: Still disgruntled over the Lydia affair, Boston customs commissioners order the seizure of another of John Hancock’s ships, the Liberty, on trumped-up charges based on narrow technicalities. Comptroller Benjamin Hallowell and Collector Joseph Harrison seize the Liberty and signal the man-of-war Romney to have it towed away from Hancock’s wharf. A mob organized by the Sons of Liberty unsuccessfully attempts to thwart the seizure and then attacks and beats Hallowell and Harrison. As the night proceeds, the mob increases, attacking the houses of officials and
beating customs officials. June 21: Under orders from Lord Hillsborough, secretary of state for the American colonies, Governor Bernard in Boston, where the Sons of Liberty are now in control, sends Hillsborough’s order to the Massachusetts General Court that it must rescind its Circular Letter. June 30: By a vote of 92 to 17, the Massachusetts General Court refuses to rescind the Circular Letter; in response, Governor Bernard follows Hillsborough’s orders and dissolves the legislature. Prelude to Revolt 27 August 15: Merchants in Boston agree on a policy of nonimportation of English goods. James Otis and Sam Adams stage a celebration of the anniversary of the Oliver riot that includes cannon fire, a parade, songs, and 14 toasts, ending with one to the “Glorious Ninety-two,” the legislators who voted against rescinding the Circular Letter. August 25: Following Boston’s lead, the merchants of New York adopt an agreement not to import English goods. August 27: Governor Bernard receives word that British troops have been dispatched to Boston. September 22: The convention of Massachusetts towns meets in Boston, with 70 representatives of 66 towns and several districts—30 additional towns will be represented before the convention concludes. The first order of business is to petition Governor Bernard to recall the legislature into session—a petition Bernard refuses to accept, while also urging the convention to disband. September 27: With issuance of a “Result of Convention” that petitions the king and calls again for reconvening the Massachusetts legislature, the convention of cities ends with no exhortations to militancy against the landing of troops in Boston. October 1: Two regiments of British troops—the 14th West Yorks and the 29th Worcesters—disembark from ships that have recently arrived in Boston Harbor from Halifax and establish living quarters in the city, the 14th in Faneuil Hall and the 29th in tents pitched on Boston Common. As winter approaches, they will occupy warehouses and other buildings rented from private citizens. October 31: Somewhat horrified by the severity of punishments used in disciplining British troops, Bostonians now witness the ultimate punishment on the common, where Pvt. Richard Ames, convicted of desertion, is executed by firing squad. 1769 March: After Parliament fails to respond to the Pennsylvania legislature’s petition for relief from the Townshend Duties, Philadelphia merchants adopt a policy of nonimportation of British goods. May: Virginia adopts
nonimportation of British goods. June: Maryland joins other colonies in refusing to import British goods. 28 The American Revolution June 7: Daniel Boone and his party of hunters reach the terminus of the Cumberland Gap and see for the first time the land that will become Kentucky. July: South Carolina joins the nonimportation movement. August 1: Governor Bernard sets sail out of Boston Harbor, bound for England, as residents raucously celebrate his departure. September: Georgia adopts nonimportation. November: North Carolina joins the other colonies in refusing to import British goods. 1770 January 16: British soldiers chop down the Liberty Pole in New York City, saw it into segments, and leave the pile in front of a tavern the Sons of Liberty use as their headquarters. January 17: In New York City, the Sons of Liberty, in the presence of 3,000 supporters, erect a new Liberty Pole. British soldiers let loose a broadside that menaces the crowd. A skirmish results, followed by a full battle on Golden Hill. January 18: The conflict in New York ends with one dead and many wounded. February 23: In Boston’s North End, a Patriot crowd besieges the importing shop of Theophilus Lily, a Tory who refused to sign the Nonimportation Agreement. His fellow Tory and neighbor Ebenezer Richardson attempts to help Lily, but the crowd forces Richardson’s withdrawal into his home; the Patriots smash in his door and hurl a rock that hits his wife. Goaded to violence, Richardson fires on the crowd from a second-story window, mortally wounding 11year-old Christopher Snider. The mob nearly lynches Richardson on the spot. Snider dies at 9:00 P.M. March 5: Wrangling civilians urged on by radical leaders and beleaguered troops in Boston spark a fatal encounter under the evening moonlight. Capt. Thomas Preston conducts a group of soldiers to the rescue of the customhouse sentry, who was threatened by a hostile crowd. The crowd, some shouting “kill them,” pelts the soldiers with snowballs and ice. One soldier loses his footing, regains it, and fires his rifle. Others then fire sporadically. Eleven men in the mob fall wounded; three die instantly—including one of the leaders, a free black named Crispus Attucks—and two receive mortal wounds. The mob swells and roams through the streets, demanding vengeance. The Boston Massacre, as it is
quickly dubbed, provides martyrs and a rallying issue for the American Patriots. April 12: Obliged to concede that the Townshend Duties are a failure—the costs of maintaining troops in Boston exceed the tax revenues, also greatly reduced by the Americans’ nonimportation tactic—Parliament repeals the Townshend Acts. But in deference to Prime Minister Frederick, Lord North, and to sustain the principle that Parliament has the power to tax without the colonies’ consent, members also vote to retain one of the duties—the tax on tea. In response, the colonies, with the exception of Boston merchants, will revoke their nonimportation agreements on all goods except tea. October 24–30: Captain Preston, the British officer held responsible for the Boston Massacre, is brought to trial in Boston. Defended by John Adams and Josiah Quincy, Jr., he is acquitted. November 27–December 5: The eight other soldiers arraigned with Capt. Preston are tried, defended by Adams and Quincy; six are acquitted, and two are found guilty of manslaughter. 1771 August: At the home of Bishop Jonathan Shapley, Benjamin Franklin begins to write his Autobiography. 1772 June 9–10: Trade between Great Britain and the American colonies has greatly increased since repeal of the Townshend Duties, but American smuggling has remained commonplace as colonial merchants and shipmasters try to evade British customs tariffs. The Narrangansett Bay coastline, with its numerous inlets, affords a primary area for smuggling operations that bring goods into Rhode Island for transport inland. In an effort to interdict these operations and to support the customs service, the Royal Navy in March has sent the schooner Gaspee, commanded by Lt. William Dudingston, to patrol the Narrangansett waters. Over the months, Dudingston has seized several trading vessels, and the local sheriff has threatened his arrest. On June 9, Dudingston runs the Gaspee aground while pursuing a suspected smuggler and is unable to free the ship. During the night, locals board and take the ship by force, shoot and wound Dudingston, and torch the ship, which burns to the waterline. The local sheriff then arrests Dudingston and refuses to release him until his commanding admiral pays the lieutenant’s fine. The lieutenant will be sent back to England to face a court-martial, while authorities unsuccessfully attempt to bring the perpetrators to justice. November: Sam Adams is distressed by the political
quiescence in the colonies resulting from repeal of the Townshend Duties and angered over the payment of royal officials’ salaries from proceeds of the tax on tea, which he argues places the officials beyond the influence of the colonial legislatures. He moves the Boston Town Meeting to ask Governor Thomas Hutchinson to convene the Massachusetts General Court to consider the issue of paying officials with tea tax funds. Hutchinson refuses, reminding the town of his authority over the legislature and the town’s limited rights. In response, Adams persuades the Town Meeting to create a Committee of Correspondence to circulate protests. The committee immediately goes to work and by the end of November issues Votes and Proceedings... of Boston, known throughout the colony and beyond as the Boston Pamphlet. The widely read tract outlines Great Britain’s perceived plot to enslave America through taxation without representation, the recent depredations of British troops in Boston, depriving colonials of trial by jury through use of admiralty courts and commissions, and the threat to religions’ practices posed by the plan to send Anglican bishops to America. It also stresses the colonists’ rights as British subjects, declaring them to be “absolute Rights.” 1773 January: A commission appointed by the British government to investigate the Gaspee affair is unable to ascertain guilt. But its report, issued later in the summer, will reveal a condition the colonists find menacing—namely, that the commission was empowered to send to England for trial anyone it accused, a violation of the ancient right to a trial by one’s peers. This revelation provides yet another issue for those advocating independence. January 12: The colonies’ first officially established museum is founded in Charleston. February 27: Construction of Christ Church (Anglican), where George Washington’s family worships, is completed in Alexandria, Virginia. March: Alarmed by the revelation of the Gaspee commission’s power to revoke trial by jury in the colonies, influential members of the Virginia House of Burgesses—among them Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and Richard Henry Lee—create a Committee of Prelude to Revolt 29 Correspondence to communicate with other colonies while also gathering information about British actions. The House of Burgesses encourages other colonies to do the same. Within a year, all the colonies but Pennsylvania will have followed Virginia’s lead. May 10: Parliament approves the Tea Act of 1773. An effort by Lord North’s government to rescue the financially distressed British East
India Company, the Tea Act awards the company a monopoly on the tea trade with the colonies, allowing the company to ship surplus Indian tea directly to the colonies. The act also retains the three-pence duty on tea imposed by the Townshend Acts, while forgiving regular export duties, so that the company will be able to sell tea in America for less than the cost of smuggled tea. Tory merchants will reap the advantage of being privileged to sell the monopoly tea. July 14: The first annual conference of American Methodists convenes at St. George’s Church in Philadelphia. October 16: In Philadelphia, a mass meeting adopts resolutions declaring that anyone importing British East India Company tea is “an enemy to his country” and appoints a committee to pressure local tea consignees to give up their commissions. By December, all of the consignees, mostly wealthy Quaker merchants, will have done so. New York City follows a similar path. November 5: The Boston Town Meeting adopts the resolution approved in Philadelphia and pressures local tea consignees to relinquish their commissions. November 30–31: The Dartmouth, first of the East India Company ships carrying a tea cargo, having arrived in Boston Harbor two days earlier, Samuel Adams and other Sons of Liberty hold mass meetings at Old South Meeting Hall to demand that the tea be sent back to England. The duties must be paid on the tea by December 16. December 16: Two other ships with tea cargos, the Eleanor and the Beaver, have joined the Dartmouth at Griffin’s Wharf. The Dartmouth has not been cleared by customs, and Governor Hutchinson has denied it clearance to sail, so the Patriots meeting at Old South fear the owner will attempt to have the tea unloaded. When Samuel Adams announces that nothing more can be done, the crowd whoops and hastens from the meetinghouse, bound for the waterfront. About 50 men, thinly disguised as Mohawk, break away from the crowd and board the three ships at Griffin’s Wharf. They hoist the casks of tea on deck, break them open, 30 The American Revolution and hurl the tea into the harbor’s waters. Some 90,000 pounds of East India Company tea is destroyed, as the 342 casks that had stored the tea float with the tide, bobbing in the seawater as far out as Dorchester Neck. The defiance expressed in the Boston Tea Party is certain to elicit a response from the North ministry. 1774 January: The
first magazine in the colonies to include frequent illustrations, Royal American Magazine, is founded. January 27: Although informal news of the event has already arrived in England on January 19, the official report on the Boston Tea Party prepared by Governor Thomas Hutchinson now reaches the ministry in London. Concern grows among the ministry that something must be done to assert the supremacy of the king and the Parliament in the colonies. January 29: In London, the Privy Council holds a hearing on a petition from Massachusetts requesting that Hutchinson and Oliver be removed from office. As the agent for Massachusetts, Benjamin Franklin has been ordered to appear before the council, where he is subjected to more than an hour of vituperation and calumny, delivered by Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn in an effort to totally discredit him. Franklin listens impassively and then leaves. The petition is never mentioned. The North cabinet decides that some action must be taken to impose dependency on the American colonies. March 14: The North ministry, after weeks of discussion, publicly announces the actions it plans to take in Massachusetts—closing the port of Boston and moving the provincial government to another town. March 18: North introduces the Boston Port Bill in the Commons. The bill mandates closing the port of Boston to all ocean-borne trade, with the exception of some coastal vessels bearing food and fuel. The port is to remain closed until the king permits its reopening, but only after the East India Company has received compensation for the destroyed tea. March 31: Parliament approves the Boston Port Act; it is the first of a series of laws that become known as the Intolerable Acts, or the Coercive Acts, whose purpose is to force the rebellious Bostonians into submission and to intimidate merchants and recalcitrants in other cities who have supported the boycott of East India Company tea. The effort will backfire, however, as sympathizers in the other colonies send food and money to sustain the Bostonians. Royal governors in several colonies will be forced to dissolve legislatures to prevent their passing laws in support of Boston. May 13: Gen. Thomas Gage, commander of the British army in the colonies, arrives in Boston with a royal commission as governor of the province—in effect a declaration of martial law in Massachusetts. Gage’s orders are to establish as strong a military garrison in Boston as he deems necessary. May 17: Rhode Island issues a call for convening a congress of the colonies. Philadelphia and New York respond favorably, and approval of the idea soon emanates from most
of the colonies. May 20: Parliament approves the second of the socalled Intolerable Acts, the Massachusetts Government Act, which alters the charter of Massachusetts, placing the colony entirely under royal authority—the Crown will appoint council members, the royal governor will appoint officials of the colony, and town meetings are forbidden except with the governor’s approval. Parliament also approves the Administration of Justice Act, which stipulates that any royal official accused of a capital crime must be sent to England or to another colony for trial. The king signs both acts. June 2: Parliament approves the last of the Intolerable Acts, a new Quartering Act that empowers British commanders to billet troops anywhere in Boston they deem suitable, now including private homes; the act also requires Massachusetts residents to pay the costs of housing and feeding the troops. June 10: The Massachusetts General Court, meeting in Salem, approves the convening of a congress of the colonies. In response, Gen. Thomas Gage, in control of the colony in the absence of Governor Hutchinson, dissolves the assembly. An unrelated event, the artist John Singleton Copley sets sail for England. June 17: Sam Adams and other radicals manage to convene the Boston Town Meeting, which votes against paying for the tea destroyed during the Boston Tea Party. June 22: Parliament approves the Quebec Act, which establishes a permanent government in Quebec and extends the boundaries of British Canada to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, effectively eliminating the lower colonies’ land claims in the West. The act further alienates the Americans by extending religious rights to Roman Catholics in Quebec. Protestants in the lower colonies regard this recognition of “popery” as a threat; many consider it yet another Intolerable Act. June 27: The Boston Town Meeting endorses the Solemn League and Covenant, sponsored by the Committee of Correspondence, which pledges its signers to cease all trade with Great Britain by refusing to buy any British goods imported after August 31 and boycotting any merchant who refuses to sign the covenant. July 10: John Singleton Copley arrives in London. September 1: About 260 British troops stationed at Boston embark at the Long Wharf and cross over to Charlestown, where they seize and cart off what remains of the gunpowder stored at the powder house for use of nearby towns and the province. News of the raid spreads quickly, along with a false rumor that the soldiers fired on local patriots resisting the seizure and killed six. As the rumor spreads into Connecticut, it expands
with the added rumor that British ships in the harbor shelled Boston. September 4: Thousands of aroused patriots marching toward Cambridge disperse after learning that the rumors about Charlestown and Boston are false. September 5: General Gage orders the erection of fortifications at the Neck, which connects Boston to the mainland. With troops stationed here, the city is effectively both cut off from the rest of Massachusetts and under siege. The First Continental Congress convenes in Philadelphia at Carpenter’s Hall. Sam Adams and his cousin John Adams are among those representing Massachusetts; George Washington, Patrick Henry, Peyton Randolph, and Richard Henry Lee, Virginia; Silas Deane, Connecticut; Caesar Rodney, Delaware; John Jay, New York; John Dickinson and Joseph Galloway, Pennsylvania; Christopher Gadsden, Edward Rutledge, and John Rutledge, South Carolina. The delegates elect Peyton Randolph president of the congress and choose a committee to begin formal discussions focused on the twin issues of defining Americans’ rights and determining exactly how to defend those rights. September 6: After a day of debate, members of the congressional committee agree that Americans’ rights derive from the laws of nature, the British constitution, and the various colonial charters. A subcommittee will pursue drafting a declaration of the rights based on these principles, while the committee as a whole turns its attention to the issue of how to defend Americans’ rights. September 9: Massachusetts’s Suffolk County adopts the Suffolk Resolves, written by the Boston Patriot Dr. Joseph Warren. The resolves denounce the Intolerable Prelude to Revolt 31 Acts and advocate that residents of Massachusetts withhold payment of taxes to the Crown until the acts are rescinded; that they cease all trade with Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies; and that they make preparations for war with Britain. October: The Massachusetts General Court, meeting illegally in Concord and reconstituting itself as the Provincial Congress, with John Hancock as president, establishes the Committee of Safety, headed by Hancock, with authority to call up the militia, and votes to purchase 20 field pieces, four mortars, and 5,000 muskets and bayonets. October 6: Paul Revere rides into Philadelphia and delivers a copy of the Suffolk Resolves, already commended by the congress, and a letter from the Boston Committee of Correspondence to the Continental Congress. The letter requests the congress’s counsel on how the citizens of Boston might appropriately respond to British militarization of the city and suspension of the legislature. The
congress will approve the Suffolk Resolves but hedge on the issue of advising Boston’s citizenry. John Hancock was president of the Continental Congress. (From The Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution, 2 vols. by B. J. Lossing. New York: Harper Brothers, 1851 and 1852.) 32 The American Revolution October 14: The Continental Congress approves a Declaration of Rights and Grievances. The declaration affirms the initially agreed-upon concept that Americans’ rights derive from the laws of nature, the British constitution, and the colonial charters. It also asserts the colonies’ right to generate their own laws and taxes because of lack of representation in Parliament, accepts the Crown’s right to regulate the colonies’ external commerce, affirms allegiance to the Crown, rejects acts of Parliament that violate colonists’ rights, and lists “infringements and violations” committed by Parliament. October 20: Delegates to the Continental Congress sign the “Association,” which commits the colonies to an immediate boycott of East India Company tea, a ban on imports from Great Britain effective on December 1, and, if it proves necessary, a prohibition of exports to Great Britain effective September 10, 1775. The congress provides for enforcement of these agreements through creation of elected local committees that will inspect customs-house books, publish the names of offenders, and otherwise apply peer pressure. October 26: Following adoption of a petition to the king and addresses to the people of Great Britain, America, and Quebec, the Continental Congress dissolves, with the understanding that it will reconvene on May 10, 1775, if necessary. November 17: Twenty-six Philadelphia patriots found the Philadelphia Troop of Light Horse, one of the first military units in the colonies. December 13: The text of the Suffolk Resolves arrives in London; the outraged attorney general declares it treason. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 1756 There is no Virtue, the Honour whereof gets a Man more Envy, than that of Justice, because it procures great Authority among the common People; they only revere the Valiant, and admire the Wise, while they truly love Just Men; for in these they have entire Trust and confidence, but of the former, they always fear one, and mistrust the other. They look on Valour as a certain natural Ferment of the Mind, and Wisdom as the effect of a Fine Constitution, or a happy Education; but a Man has it in his own
Power to be just; and that is the Reason it is so dishonourable to be otherwise......... Love your Enemies, for they tell you your Faults. He that has a Trade, has an Office of Profit and Honour. Benjamin Franklin, from Poor Richard improved: Being an Almanack and Ephemeris... for the Year of our Lord 1756, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 6, pp. 319 and 321. You mention your frequent Wish that you were a Chaplain to an American Army. I sometimes wish, that you and I were jointly employ’d by the Crown to settle a Colony on the Ohio. I imagine we could do it effectually, and without putting the Nation to much Expence. But I fear we shall never be call’d upon for such a Service. What a glorious Thing it would be, to settle in that fine Country a large Strong Body of Religious and Industrious People! What a Security to the other Colonies; and Advantage to Britain, by Increasing her People, Territory, Strength and Commerce. Might it not greatly facilitate the Introduction of pure Religion among the Heathen, if we could, by such a Colony, show them a better Sample of Christians than they commonly see in our Indian Traders, the most vicious and abandoned Wretches of our Nation?... Benjamin Franklin, from a letter to Calvinistic Anglican priest George Whitefield, July 2, 1756, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 6, pp. 468–469. Your Information of my being chosen a Member of the Royal Society, was extremely agreeable, and the more, as I had not the least Expectation of ever arriving Prelude to Revolt 33 at that Honour.... I must request the Favour of you to present my humble Thanks to the Society, whose truly noble Designs I wish I may be able in any Degree to promote.... Benjamin Franklin, from a letter to Peter Collinson, November 5, 1756, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 7, p. 11. I am just return’d from the Forks of the Delaware, where I with some others attended the Governor, at a Conference with the Indians. They complain of Injuries from the Proprietors [Thomas and Richard Penn
–91. It was not until it was too late, we discovered that the French were on the Ohio; or rather, that we could be persuaded they came there with a design to invade his Majesty’s dominions. Nay, after I was sent out in December, 1753, and brought undoubted testimony even from themselves of their avowed design, it was yet thought a fiction, and a scheme to promote the interest of a private company, even by some who had a share in the government. These unfavorable surmises caused great delay in raising the first men and money, and gave the active enemy time to take possession of the Fork of Ohio (which they now call Duquesne), before we were in sufficient strength to advance thither, which has been the chief source of all our past and present misfortunes. For by this means, (the French getting between us and our Indian allies), they fixed those in their interests, who were wavering, and obliged the others to neutrality, ’till the unhappy defeat of his (late) Excellency General Braddock. George Washington, from a letter to the earl of Loudoun, January 1757, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 6–7 and 17–18. Hon’ble Sir: Since closing my packet for your Honor of this date, I have received by Express, from Fort Cumberland the agreeable news of Lt. Bakers return to that place with 5 Scalps &c. one french officer, prisoner. Two other Officers were also made prisoners; but one of them being wounded and unable to march, the Indians killed; and the other they served in the same manner soon after: and bot contrary to the intreaties of Mr. Baker. In this they took revenge for the death of the truly brave Swallow-Warrior, who was killed in the Skirmish, and for the wound received by his son; whom they brought from the head of Turtlecreek, where the Engagement happened (about 100 miles beyond Fort Cumberland) on their Shoulders, without eating a morsel the whole distance. The name of the Officer commanding the french troops on the Ohio, together with the names of the two who were killed, and the other taken prisoner, are given in by the latter, as enclosed. The party they engaged, consisted of 10 french, 3 of whom were Officers; who had parted only the day before with
fifty odd Shawnese, returning from war. Our people wou’d have taken the whole party, had it not been for the unfortunate loss of the indian chief, which put a stop to his mens pursuing. If this party was to meet with a reward for their Scalps and Services, with no more difficulty, than Warhatchie did in Maryland; it wou’d be attended with happy consequences. If they do not, discontent and murmuring will ensue. George Washington, from a letter to Robert Dinwiddie, governor of Virginia, June 12, 1757, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 57–58. I leave some Enemies in Pensilvania, who will take every Opportunity of injuring me in my Absence. However, as they are my Enemies, not on my own private Account but on that of the Publick, I seem to have some Right to ask the Care of my Friends, to watch ’em and guard my Reputation and Interest as much as may be from the Effects of their Malevolence. I chearfully leave my dearest Concerns ynder that Care, having no reason to doubt the Continuance of the Friendships I have so long experienc’d. Benjamin Franklin, from a letter written in New York to Joseph Galloway, April 11, 1757, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 7, p. 179. No man I conceive was ever more plagued than I have been with the Draughts that were sent from the several counties in this Government, to complete its Regiment: out of 400 that were received at Fredericksburgh, and at this place [Fort Loudoun], 114 have deserted, notwithstanding every precaution, except absolute confinement has been used to prevent this infamous practice. I have used the vigorous measures to apprehend those fellows who escaped from hence (which amounted to about 30) and have succeeded so well that they are taken with the loss of one of their men, and a Soldier wounded. I have a Gallows near 40 feet high erected (which has terrified the rest exceedingly), and I am determined if I can be justified in the proceeding, to hang two or three on it, as an example to others. George Washington, from a letter to Col. John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings
of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 97–98.... No troops in the universe can guard against the cunning and wiles of Indians. No one can tell where they will fall, till the mischief is done, and then ’t is vain to pursue. The inhabitants see, and are convinced of this, which makes each family afraid of standing in the gap of danger; and by retreating, one behind another, they depopulate the country, and leave it to the enemy, who subsist upon the plunder. This, Sir, is a matter of fact which you may depend on from me; and further, if we pursue a defensive plan next campaign, there will not, by autumn, be one soul living on this side of the BlueRidge, except the soldiers in garrison, and such of the inhabitants as may seek shelter therein. This, Sir, I know to be the immovable determination of the people; and, believe me, when I tell you, that I have been at great pains, before I could prevail on them to wait the consultations of this winter, and the event of spring. I do not know on whom those miserable, undone people are to rely for redress. If the Assembly are to give it to them, it is time that measures at least were concerting, and not when they should be going into execution, as has always been the case. If they are to seek it from the Commander-in-chief, it is time our grievances were made known to him; for I cannot forbear repeating again, that while we pursue defensive measures we pursue inevitable ruin, the loss of the country being the inevitable and fatal consequence. There will be no end to our troubles, while we follow this plan, and every year will increase our expense.... George Washington, from a letter written at Fort Loudoun to John Robinson, Speaker of the Virginia House of Burgesses, October 25, 1757, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 154–155. 1758 Get what you can, and what you get hold; ’Tis the Stone that will turn all your Lead into Gold, as Poor Richard says.... This Doctrine, my Friends, is Reason and Wisdom; but after all, do not depend too much upon your own Prelude to Revolt 35 Industry, and Frugality, and Prudence, though excellent Things, for they may be blasted without the Blessing of Heaven
; and therefore ask that Blessing humbly, and be not uncharitable to those that at present seem to want it, but comfort and help them. Remember Job suffered, and was afterwards prosperous. And now to conclude, Experience keeps a dear School, but Fools will learn in no other, and scarce in that; for it is true, we may give Advice, but we cannot give Conduct, as Poor Richard says: However, remember this, They that won’t be counseled, can’t be helped, as Poor Richard says: And farther, That if you will not hear Reason, she’ll surely rap your Knuckles. Benjamin Franklin, from Poor Richard Improved, 1758, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 7, p. 349.... At present few or none give their Negro Children any Schooling, partly from a Prejudice that Reading and Knowledge in a Slave are both useless and dangerous; and partly from an Unwillingness in the Masters and Mistresses of common Schools to take black Scholars, lest the Parents of white Children should be disgusted and take them away, not choosing to have their Children mix’d with Slaves in Education, Play, &c. But a separate School for Blacks, under the Care of One, of whom People should have an Opinion that he would be careful to imbue the Minds of their young Slaves with good Principles, might probably have a Number of Blacks sent to it; and if on Experience it should be found useful, and not attended with the ill Consequences commonly apprehended, the Example might be followed in the other Colonies, and encouraged by the Inhabitants in general... Benjamin Franklin, from a letter written in London to John Waring in Philadelphia, January 3, 1758, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 7, p. 356. I have no Prospect of Returning till next Spring, so you will not expect me. But pray remember to make me as happy as you can, by sending some Pippins for my self and Friends, some of your small Hams, and some Cranberries. Billy [their son] is of the Middle Temple, and will be call’d to the Bar either this Term or the next. I write this in answer to your particular Enquiry. 36 The American Revolution..... I think I have now
gone thro’ your Letters, which always give me great Pleasure to receive and read, since I cannot be with you in Person. Distribute my Compliments, Respects, and Love, among my Friends, and believe me ever my dear Debby Your affectionate Husband. Benjamin Franklin, from a letter written in London to his wife, Deborah, June 10, 1758, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 8, pp. 92, 93, 94, and 95. In a former letter I mentioned the experiment for cooling bodies by evaporation, and that I had, by repeatedly wetting the thermometer with common spirits, brought the mercury down five or six degrees. Being lately at Cambridge, and mentioning this in conversation with Dr. Hadley, professor of chemistry there, he proposed repeating the experiments with ether, instead of common spirits, as the ether is much quicker in evaporation. We accordingly went to his chamber, where he had both ether and a thermometer. By dipping first the ball of the thermometer into ether, it appeared that the ether was precisely of the same temperament with the thermometer, which stood then at 65... But when the thermometer was taken out of the ether, and the ether... began to evaporate, the mercury sank several degrees. The wetting was then repeated by a feather that had been dipped into the ether, when the mercury sunk still lower. We continued this operation, one of us wetting the ball, and another of the company blowing on it with the bellows, to quicken the evaporation, the mercury sinking all the time, till it came down to 7, which is 25 degrees below the freezing point, when we left off.... From this experiment one may see the possibility of freezing a man to death on a warm summer’s day, if he were to stand in a passage thro’ which the wind blew briskly, and to be wet frequently with ether, a spirit that is more inflammable than brandy, or common spirits of wine. Benjamin Franklin, from a letter written in London to John Lining, June 17, 1758, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 8, pp. 108–109. There’s three Parties gone from hence towards the Enemy’s Country within these few days. The largest of them, (consisting of an Officer
and 18 Cherokees,) March’d 3 days ago. I always send out some white people with the Indians, and will to day or tomorrow, send an Officer and some alert white men, with another Party of Cherokees as you desire it; tho’ I must confess, that I think these Scalping Parties of Indians we send out, will more effectually harass the Enemy (by keeping them under continual Alarms) than any Parties of white People can do; because small parties of ours are not equal to the undertaking, (not being so dexterous at skulking as Indians;) and large ones will be discover’d by their spies early enough to give the Enemy time to repell them by a superior Force; and at all events, there is a great probability of loosing many of our best men, and fatiguing others before the most essential Services are enter’d upon and am afraid not answer the propos’d end...... The malbehaviour [stealing goods] of the Indians with you, gives me great concern; if they were hearty in our Interest their Services wou’d be infinitely valuable, as I cannot conceive the best white Men to be equal to them in the Woods; but I fear they are too sensible of their high Importance to us, to render us any very acceptable Service. George Washington, from a letter written at Fort Cumberland to Col. Henry Bouquet, July 16, 1758, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 237–238. We have begun our march for the Ohio. A courier is starting for Williamsburg, and I embrace the opportunity to send a few words to one whose life is now inseparable from mine. Since that happy hour when we made our pledges to each other, my thoughts have been continually going to you as another Self. That an all-powerful Providence may keep us both in safety is the prayer of your ever faithful and affectionate friend. George Washington, a letter to Mrs. Martha Custis, July 20, 1758, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, p. 242. We are still Incamp’d here, very sickly; and quite dispirited at the prospect before Us. That appearance of Glory once in view, that hope, that laudible Ambition of serving Our Country, and meriting its applause, is now no
have long entertained, that there is a Destiny which has the control of our actions, not to be resisted by the strongest efforts of Human Nature. George Washington, from a letter written at Fort Cumberland to Mrs. George William Fairfax, September 12, 1758, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 287–288. Prelude to Revolt 37 I have the pleasure to inform you, that Fort Duquesne, or the ground rather on which it stood, was possessed by his Majesty’s troops on the 25th instant. The enemy, after letting us get within a day’s march of the place, burned the fort, and ran away (by the light of it,) at night, going down the Ohio by water, to the number of about five hundred men, from our best information. The possession of this fort has been a matter of great surprise to the whole army, and we cannot attribute it to more probable causes, than those of weakness, want of provisions, and desertion of their Indians. Of these circumstances we were luckily informed by three prisoners, who providentially fell into our hands at Loyal Hannan... the information caused us to march on without tents or baggage, and with a light train of artillery only, with which we have happily succeeded........ This fortunate, and, indeed unexpected success of our arms will be attended with happy effects. The Delawares are suing for peace, and I doubt not that other tribes on the Ohio will follow their example. A trade, free, open, and upon equitable terms, is what they seem to stickle for, and I do not know so effectual a way of riveting them to our interest, as sending our goods immediately to this place for that purpose. It will, at the same time, be a means of supplying the garrison with such necessaries as may be wanted; and, I think, those colonies, which are as greatly interested in the support of this place as Virginia is, should neglect no means in their power to establish and support a strong garrison here. Our business, (wanting this) will be but half finished; while, on the other hand, we obtain a firm and lasting peace, if this end is once accomplished. George Washington, from a letter written at Fort Duquesne to Francis Fauquier, lieutenant governor of Virginia, November 28, 1758, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed
you or any body. If anything, it was a general Reflection on our Sect; we zealous Presbyterians being too apt to think ourselves alone in the right, and that besides all the Heathens, Mahometans and Papists, whom we give to Satan in a Lump, other Sects of Christian Protestants that do not agree with us, will hardly escape Perdition. And I might recommend it to you to be more charitable in that respect than many others are.... Benjamin Franklin, from a letter written in London to his sister Jane Mecom, January 9, 1760, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 9, pp. 17–18. 40 The American Revolution... Is it because you have left your native land at the risk of your lives and fortunes to toil for your mother country, to load her with wealth, that you are to be rewarded with a loss of your privileges? Are you not of the same stock? Was the blood of your ancestors polluted by a change of soil? Were they freemen in England and did they become slaves by a six-weeks’ voyage to America? Does not the sun shine as bright, our blood run as warm? Is not our honor and virtue as pure, our liberty as valuable, our property as dear, our lives as precious here as in England? Are we not subjects of the same King, and bound by the same laws, and have we not the same God for our protector? What, then, can you think of those abject Americans, those slaves by principle, those traitors to their own and posterity’s happiness, who, plunging the dagger into the vitals of their own liberty, do not blush at declaring that you are not entitled to the same security of property, the same rights and privileges of the freeborn subjects of England? Let me ask those enemies to your welfare, how much thereof are you entiled to? Who will measure out and distribute your poor pittance, your short allowance? Is a tenth, an hundredth, or a thousandth part to be the portion of your liberty? Abject, detestable thought! The poor African, who is taken captive in war and dragged an involuntary slave to Jamaica calls for your humanity and compassion; but the voluntary wretch that works out his own and posterity’s slavish condition for the sake of a little present lucre, promotion, or power
is an object deserving your deepest resentment, your highest indignation. Joseph Galloway (probably), from A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, &c., Philadelphia, 1760, in Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776, vol. 1, pp. 270–271.... The discouraging Sales I have generally got for all Tobos. [tobaccos] Shipped of my own growth, has induced me to dispose of my last year’s Crop in the Country, the price being good and certain, but this may not always happen, and while I can Ship without loss I shall always be glad to have it in my power of consigning you a part.... The French are so well Drubd, and seem so much humbled in America, that I apprehend our Generals will find it no difficult matter to reduce Canada to our Obedience this Summer, but what may be Montgomery’s Fate in the Cherokee Country I wont so readily determine. It seems he has made a prosperous beginning having penetrated into the Heart of the Country, and is now advancing his Troops in high health and Spirits to the relief of Fort Loudoun. But let him be wary, he has a crafty, Subtil Enemy to deal with that may give him most trouble when he least expects it. We are in pain here for the King of Prussia, and wish Hanover safe, these being Events in which we are much Interested. George Washington, from a letter written at Mount Vernon to London merchant Richard Washington, August 10, 1760, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2, pp. 344–345. I am not a little pleas’d to hear of your Change of Sentiments in some particulars relating to America; because I think it of Importance to our general Welfare that the People of this Nation should have right Notions of us, and I know no one that has it more in his Power to rectify their Notions, than Mr. Hume. I have lately read with great Pleasure, as I do every thing of yours, the excellent Essay on the Jealousy of Commerce. I think it cannot but have a good Effect in promoting a certain Interest too little thought of by selfish Man;... I mean the Interest of Humanity, or common Good of Mankind: But I hope particularly from that Essay, an Abatement of
Building, by means of Staples, so as it may be kept steady. Let the pointed End be upwards, and rise three or four Feet above the Chimney or Building that the Rod is fix’d to. Drive into the Ground an Iron Rod about an Inch Diameter, and ten or twelve feet long, that has also an Eye or Ring, in its upper End.... A Building thus guarded, will not be damaged by Lightning, nor any Person or Thing therein kill’d, hurt or set on fire... Benjamin Franklin, from a letter written in London to David Hume, January 21, 1762, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 10, pp. 17–18. I have sent off your Letter to Lord Marischal, who... is at present very much employd in settling the Controversy about the Eternity of Hell-Torments, which has set the little Republic of Neuf-chatel in Combustion. I have ventur’d to recommend to his Lordship the abridging these Torments as much as possible, and have usd the Freedom to employ your name, as well as my own, in this Request: I have told him, Prelude to Revolt 41 that, as we have taken so much Pains to preserve him and his Subjects from the Fires of Heaven, they cannot do less than guard us from the Fires of Hell. My Lord told me... that the King of Prussia could not at first be brought to regard this theological Controversy as a Matter of any Moment, but soon found... that these were not matters to be slighted. But surely, never was a Synod of Divines more ridiculous, than to be worrying one another, under the Arbitration of the King of Prussia and Lord Marischal, who will make an Object of Derision of every thing, that appears to these holy Men so deserving of Zeal, Passion, and Animosity. David Hume, from a letter written at Edinburgh to Benjamin Franklin, May 10, 1762, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 10, p. 81. Dear Sir: Soon after the Appraisement of the Decd. Colo. Custis’s Estate it seemed to be a matter of doubt whether Davy (a boy) who was appraised among his Negroes belonged to him,
or Mr. Dandridge your Father. Your Bro: then having, as I have understood, the Administration of his Affairs, conceived him to be the property of the latter and offered the boy to Mrs. Washington at the Appraisement price, which She agreed to, and I thought the thing had been concluded upon, but as it appeared to be a matter liable to dispute I intended to take the Courts direction’s upon it... until mentioning the Affair again to your Bro:, he told me that he now had nothing to do in it, and that I must speak to you about it.... I therefore take this method of knowing if it is agreable to you for me to take the boy at the Appraisd price, provided the Court shall adjudge the Right to him to lye in your Father... and as Mrs. Washington relinguished her right to a Childs part of the whole Estate, and seems desirous of making a Gardner of this boy, I imagine you will not be against it.... George Washington, from a letter written at Mount Vernon to Captain William Dandridge, May 20, 1762, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 2. pp. 375–376. Dear Sir: I am sorry to be the Messenger of ill news, but it is incumbent upon me to inform you of the Death of the Mare you committed to my care; how she died, I am able to give you but a very unsatisfactory acct., for on the 3d. Instt. I set out for Frederick and left her to all appearance as well as a Creature 42 The American Revolution could be... and on my return in 8 days time, I got the News of her death. She discovered no visible Signs of ailment as I am told in the morning of the 7th. when let out of the Stable, but before Night was swelled to a monstrous size and died in a few hours.... She had no Foal in her, which assures me that she never woud Breed. As I am convinced she had a competent share of Ariel’s performances; not content with which, She was often catched in amorious moods with a young horse of mine not withstanding my utmost endeavours to keep them asunder. You will feel the loss of this accident more sensibly, but cannot be more concerned at the acct. than I was

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